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ABSTRACT
Based on the assumption that further proliferation of nuclear weapons will jeopardize 
international peace and stability, the ways and means for restraining proliferation of nuclear 
weapons are extensively researched. The research is conducted at state level.
The framework of international efforts for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is 
identified as the n u clear  n on -proliferation  regim e. In that respect, the International Regimes 
Theory is exploited to a certain extent. The basic premises of the regimes theory furnished the 
necessary insights about the concepts of international regime formation, regime maintenance, 
and regime effectiveness. Hence, these concepts have then formed the background of the 
proposals for increasing the strength of the non-proliferation regime.
The degree of effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in inhibiting states from 
going nuclear is observed to have largely depended on the attitudes of the states that participated 
in the international negotiations which aimed at establishing the fundamental stones of the 
regime (e.g., the IAEA Statute, the NPT and the related IAEA safeguards document 
INFCIRC/153 ). Emergence and evolution of these elements of the non-proliferation regime are 
investigated, and the loopholes and shortcomings that came into view in practice are determined.
Despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of states have joined the ranks of international 
collaboration for halting the further spread of nuclear weapons, a group of states (hold-outs) 
have opted to stay far from the nuclear non-proliferation regime by putting forward numerous 
arguments, and went on to manufacture nuclear explosives. Likelihood of an increase in the 
number of such states in the short and medium terms (unless appropriate measures are taken to 
strengthen the regime) necessitated a research about various regional and bilateral nuclear 
restraint arrangements that would prove feasible for associating the hold-outs with the principles, 
norms, rules, as well as the decision-making procedures of the non-proliferation regime.
Regarding the recent developments in world affairs, measures are suggested to amplify the 
usefulness and the effectiveness of the essential elements of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. Moreover, measures with regard to several other issues that are not generally considered 
among these mainstays of the non-proliferation regime, but which are believed by the author to 
have an impact on the future performance of the regime, are also incorporated into the research.
ÖZET
Nükleer silahlann yayılmasının uluslararası barışı ve istikran tehdit ettiği yargısından hareketle, 
yayılmanın önlenmesi konusunda neler yapılması gerektiği hakkında önerilerde bulunmak 
amacıylakapsamlı bir araştırma yürütülmüştür. Araştırma ülkeler düzeyinde ele alınmıştır.
Nükleer yayılmaya karşı alınması gereken önlemler çerçevesinde oluşan uluslararası çabalar 
bütünü n ü kleer  s ilah lan n  yayılm asın ın  ön lenm esi rejimi olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu sebeple, 
araştırma sırasında yol gösterici olarak Uluslararası Rejim ler Teorisi'nin önermelerinden 
faydalanılmıştır. Böylece, bir uluslararası rejimin oluşması, sürdürülmesi, ve etkin bir yapıya 
kavuşturulması için neler yapılması gerektiği konularında en sağlam öngörüşlerin oluşturulması 
amaç edinilmiştir.
Yayılmanın önlenmesine yönelik çabaların etkinliği ülkelerin tutumlarına bağlı olarak sınırlı bir 
gelişme kaydetmiştir. Bu gerçek karşında, öncelikle söz konusu tutumlann sebepleri anlaşılmaya 
çalışılmış ve yayılmanın önlenmesi rejiminin izlediği gelişme çizgisi ortaya konulmuştur. Aynı 
zamanda, uluslararası anlaşmalar ve düzenlemelerde şikayet konusu olan ve rejimin daha etkin 
bir konuma getirilebilmesi için doldurulması gereken hukuki boşluklann ve yetersizliklerin neler 
olduğunun tespitine çalışılmıştır.
Uluslararası camianın büyük bir çoğunlukla benimsediği ve katıldığı yayılmanın önlenmesi 
rejimine rağmen, bir kısım ülke çeşitli sebepler öne sürerek bu kapsamda bir gayret içinde 
olmadıkları gibi, aksine bir davranışla nükleer silah üretme yoluna gitmişlerdir. Dolayısıyla, 
nükleer yayılmanın önlenmesi rejimi kısa ve orta vadede daha etkin bir yapıya kavuşturulmadığı 
takdirde sayılarının çok daha fazla olacağından endişe edilen bu gibi ülkelerin, yayılmanın 
önlenmesi prensibi dahilinde politikalar benimsemelerini sağlayabilmek amacıyla bu yönde 
örnek teşkil edebilecek değişik uluslararası düzenlemeler tanıtılmıştır.
Esas olarak, yakın geçmişte ve günümüzde dünyada meydana gelen olaylar da dikkate 
alındığında, yayılmanın önlenmesi rejimi çerçevesindeki uluslararası anlaşmaların ve kurumsal 
yapıların işlerliklerinin ve etkinliklerinin arttırılması için nelerin yapılması gerektiği yönünde 
öneriler ortaya konulmuştur. Ayrıca, genellikle yayılmanın önlenmesi rejimi dahilinde 
tanımlanmayan, ancak tez araştırmacısı tarafından rejimin geleceği üzerinde etkili olacağı 
düşünülen konular da tez çalışması kapsamına alınmıştır. Böylece, nükleer yayılmamn önlenmesi 
rejimi dahilinde veya haricinde olan ülkelerin, rejimin prensipleri, normları ve kuralları 
bağlamında hareket etmelerinin kesin olarak sağlanabilmesi için ne gibi önlemler alınması 
gerektiği hakkında görüşler belirtilmiştir.
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INTRODUCTION
The events that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union revealed that the bipolar international system was eroding and that 
a new era characterized with uncertainty was emerging. In the midst of the last 
decade prior to the third millermium, uncertainty still reigns. Scholars and policy 
makers are therefore very much concerned with what would most likely happen in 
the future in their fields of interest. Various issue areas are extensively researched 
with a new momentum, especially since the early 1990s, in the field of the spread of 
all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Towards the turn of the millennium, those 
who have thought that the end of the Cold War would also mean the end of serious 
confrontations in the international system have been terrified with the rise of the 
threat of weapons of mass destruction throughout the world. Radical regimes either 
have already acquired nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, or are likely to 
acquire them in the foreseeable future. Therefore, nuclear weapons, the most 
destructive and lethal among the existing weapons of mass destruction, constitute 
the focal point of this study with a view to search for the possibilities to halt and 
even to roll back their proliferation.
The phrase "nuclear proliferation" should indeed imply two kinds of 
proliferation. One is the so called vertical proliferation which means an increase in the 
number of the nuclear weapons in the military arsenals of the USA, the Russian 
Federation (inherited from the former Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, 
and the People's Republic of China. The other is horizontal proliferation, which means 
an increase in the number of states that possess nuclear weapons, beyond the five 
states noted above. This study is more concerned with the dangers of horizontal 
proliferation. The underlying assumption in this study is that the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, inter alia, is a serious threat to international peace and stability.
hence it should be overcome. There is, however, an ongoing debate among scholars 
and policy makers on the likely consequences of both the vertical and especially the 
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons for international peace and stability. 
Views expressed in this debate range from the demands for immediate 
dismantlement of the existing nuclear weapons to demands for providing complete 
freedom to states in their exploitation of nuclear energy. For instance, several 
scholarly writings argue, notwithstanding the basic assumption of this study, that 
further horizontal proliferation would contribute more to the maintenance of 
international peace and stability. In order to clarify the basic assumption of this 
study, this highly stimulating theoretical debate is introduced in Chapter I, to the 
extent that the of the study permits.
International attempts for halting the proliferation of nuclear \veapons in both 
senses (i.e., vertical and horizontal) have their roots in the initiative of the United 
Nations General Assembly which created with a resolution the Atomic Energy 
Commission (UNAEC) in 1946, a very short while later than nuclear weapons were 
used for the first and the last time in wartime conditions.^ The mandate of the 
UNAEC was to search for the possible peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to 
suggest ways to control the development of nuclear energy so as to prevent its 
diversion from civilian to military purposes. This short lived attempt was followed 
by the personal initiative of the then US President Eisenhower who proposed to 
establish an international authority in the field of atomic energy in his famous speech 
at the United Nations in 8 December 1953 for the purpose of promoting its world 
wide peaceful exploitation. The outcome of the follow-up negotiations in various 
international gatherings was the establishment of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) in 1957 with its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The treat}· creating *
*In fact, the first nuclear explosive device was detonated in 16 July 1945 at Alamogordo Desert, 
Los Alamos, New Mexico, in the United States. This event is also known as the 'Trinity' test. The 
device had an explosive power of 21 kiloton or an energy equivalent to about 21 tons of TNT.
the IAEA, however, did not contain any promise by the states to refrain from 
acquiring nuclear weapons, or from conducting nuclear activities outside Agency 
channels free of safeguards. Hence, to fill in the loopholes in the IAEA Statute, the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was painstakingly 
drafted in the 1960s by a group of countries led by the Uruted States and the Soviet 
Union. The NPT was then opened to signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. 
The principal purpose of the NPT was to prevent diversion of nuclear energy from 
civilian to military purposes by the states that hitherto did not possess nuclear 
weapons. Accordingly, the NPT aimed at gaining widespread acceptance of the 
safeguards of the IAEA for controlling as well as promoting peaceful development 
of nuclear energy all over the world. The drafters of the NPT, however, 
differentiated among the states party to the Treaty. The states that had detonated a 
nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967 were recognized in the Treaty as 
nuclear-iueapon states.^ And, the rest of the states were identified as non-nuclear- 
weapon states. Withstanding this differentiation, the nuclear-weapon states that 
became party to the Treaty solemnly undertook with Article I of the NPT "... not to 
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ... 
and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons ..." Consequently, with Article II of 
the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty undertook "... not to 
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever o f nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices ... not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons ... and not to 
seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture o f nuclear weapons ..." These phrases 
incarnated the basic principles and norms as well as the rules that would be 
eventually adapted by a great majority of states.^
^The United States was the first state that detonated a nuclear explosive device in 1945. The Soviet 
Union followed suit in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960 and the People's 
Republic of China in 1964. These five states which are also the permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council are counted as de jure nuclear-weapon states.
^So far, more than 170 countries have adhered to the NPT.
States that adhered to the NPT are obliged to comply with its terms fully. And, 
the task of the verification of compliance of non-nuclear-weapon states with their 
basic undertaking defined as not to divert nuclear energy from civilian to military 
purposes is conferred to the IAEA. Unlike the loose safeguards requirements of the 
IAEA's preliminary docum ents^ the Agency was then granted, with Article III of the 
NPT, necessary authority to carry out comprehensive (full-scope) safeguards 
inspections. These inspections were sought to encompass every installation of states 
party to the Treaty that contained nuclear material. In theory, everything seemed to 
work well. Because, the IAEA was settled as an organization technically and 
scientifically competent enough to accomplish its basic task. And, since the states 
party to the NPT were supposed to submit all of their nuclear materials to 
international controls, then the Agency would certainly determine whether any 
diversion in the status of the nuclear material happened to take place or not. Hence, 
world wide peaceful development of nuclear energy could be ascertained.
Nevertheless, theory did not fit praxis. Because, according to the terms of the 
bilateral safeguards agreements concluded between the IAEA and the non-nuclear- 
weapon states party to the NPT, these states are required to declare to the IAEA the 
exact locations of their nuclear installations and the initial inventory of nuclear 
material contained within. Then, the IAEA is authorized to schedule and implement 
safeguards inspections by relying only on the information supplied by the states.^ 
This clearly means that the IAEA can be deceived by a state determined to 
manufacture nuclear weapons clandestinely, simply by not supplying the Agency
^Prior to the IAEA safeguards document drafted in 1971 in connection with the requirements of 
the NPT (INFCIRC/153), the Agency was granted a limited authority to carry out inspections in 
states' nuclear facilities only in the following cases: (1) if a state received assistance from the IAEA 
(either nuclear material or technological aid); (2) if a state that provided assistance, instead of the 
IAEA, to a receiver state made its assistance conditional on IAEA's safeguards inspections; (3) if a 
state voluntarily asked for IAEA inspections in its installations. In all these cases inspections had 
to be confined to assistance provided to the states. These inspections were not comprehensive. 
^During the inspections the IAEA inspectors apply simple material accountancy techniques to the 
nuclear material to determine whether any significant amount of nuclear material is missing, or 
not. Inspections are conducted in restricted areas within the facilities called material balance areas.
with accurate information. The liability of the IAEA to rely on the declaration of 
states is therefore one major deficiency of the safeguards agreements. Only in rare 
instances the Board of Governors of the IAEA may call a state for conducting special 
inspections which are however normally limited to the declared sites.^ A second 
difficulty in the same regard is that, even if a state accurately accommodates an initial 
declaration to the IAEA, it may create frictions for obstructing timely and effective 
implementation of safeguards inspections.^ The principle of sovereignty and the 
sensitivity of the states to their domestic jurisdiction gave way to such defects in the 
above noted internationally agreed documents.
Another indication of discrepancy between the theory and praxis is the 
emergence of the de facto nuclear-weapons states such as Israel, India, and Pakistan, 
all of which rejected the NPT membership by putting forward different arguments.^ 
Similarly, it has recently been made public that until 1992 South Africa was indeed 
among this group of states.^ In the same vein, states like Argentina, Brazil, Algeria, 
and North Korea have all opted to stay clear from the NPT. The nuclear 
programmes of this group of states were not as significant as those of the states 
noted above, but they were still considered as threshold states. Consequently, the
^According to its Statute and the terms of the safeguards agreement applicable to the states party 
to the NPT, the IAEA has no power to have access to the suspected sites in a state without the 
consent of the host state. Direct enforcement measures are beyond the mandate of the IAEA. 
^Either by objecting to the inspectors' nationalities or by not providing reliable escort services, 
and the like, states may seriously delay inspections, and the time gained may be significant from 
the military point of view. Based on the degree of suspicion, the IAEA may ask more frequent 
inspection from several states. But, the frequency of inspections is negotiated between the parties, 
hence no unilateral encroachment is possible. In a protracted conflict, however, the IAEA is not 
totally powerless. Indicating such a circumstance, through its Board of Governors, ultimately to 
the UN Security Council, the IAEA may then take several measures for the fulfilment of its task, 
as it was the case in North Korea.
^Although none of these states formally acknowledged the existence of nuclear weapons in their 
arsenals in varying quantities and payloads, in the nuclear (non-)proliferation literature there exist 
a plethora of articles and reports that make it certain for the international community to believe in 
the existence of these weapons in the states mentioned.
^The South African President Frederick De Klerk had declared in March 1993 prior to leaving 
the office to his successor Nelson Mandela, leader of the black majority, that they manufactured 
six nuclear weapons in South Africa and the seventh was underway, but they dismantled all of the 
weapons together with their test sites and that they converted their nuclear installations for civilian 
goods manufacturing. Then, South Africa adhered to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
basic principles and norms which were brought into practice by the terms of the 
NPT could not be made applicable to this category of states.
Ever since the very presence of nuclear weapons on earth, those who believed 
in the necessity and urgency of the struggle against the danger of nuclear 
proliferation have developed different non-proliferation instruments such as the 
nuclear-weapons-free zones or zones of peace, and bilateral/multilateral nuclear 
restraint agreements. These instruments have become effective, to some extent, in 
widening the scope of the efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and nuclear 
material and technology used in the manufacture of such weapons. These efforts 
have eventually culminated in what is called the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 
IAEA Statute and its safeguards together with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
are regarded as the "backbone" of the non-proliferation regime. Apart from these, 
several other institutions such as EURATOMI^, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco^l had 
already been established prior to the NPT. Some other important elements of the 
regime are also established as reactions to the post NPT developments in the field of 
nuclear industry. Their "raison d’être" was to cope with the loopholes and 
shortcomings of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The establishment of the 
Zangger Committee, and the emergence of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (the 
London Club) are such developm ents.O ther nuclear-weapon-free zones and the 
zones of peace in various parts of the globe are also considered within the context of 
the non-proliferation regime. Similarly, ABACC^^ as the outcome of the bilateral 
nuclear cooperation agreement signed in 1991 between two threshold states, namely
l^European Atomic Energy Community.
 ^ ^The Treaty of TIatelolco emerged as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the 
Caribbean encompassing a large inhabited region.
^^The Zangger Committe, named for its Swiss chair Prof. Claude Zangger, and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group shared in common the purpose of limiting the transfer of significant material 
and technology to states that are suspected for being engaged in clandestine nuclear weapons 
manufacturing.
^^Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.
Argentina and Brazil, has become one of the most efficient and successful elements 
of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Notwithstanding the efforts spent for associating the hold outs with the non­
proliferation principle of the regime, the disclosure of the clandestine nuclear 
weapons manufacturing programme of Iraq as an insider has unequivocally 
displayed the weaknesses of the regime.14 Successive inspections of the UN Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) created by the UN Security Council Resolution 687 in the 
aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 evidenced that Iraq had long violated its basic 
undertakings set out in the articles of the NPT. It has then become clear that Iraq 
procured large amounts of nuclear materials and various technological products 
from abroad but did not submit them to IAEA inspection. Such an act was strictly 
prohibited by the terms of the NPT. Iraq "succeeded" to overcome the obstacles set 
by the international nuclear export guidelines restricting transfers of significant 
nuclear materials. Hence, neither the binding terms of the NPT nor the "gentlemen's 
agreements" on nuclear exports have proved successful in hindering a determined 
state from materializing its nuclear ambitions. This is a dramatic indication of the 
failure of a "grandiose" regime.15 This study, therefore, contends that with its 
present structure the nuclear non-proliferation regime is at a crossroads, and that the pace 
of the developments in this field will determine the fate of the non-proliferation 
regime which may have serious repercussions for international peace and stability. 
In conformity with the underlying assumption in this study that the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is a serious threat to international peace and stability, it is asserted 
that a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime will contribute more to the
l^lraq is a state party to the NPT since 1969.
is interesting to note at this stage that in the nuclear non-proliferation literature the definition 
of the non-proliferation regime is not unique, especially as regards what the elements of the 
regime are. Therefore, this study principally aimed at bringing clarity to the context of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. That context determined the ground for further discussion on 
how to strengthen the regime.
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maintenance o f international peace and stability. Because, it is equally believed that, the 
weaker the regime is perceived by its adherents, the more will be the likelihood o f states to 
defect from the regime. Such an umvanted developments may prompt more and more 
states to defect from the regime and to go nuclear if they lose their faith in the 
effectiveness and usefulness of the regime.
Bearing in mind that what is at stake is an international regime, the 
fundamental characteristics of international regimes are identified in Chapter II in 
order to become familiar with such concepts as regime formation, regime effectiveness, 
and regime maintenance. A clear understanding of these concepts is thought to be 
useful so as to put forward proposals for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. Hence, the theoretical discussion in Chapter II cross cutting a wide literature 
on the theory of international regimes is confined to this limited objective. Extensive 
and in depth discussion on theory of international regimes is beyond the scope and 
the purpose of this study. The brief investigation of what the theory of international 
regimes would imply for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
provided several valuable inferences. One, as Stephen ICrasner put it, is to improve the 
principles and norms o f the regime so as to improve its effectiveness. This conclusion, 
however, did not prove feasible for the case of nuclear non-proliferation. Because, 
the principles and norms of the non-proliferation regime are basically found in the 
Preamble and the Articles of the NPT, and the NPT is decided to remain in force as it 
exists "indefinitely and unconditionally" in the Review and Extension Conference 
held at the United Nations in New York in April/May 1995.1^ The implication of the
^^Since the entry into force of the NPT in 1970, Review Conferences were held in five-year 
periods. Issues pertaining to the implementation of the terms of the Treaty as well as the 
complaints and suggestions of the states party to the Treaty are discussed by and large during 
these conferences. Opposition of several countries sometimes made it difficult to come up with 
final declarations. Twenty-five years after the entry into force, states party to the NPT had to 
decide, according to the Article X(2) of the Treaty, on how to extend the Treaty. Prior to the 
Extension Conference, some countries held the view that the extension should be made contingent 
on the fulfilment of certain conditions, particularly by the nuclear-weapons states. But, their hopes 
did not materialize. No amendment was made in the Treaty articles.
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decision is that, what Krasner suggested would hardly be p o s s i b l e . Another 
deduction from the study of theory of international regimes, inter alia, is what 
Robert Jervis postulated: perception o f the future contingencies may have a strong impact 
on the maintenance and effectiveness o f the regime. Implication of this deduction for the 
subject matter of this study is that unless the non-proliferation regime is strengthened, 
defects o f several militarily significant countries from the regime can be highly likely.
With these in mind, the principal purpose of this study is to suggest ways for 
strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Accordingly, answers are 
sought to the following questions:
1.. . What are the elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime ?
2.. . What is the significance of the elements of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime for the operation and overall effectiveness of the regime ?
3.. . What are the loopholes and shortcomings of the non-proliferation regime ?
4.. . What should be done to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime ?
To come up with appropriate proposals to strengthen the nuclear non­
proliferation regime, the life-cycles of the regime’s elements are analysed. Such a 
comprehensive research is undertaken in Part II which includes chapters on the 
emergence and evolution o f nuclear safeguards (Chapter III) and the IAEA safeguards 
documents (Chapter IV) as well as chapters which cover the emergence and evolution o f 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Chapter V) and the IAEA safeguards document 
drafted in connection with requirements of the NPT called the model agreement 
INFCIRC/153 (Chapter VI). That research revealed the loopholes and shortcomings of 
the non-proliferation regime. It equally revealed that the attitudes and the official 
stance o f the states concerned had a great impact on the evolution and the effectiveness o f the
1 ^ Nevertheless, injection of renewed norms, if not principles, into the regime framework could be 
helpful. This has been an inspiration factor in working out Part III and Part IV of this study.
international efforts for preventing diversion o f nuclear energy from civilian to military 
purposes. The political, economic, military as well as sociological factors which are 
said to have adversely affected the dispositions of several threshold states vis-à-vis 
the others that adhered to the NPT are reconsidered in Part III with a view to see 
what would be achievable for associating these hold outs with the basic principles and 
norms of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this regard, the concepts of 
nuclear-ioeapons-free zones and zones o f peace (Chapter VII) as well as studies on 
successful regional nuclear restraint agreements (Chapter VIII) are presented as 
auxiliary elements o f the nuclear non-proliferation regime.^^ The issues considered in Part 
II and Part III prompted further deliberations in Part IV in order to search for the 
proposals for a fully strengthened and hence effectively functioning nuclear non­
proliferation regime. Several issue areas that this study considers within the broader 
context of the non-proliferation regime are therefore brought into discussion. 
Accordingly, Chapter IX investigated, first of all, the prospects for enhanced inspection 
and verification provisions under the NPT and the current safeguards agreements. 
Then, it is basically encharged with suggesting remedies to the shortcomings of the 
IAEA provisions that are largely presented in Part II. Chapter X, on the other hand, 
covered the external issues that are thought to be likely to pose as great a threat to 
the maintenance and effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as the 
internal ones already enumerated. The reason for expanding the scope of the study 
is that, in the world of 1990s it seems more probable for the nuclear have-nots to 
have access to nuclear material, technology, and know-how if they are determined 
to manufacture nuclear explosives. Hence, supplementary preventive measures are 
urgently needed to be taken by the international community. Measures that are 
discussed in Chapter X are generally accorded, within the non-proliferation 
community, to have impact on the strength of the non-proliferation regime, even
^^The logic behind incorporating Part III into this study is indeed as simple as supplementing a 
malfunctioning mechanism with more operational and more efficient spare parts.
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though they may not necessarily be linked to the NPT or the IAEA documents.^^ 
This study resumed with the Conclusion where an overall evaluation of the study is 
made and where the answers to the questions presented in the Introduction are 
outlined. Two Appendices followed suit which are intended to provide the reader 
with sufficient and understandable technical information about the characteristics o f 
atomic bombs (Appendix A) and manufacturing nuclear weapons & nuclear fuel cycle 
(Appendix B).
This analytical and descriptive study where states are taken as the unit levels, 
required references to a good deal of primary sources (mostly the lAEA-UN 
documentation) and several books which are considered by the author as worthy as 
primary sources written by the scholars or scientists as Allan McKnight, Lawrence 
Scheinman, Benjamin Sanders, Jan Prawitz, George Bunn, Roland Timerbaev, 
Mohamed Shaker, and David Fischer, all of whom have taken active parts in the 
making of the principal elements of the non-proliferation regime while drafting the 
articles of the NPT, and the Statute of the IAEA and its safeguards documents. For 
setting the research on a right track prominent scholars in the nuclear non­
proliferation field as Prof. Jozef Goldblat (Geneva Graduate Institute of International 
Studies); Prof. John Simpson and Dr. Darryl Howlett (Mountbatten Centre for 
International Studies); Mr. Sverre Lodgaard, Prof. Serge Sur, and Dr. Virginia 
Gamba (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research -UNIDIR); Dr. Jan 
Prawitz (Swedish Institute of International Affairs); Dr. Edward Laurance (Monterey 
Institute of International Studies); Mr. James Leonard (Washington Council on Non- 
Proliferation); and Ms. Astrid Forland (University of Bergen) are consulted at 
different stages of the research either through personal interviews and/or by kindly
1 ^Essentials of these issues are: achieving a comprehensive nuclear test han treaty, containing the 
flow  of the nuclear fissile material & know-how; halting the production of weapons-usable 
materials {cut-off treaty)', gathering reliable intelligence·, and negative or positive security 
assurances to non-nuclear weapons states by de jure nuclear powers.
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asking them to comment on the drafts of this study. These consultations, most of 
which have taken place in Geneva during the author's fellowship at UNIDIR, have 
been the most helpful in giving the research its final structure. Besides, publications 
of the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (Programme for Promoting 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation -PPNN series)20 and the publications of the Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (The 
Nonproliferation Review) have provided the author with the most sophisticated 
writings and up-to-date information, and contributed to his comprehension of the 
problems of nuclear non-proliferation.
20ppNN Study Series, PPNN Occasional Papers, PPNN Issue Reviews, and PPNN Newsbriefs.
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C H A PTER  I. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION : ISSUES & DEBATES
Following the disclosure of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program, 
and the evidences that "proved" North Korea's engagements for manufacturing 
nuclear weapons, the debate over the proliferation policies, which was comparably 
dormant, has grown substantially in the recent years. Not only these events, but 
also the declaration of the South African government that they once possessed 
nuclear weapons but have dismantled the technology and the bombs; and the 
emergence of three de facto nuclear-weapons states namely, Ukraine, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus, out of the former Soviet Union, also brought about diverse theoretical 
approaches to the nuclear (non-)proliferation issues. In general, one can identify 
several schools of thoughts amongst the scholars, scientists, and policy makers 
regarding their approaches to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And, these 
approaches are mainly divided into two broad categories based on whether the 
scholars and policy-makers think nuclear proliferation is evitable, or inevitable. 
Accordingly, parties to the debate are further divided within their categories based 
on what they think might or should happen in the future. Hence, the lines of actions 
that are likely to be advocated and/or proposed by the proponents of each 
argument are, in a way, dependent on their expectation about the probability of 
dissemination of nuclear weapons in the future. Since, he who assumes that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is inevitable may either seek and suggest ways to 
manage proliferation, or may, on the contrary, endorse the idea that presence of 
nuclear weapons at the hands of many states will deter other states from attacking 
them, and will therefore preserve international stability.21
2lThe contention on the fate of nuclear weapons (i.e., whether proliferation is evitable or not) is 
also an important factor for the maintenance and effective operation of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime. As it will be discussed in the next chapter, the degree of coherence of the 
states around the principles and norms of the non-proliferation regime is dependent, among
14
R... "Nuclear Proliferation is Euitable...."
Among those scholars and policy makers who believe that nuclear 
proliferation is evitable, one can clearly identify, first of all, those ^vho believe that 
proliferation can be halted and rolled back if proper steps are taken. This group of 
scholars contend that exisiting non-nuclear-weapons states can be persuaded to 
abstain from developing nuclear weapons. Hence, they believe that nuclear 
proliferation can be reversed.
1.. . " Proliferation can be Reversed....**
This group of theorists and policy makers define an all-out %vinning strategy 
and believe that nuclear proliferation can be reversed. Amongst them, Thomas 
Graham, for instance, argues that the battle against nuclear proliferation has gone 
far better than was previously predicted. Graham believes that international non­
proliferation efforts have been extremely successful noting that winning the battle is 
not just theory but it has been a fact, and lists several successes of the non­
proliferation regime.22 These successes, according to Graham, can be outlined as 
follows;
1.. . France and China have agreed to sign the NPT;
2.. . South Africa has abandoned its nuclear weapons program;
3.. . Approximately 170 countries are parties to the NPT;23
4.. . Argentina and Brazil have agreed to comprehensive safeguards on their 
nuclear facilities;^^
others, on the consideration of states whether the regime is likely to persist or not, and whether it 
will succeed to undermine the danger of further proliferation, or will fail to do so.
22xhomas Graham, "Winning the Nonproliferation Battle", Arms Control Today. 1991, vol.7, pp: 
8 -13.
23xhe number of the member states to the NPT is reached a figure like 168 with the previous 
adherence of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the recent accession of Ukraine in 5 December 1994, 
during the CSCE summit meetings in Budapest. Hungary.
24At the end of the process which has culminated in the signing of the agreement on establishing 
the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC), the 
Argentine Parliament ratified, in February 1995, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Though 
the Brazilian Parliament did not take a similar action with regard to the formal accession to NFT,
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5... Allied victory in "Desert Storm" in the Persian Gulf led to the destruction of 
most, if not all, of the Iraqi nuclear facilities and nuclear capabilities. This was 
followed by the IAEA’s successfully conducted challenge and on-site inspections 
against a hostile state, for the first time in safeguards implementation history.
a. .. optimistic approach.
The logic of the winning view on nuclear non-proliferation is based on several 
considerations. In the past decades the proliferation problem has been limited to no 
more than forty states that were thought to be capable of going nuclear. Most of 
these states have opted to stay clear of such weapons, including those that were 
considered possible problem states some twenty years ago (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, 
South Korea, and Taiwan). Thus, most states have acquired nuclear weapons 
capacity far more slowly than previously predicted. Alternative sources of power 
appeared to be more cost effective leading many states to curtail or discontinue 
nuclear power projects and nuclear research. The high economic cost of developing 
nuclear weapons, and the strength of international norms against proliferation also 
appeared to be acting as effective deterrents.^5 There is, therefore, a group of 
scholars and policy makers who believe that there are rooms for being optimistic 
about the future of the regime.
b. .. pessimistic approach.
On the other hand, among the first group who believe that proliferation is 
evitable and it can be reversed, there are nonetheless those who are rather 
pessimistic regarding what might happen in the future. These scholars argue that all 
additional nuclear proliferation should be opposed. For instance, James Leonard,
their commitments under the terms of the bilateral ABACC agreement is believed to highly satisfy 
the expectations of the international community in these respects.
25oarry R. Schneider, "Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: Policy Issues and 
Debates", Mershon International Studies Review, 1994, No: 38, pp: 209-234.
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Adam Scheinman and Ben Sanders see that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a reality, 
and they point to the fact that approximately 170 countries have signed the NPT.^^ 
Having sworn that they would not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, these states 
must have, accordingly and presumably, put their nuclear installations and all source 
and fissile materials under the IAEA safeguards inspections. However, the actual 
implementation reports of the IAEA shows that this is not totally the case for many 
reluctant states. Therefore, such a circumstance leads a group of concerned scholars 
and scientists to a certain degree of pessimism.^^ Pessimists, therefore, do equally 
stress the utmost importance they pay to strengthening the non-proliferation 
regime with all its aspects, for the effective implementation of the terms of the NPT, 
and for the proper fulfilment of the requirements of the comprehensive safeguards 
agreements that must be concluded between the states and the IAEA.
ii... "Selective Proliferation Promotes Stability...."
There is a somewhat contradictory vie\vpoint to the ones mentioned above 
coming from a group of scholars and policy makers who confirm that nuclear 
proliferation is evitable, but also take on a rather selective approach, on the other. 
The proponents of the selective approach do believe in deliberately permitting some 
friendly states to proliferate while hindering some hostile destabilizers. Therefore, they 
base their argument on a clear differentiation between destabilizing and stabilizing 
proliferators. According to this point of view, states like Iran and North Korea, for 
instance, should be prevented from possessing nuclear weapons while not 
interfering with such states like Ukraine and Pakistan. Since, according to this school
^^See, James F. Leonard, Adam Scheinman, & Ben Sanders, "Towards 1995: A U.S. Arms 
Control Agenda for the Run-Up to the NPT Extension Conference", Consensus Report. WCNP 
Working Paper No; 3, Washington Council On Non-Proliferation, Washington. D.C., July 1993; 
See also, James F. Leonard, "Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the Post-Cold War 
World", WCNP Working Paper, No: 1, Washington Council On Non-Proliferation, Washington, 
D.C., October 1992.
2^The number of states which have concluded comprehesive safeguards agreements with the 
IAEA within the time limit prescribed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty is unfortunately is far below 
the expected number. See Annual Report of the IAEA, 1993. International Atomic Energy 
Agency Publications, Vienna, Austria.
17
of thought, the latter two states pose no threat to United States' interests and act as 
stabilizers off-setting the power of their regional rivals namely, Russia and India. 
Stephen van Evera and John Mearshimer were among the proponents of this view 
in the early 1990s.^8 The proponents of this selectivist school suggest that, instead of 
applying sanctions against any new would-be nuclear state, or trying to dissuade 
them from taking a nuclear path, each case should be addressed on its own merits. 
Hence, states that are only looking to protect themselves from a regional threat 
should be left alone and should be allowed to acquire a nuclear deterrent. In these 
regards, the so-called selectivists pursue a different type of international nuclear 
non-proliferation regime that would enable states to differentiate between stabilizing 
and destabilizing nuclear proliferators.
a... doubts about regime robustness.
Such a selectivist view would nonetheless be seriously criticized, first of all, by 
simply inquiring regime robustness. Since, it has been argued in some scholarly 
writings that compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime is weak when 
compared to the relative robustness of, for instance, the Conventional Arms 
Reduction Regime, and the Operational Arms Control Regime.29 Hence, Frank 
Schimmelfenning pointed out that, the weakness of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime consisted of the fact that, in the two years that followed the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the majority of the post-Soviet States had not signed the NPT. Thus, 
Schimmelfenning made this delay a crucial case for the evaluation of the robustness
^^Stephen van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War", International Security. 
1990, vol: 3, pp:7 -57; John J. Mearshimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent", Foreign  
A ^ irs, 1993, vol: 3. pp: 50 - 66;
^ ^ h e  Conventional Arms Control Regime is based on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in 
Europe signed at the Paris CSCE summit by the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1990. 
Its basic principles are; non-aggression, a stable balance of conventional armed forces, elimination 
of capabilities for launching surprise attack. The Operational Arms Control Regime, on the other 
hand, is based on the Confidence and Security Building Measures of the CSCE, whose principles 
are; war prevention by reducing the risk of surprise attack, non-aggression, and peaceful 
settlement of conflicts.
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of the non-proliferation regime.^O It may be interesting to briefly touch upon a 
debate between two remarkable scholars at this stage in brackets. The article of 
Schimmelfenning prompted a response from Harald Müller with his article in which 
he argued that the nuclear non-proliferation regime has been considerably 
strengthened since early 1991, the date of the revelations about Iraq’s nuclear 
weapons programme.31 Harald Müller also questioned Schimmelfennig’s 
conception of regime robustness and asserts that what his colleague measured was, 
in effect, regime attractiveness rather than robustness. Müller then gave his own 
conception on the same issue in a very comprehensive fashion, and suggested 
Schimmelfenning to refine his terminology and methodology applied in his research 
so as to avoid traps that lead, according to Müller, to unjustified conclusions. 
Counterarguments of Müller have expectedly faced siir-counter arguments of 
Schimmelfenning where he mostly defended his previous position but also 
acknowledged that MüUer's criticism was indeed relevant but not conclusive.32
b... doubts about the criteinafor selection.
Another point to be critical on the selectivist view would be the necessity to 
determine the decision-making procedure which would reach a consensus 
concerning the countries that would be allowed to proliferate. It was not always 
(and still is not) the case for all the members of the international community to share 
similar views with regard to the behaviours of other states in the international 
arena, and the measures, if needed, that should be taken against them. For instance, 
during the widely opposed aggression of Iraq towards its neighbour Kuwait in 
August 1990, not all the states adopted similar policies to recognize or to counter
^^Frank Schimmelfenning, "Arms Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union: 
Realism, Institutionalism and Regime Robustness", Cooperation and Conflict. London, SAGE 
Publications, 1994, vol: 29, No: 2, pp: 115-148.
 ^^Harald Müller, "Regime Robustness, Regime Attractivity and Arms Control Regimes in Europe", 
Cooperation and Conflict, London, SAGE Publications, 1995, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp: 287-297. 
32prank Schimmelfenning, "New States, Old Regimes, Short Time: A Rejoinder", Cooperation  
and Conflict. London, SAGE Publications, 1995, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp: 299-303.
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aggression.33 Similarly, international collaboration could not be easily achieved over 
the years for determining and then stopping the Serbian aggression against the 
other former Yugoslav Republics.34 The proponents of the select!vist approach 
should also demonstrate how the international norm against nuclear proliferation 
can be preserved if it is suddenly acceptable for any state to produce nuclear 
weapons, provided its leadership is not hostile or aggressive, and what happens if 
the friendly state that was permitted to acquire nuclear arms changes its leadership, 
and the new regime is hostile.35 Moreover, whose friends will be allowed to 
progress in the nuclear field remains problematic. With the sudden and drastic 
change in international political structure following the break up of the Soviet Union, 
old enemies are said to become new friends and even partners, while some good- 
old friends have lost their significance. Even this much of evidence should accelerate 
the efforts for halting assistance in the manufacturing process of the weapon per se, 
and the efforts to counter the spread of nuclear technology, know-how and fissile 
materials that are likely to be destined to being used for non-peaceful purposes.
B... "Nuclear Proliferation is Ineuitable...."
The second broad grouping among the theorists and policy makers with 
respect to their approaches to nuclear proliferation consists of those who share the 
fundamental view that nuclear proliferation is inevitable. Among them some are
^^Particularly in France, there was a strong commitment by a good number of politicians and 
political institutions as well as the public conscious to urge the French government use its veto 
power in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions which decided to impose economic 
embargo against Iraq.
3^Many influencial states in international politics have long considered the events as internal 
affairs of Yugoslavia, hence acted accordingly. Such a policy has long stagnated an effective 
international response to aggression.
2^0ne should bear in mind that the Islamic fundamentalists gained support in several states like 
Egypt, Algeria and Pakistan, of which the latter is strongly believed to have already assembled a 
nuclear explosive device. Moreover, there are allegations associated with Iran’s nuclear activities 
which mostly center on the recent nuclear engagements with Russia and China, all three of which 
are party to the NPT. Parties to this nuclear deal cannot perfectly assure the international 
community that these engagements will not turn out to be a part of the efforts to build a so-called 
Islamic bomb with a universal appeal to the Muslim world. See, Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear 
Ambitions: The Spread o f  Nuclear Weapons /9S9-/993, Westview Press, Boulder: Colorado, 1990.
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rather optimistic, and though they perceive that the spread of nuclear weapons is 
inevitable, they also believe that proliferation can be managed and controlled.
i... "Nuclear Proliferation can be Managed...."
Proponents of this school have formulated policies to contain and manage 
nuclear proliferation, and they have done a great deal to point to the dangers of 
nuclear proliferation.^^ Among the international relations theorists, those 
embracing the realist school (i.e., those who predict that states seek to acquire all 
appropriate power to solve their security dilemmas in an international system 
characterized by self-help and anarchy), tend to favour the management approach 
to nuclear proliferation. They accordingly see nuclear weapons acquisition as normal 
and inevitable. However, these scholars do also contend that unless controls are 
imposed, an uncontrolled arms race may result in military postures that may be 
extremely destabilizing and may indeed lead to war in the event of a crisis in which 
war might have been avoided if the parties to the conflicts had chosen different 
military postures.37 In this regard, the realist theory of international relations does 
not say that states blindly maximize their power regardless of the consequences. 
Restraint and cooperation can also increase power. Therefore, states may follow a 
non-proliferation policy and may join the NPT seeking to manage what is 
happening in order to ensure their status and power vis-à-vis perceived rivals. 
Disagreeing this, there are some scholars who believe that the formal acceptance of 
the nuclear non-proliferation obligation under the NPT could well be used as a 
stratagem for enhancing one’s own ability to mount a nuclear attack or use nuclear
2^See for example, Dagobert L. Brito, Michael D. Intriligator & Adele E. Wicks, Strategies fo r  
Managing Nuclear Proliferation, Lexington, Mass:. Lexington Books, 1983; Lewis A. Dunn, 1991, 
"Containing Nuclear Proliferation", Adelphi Paper, No: 263, London: Brassey's for IISS; Leonard 
Spector, 1992, "Repentant Nuclear Proliférants", Foreign Policy, No: 88, pp: 3 -20; Brad Roberts, 
"From Nonproliferation to Anti proliferation", International Security, 1993. vol:l, pp:139 -173. 
^”^ See. Hedley Bull, The Control o f  Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age, 
Praeger, New York, 1961; Also see. Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms 
Control, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961.
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means to defend oneself to deter an attack.38 Thus accepting the NPT and using this 
formal commitment as a cloak for acquiring the means to manufacture nuclear 
weapons may enable some states to counter the forces of a nuclear armed 
antagonist and to intimidate rivals that have chosen to abstain from nuclear 
'iveapons in the expectation that the same commitments would be honoured. This 
perverse motivation is said to have been advanced by many to explain the Iraqi, 
Libyan, and the North Korean accession to the NPT.39 Regarding such and the 
previously mentioned events in the international arena, the view that nuclear 
proliferation can only be managed gains strength. However, those who hold such a 
view are not totally pessimistic, since they believe that these events at least raise the 
level of public consciousness and facilitate the development of ways to prevent the 
probable worst outcomes, and to keep nuclear proliferation under control.
ii... "Nuclear Proliferation is Favourable...."
Among the scholars and policy makers who share the basic argument that 
nuclear proliferation is inevitable, there exists one school of thought whose 
proponents are said to be pro-proliferationist. They mainly contend that a certain 
degree of nuclear proliferation is favourable for the preservation of international 
security and stability. This is the most controversial view towards nuclear non­
proliferation and thus inflicted a fundamental debate among the scholars and policy 
makers. Though most people believe that there is a common global interest in 
preventing further nuclear proliferation, it is not in the interest of everybody that 
the spread of nuclear weapons is not desirable. Therefore, a group of political 
scientists have argued that further spread of such weapons can be a stabilizing factor 
in international relations. In this respect, Kenneth Waltz presented the first detailed
3^See, Harald Müller, David Fischer & Wolgang Kötter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and G lobal 
Order, New York, Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1994.
39lbid., p. 4.
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and forceful set of arguments in favour of nuclear proliferation.^O Waltz's 
arguments rest on the "rational model of nuclear deterrence" which is often credited 
with preserving peace between superpowers. Therefore, Waltz questions, "If nuclear 
weapons produced prudence between the two antagonistic superpowers, why 
would they not do the same for other nations ?” The same apparent contradiction 
which lies at the center of this understanding about nuclear weapons is also 
emphasized by Scott D. Sagan.'^  ^ However, Sagan argued that, while on the one 
hand it is widely believed that nuclear weapons were an important factor in 
maintaining the long peace between the superpowers during the Cold War and 
avoided war despite a deep geopolitical rivalry and repeated crisis, it is also believed, 
on the other hand that the continuing spread of nuclear weapons will greatly 
increase the risks of nuclear war.^2
Those political scientists, whose conceptualization is in favour of a certain 
degree of proliferation for preserving political stability throughout the ^vorld, base 
their argument on the contradiction between the peaceful nuclear past and a fearful 
nuclear future. Among them, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, for 
instance, advocated proliferation of nuclear weapons into areas where non-nuclear- 
weapons states face nuclear armed adversaries. They assert that the chances of a 
bilateral conflict to become nuclear decrease to zero when all nations are nuclear 
armed.43 By the same token, John Mearshimer perceives nuclear weapons as a 
"superb deterrent" and argued that Germany and Ukraine should be encouraged to
'^^Kenneth Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better". Adelphi Paper, 
No: 171, 1981, London- Brassey’s, for IISS.
'^ 1 Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation", International Seci/nYv, Spring 1994, vol:18. No: 4, 
pp: 66 -107.
42por the revised version of the fundamental debate between two scholars see also, Scott D. Sagan 
& Kenneth Waltz, The Spread o f  Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, W. W. Norton & Company, New 
York, London, 1995.
^^Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & William Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear 
Proliferation", Journal o f  Conflict Resolution, June 1982, vol: 26, p. 283.
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become nuclear weapons powers in the post-Cold War era.^4 Similarly, proponents 
of this view believe that proliferation of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts such as 
the ones between India and Pakistan, and Israel and its Arab neighbours, may create 
a degree of peaceful regional nuclear balances. For instance, Shai Feldman, a notable 
Israeli scholar, argues that an open declaration of Israeli nuclear capability would 
give Israel the necessary confidence to make further concessions in the Middle East 
Peace Process.45
Returning to Waltz's position in the debate, he underlines the fact that, one 
may not like the political positions of the leaders in proliferating states, however, 
these leaders are (for Waltz) quite capable of ends-means rationality. Since nuclear 
weapons can have effects out of proportion to any political goals that a leader could 
set, therefore, such a simple end-means rationality is all that is needed. Moreover, 
Waltz postulates that, as long as countries have invulnerable second strike nuclear 
forces, there is no reason why the rational model of nuclear deterrence cannot 
spread around the world. Since, by the late 1960s, the arms race between the United 
States and the Soviet Union had reached such a level that none of the parties could 
attain superiority on the other due to their capability to make the second-strike, that 
is to retaliate after absorbing a considerable nuclear attack from the adversary, and 
cause an unacceptable damage in return.'^^ Hence, the nuclear 'game' has come to a
44john J. Mearshimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", 
International Security, Summer 1990, vol:15. No: 1, pp :5 -56.
“^ ^For a detailed elaboration of the Israel's nuclear strategy as an element of foreign policy, see 
Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear D eterrence: A Strategy fo r  the 1980s, New York: Columbia, 
Columbia University Press, 1982. For a comprehensive coverage of these troublesome regions of 
the world regarding the arms proliferation, see Shelly A. Stahl & Geoffrey Kemp (eds.), Arms 
Control and Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia, New York, St. Martins Press, 1992. 
4^hough, no single precise definition could give an idea about what would be the "unacceptable 
damage" in military and economic as well as sociological terms, one may, however, consider it as 
causing a casualty rate as high as 25 percent of the whole population, and devastating almost 75 
percent of the industrial bases, cities, and military-strategic centers including command and 
control systems. Therefore, building up such a mighty second-strike capability constituted the 
principal deterrent asset of both superpowers during the Cold War.
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stalemate because of that delicate balance o f t e r r o r It was the result of vertical 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, that is the rapid increase in the nuclear arsenals 
and their respective delivery systems of superpowers.^^
iii... A Counterargument
A counterargument to Waltz's thesis came from Joseph Nye who believes in 
the importance of political stability, and that stable deterrence would be created only 
if the political and military conditions that created nuclear stability between the Cold 
War superpowers existed.^9 This is also the point of view which is shared to a great 
extent and advocated throughout this dissertation. Since the existence of the 
conditions that Nye has emphasized is not the case for the developing countries, and 
since revolutions, civil wars and coups may increase the likelihood of nuclear 
weapons being used because of the non-existence of political stability of the 
governments controlling the weapons, then the spread of nuclear weapons would 
nonetheless constitute a danger for international security. A similar problem rests on 
the concept of strategic stability. Since it was not merely the existence of nuclear 
arsenals of both superpowers that created stability, but it was their capability to 
make the second-strike in retaliation to a nuclear attack from the adversary (a point 
that Waltz also stressed), then it must be well acknowledged that the rules of such a 
dangerous game were learned over the years by its players. Therefore, it is hardly
' "^ I^ndeed, "The Delicate Balance of Terror" was the title of a famous essay written by Albert 
Wohlstetter in 1959, who was one of the United States' national security analysts working at the 
RAND Corp. According to Wohlstetter, international stability would be best preserved, not by 
achieving a nuclear superiority and thus a great advantage over the other to strike the first under 
the conditions of mutual vulnerability, but rather by building a relatively secure second-strike 
capability. In fact, the article that was published in Foreign Affairs was only a late summary of a 
confidential RAND research on overseas bases, undertaken in the mid-1950s. Henceforth, US 
governments had revised the deployment of their strategic forces accordingly.
^^Maintaining such a balance required further precision in military strategies, and improvement 
in the command and control mechanisms of the elaborate weapons systems at the disposal of both 
parties. Therefore, the nuclear game was considered to be too sophisticated and too costly that 
could only be played by the superpowers.
4^For an excellent elaboration of Waltz's arguments see, Joseph S. Nye. Jr., "The Case for 
Concern: Is Non-Proliferation Policy Mistaken ?" Harvard International Review, Spring 1992, 
vol: 14, No: 3, p. 8.
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probable for a Third World and/or developing country to build an invulnerable 
second-strike capability and the necessary elaborate systems of command and 
control, and special safety devices to reduce the risk of an unintentional nuclear war. 
Moreover, the requirements of a truly multi-nuclear world with respect to 
command, control, communications and intelligence (C I^) would be awesome, and 
the international stability would suffer. On the other hand, the existence of terrorist 
groups and the possibility of acquisition of nuclear weapons by them might further 
endanger the international peace and security. That is, in case nuclear weapons are 
either sold to or stolen by terrorist groups, since they would have no specific 
headquarters or homeland, then the threat of retaliation argument would become 
ineffective.
In regard to what has been said above, one may reach a conclusion that nuclear 
weapons have kept the peace during the Cold War due to a particular set of 
conditions. Though there may be some regional situations where analogies can be 
made to superpower confrontation, most appear to be very different. Hence, even if 
there is some chance of developing stable nuclear balances in South Asia and the 
Middle East, there are also higher risks of a nuclear exchange. The more nuclear 
weapons are held within different political jurisdictions, the greater the probability 
that turmoil or technological faults can lead to their loss or unauthorized use. Hence, 
whatever happens between the established nuclear-weapons states, the world will 
be a more stable one if the number of nuclear-weapons does not grow.
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CHAPTER II. THE INTERNATIONAL REGIMES THEORY 
& THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
The task undertaken in this chapter is to introduce the concept of international 
regimes with a view to accentuate the regimes' significance in promoting 
international cooperation and collaboration in different issue areas including the 
efforts to prevent further spread of nuclear explosive devices.^O this regard, the 
concept of the formation and persistence of international regimes need to be 
elaborated to some extent, so that the concept of security regimes can then be 
brought to the fore in order to lay the ground for further discussion on the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime in the following chapters.
fl... Definition of International Regimes
According to Stephen Krasner as a leading scholar in the field of international 
relations, international regimes are implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given 
issue area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of facts, causation and 
rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. Rules are specific principles of action. Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.^1 According to 
Etel Solingen, on the other hand, the definitional requirements of an international 
regime imply mutual policy adjustments by each participating state, geared to
nuclear explosive device does not necessarily mean a nuclear weapon. However, particularly 
in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, any request of or offer for assitance 
in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, whether or not intended to peaceful purposes, are 
prohibited. The purpose behind such a restriction was the clear cut understanding that there was 
indeed no distincition between the two devices (a peaceful device or a weapon) based on the 
destructive effect they could produced in case they would be used for military purposes. Only 
slight modifications would be needed to transform a so-called peaceful nuclear explosive device 
into a lethal nuclear weapon.
^'Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca: New York, 
1983, pp. 1 - 2 1 .
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improve the position of all sides, through a joint policy process of coordination and 
collaboration, generally underpinned by an institutional foundation of principles, 
rules, and decision making procedures.^^ International regimes have been 
conceptualized as intervening variables standing between basic causal factors on the 
one hand, and outcomes and related behavior of the states on the other.
i... Relationship Between Basic Causal Factors and Regimes
There has been several basic paradigmatic debates among the scholars about 
the nature of international relations which related to basic causal factors. Regarding 
the relationship between these factors and international regimes, a fundamental 
question, such as the following, can be posed: lohat are the conditions that lead to regime 
formation, regime continuance, and dissolution o f regimes ? In a narrow explanation, 
these factors can be reduced to three: interest, power, and values.
a... intei'est
The most widespread explanation for the formation and continuance of 
international regimes is egoistic self-interest of the actors in the international scene. In 
this regard, Stephan Krasner refers to the desire to maximize one's own utility 
function where that function does not include the utility of another p a r t y t h e  
same regard, Arthur Stein postulates that the same forces of autonomously 
calculated self-interest that lie at the root of the anarchic international system also lay 
the foundation for international regimes as a form of international order. That is to 
say, according to Stein, the same forces that lead individuals to bind themselves 
together to escape the state of nature also lead states to coordinate their actions, 
even to collaborate with one another. Quite simply, there are times when rational
^^Etel Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes : The Evolution of Nuclear 
Ambiguity in the Middle East", International Studies Quarterly, 1994. Vol: 38. No: 2, pp: 305 - 
337.
^^Krasner, ibid., p. 11.
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self-interested calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in 
favor of joint decision making.^4 On the other hand, Robert Keohane is primarily 
concerned with the demand for regimes, the conditions under which ad hoc 
agreements fail to provide optimal outcomes. Keohane maintains that regimes can 
make agreements easier if they provide frameworks for establishing legal liability; 
improve the quantity and quality of information available to actors; or reduce 
transaction costs (e.g., costs of organization or of making side-payments). Keohane 
also points out to the importance of the regimes in providing established negotiating
frameworks.55
Egoistic self-interest is also regarded as an important determinant of regimes 
by other authors, such as Oran Young. According to Young, international regimes 
are those pertaining to activities of interest to members of the international system, 
and some of these activities involve actions with a direct impact on the interests of 
two or more members of the international community. Like other social institutions. 
Young believes, international regimes develop and evolve over time, and it 
therefore becomes important to think about the development patterns or life-cycles 
of regimes. It is also important to account for the emergence of any given regime, 
and to detect what factors determine whether an existing regime will remain 
operative over time. Therefore, Oran Young argues that, there are three paths to 
regime formation.56 Accordingly, regimes can either be created spontaneously^'^
^^Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World", in Krasner 
(ed.), ibid, pp: 115 - 140.
55Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", in Krasner (ed.), ibid., pp: M i­
n i .
5*^Oran Young, "Regime Dynamics: the Rise and Fall of International Regimes", in Krasner (ed.), 
ibid., pp: 93 - 115.
5^Such social institutions are distinguished by the fact that they do not involve conscious 
coordination among participants, do not require explict consent on the part of subjects or 
prospective subjects, and are highly resistant to efforts at social engineering. In fact, there are 
numerous cases in which subjects' expectations converge to a remarkable degree in the abscence 
of conscious design or even explicit awareness. To Young, this is an appropriate interpretation of 
many balance of power situtations at the international level. See, Oran Young, ibid., p. 98.
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emerging from the converging expectations of many individual actions, or can be 
negotiated^^ and formed, based on explicit agreements, or, can be initally forced 
upon, and externally imposed^^ by some actors in the international system.
From the point of view of nuclear non-proliferation, the concept of interest, or 
the so-called egoistic self-interest of states, can be considered as one of the basic 
causal variables, whereas the non-proliferation regime as the dependent variable. 
Withstanding the arguments of Krasner and Stein in particular, some states sought 
in the past (and still at present) to maximize their own utility function in the field of 
nuclear energy regardless of the utility of other states. Hence, the chaotic structure 
of the international relations especially in the 1960s led different states, as forwarded 
by Keohane, to make agreements for establishing frameworks so as to come up 
with a legal liability in the nuclear field. The outcome was the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty which theretofore constituted the crux of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime. The emergence of the non-proliferation regime in general, and 
the creation of the NPT in particular, were indeed the results of, on the one hand, the 
enduring negotiation processes over the years in different international gatherings, 
and the result of imposition of the leading states on the other (particularly the two 
hegemonic powers, namely the US and the USSR). Thus, one may conclude that, 
both the outcomes of the negotiations, and the impositions of superpowers have 
been influencial in shaping the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its elements.
contrast to spontaneously formed regimes, negotiated regimes are characterized by 
conscious efforts to agree on their major provisions, explict consent on the part of individual 
participants, and formal expression of the results. Comprehensive regimes sometimes emerge 
from careful and orderly negotiations. Negotiated orders are relatively common at the 
international level. Therefore, Young points out to the fact that there is some tendency to become 
so involved in thinking about negotiated regimes in this domain that it is easy to forget that other 
^ e s  of regimes are also prominent in the international system. See, Young, ibid.,
^"imposed regimes differ from spontaneous orders in the sense that they are fostered deliberately 
by dominant powers or consortia of dominant actors. At the same time, as Young postulates, such 
regimes do not involve explict consent on the part of subordinate actors, and they operate 
effectively in the abscence of any formal expression. Of two types of imposed orders, namely 
overt hegemony and de fa cto  imposition, the latter refers to situations in which the dominant actor 
is able to promote institutional arrangements favorable to itself through various forms of 
leadership and the manipulation of incentives. See, Young, ibid..
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b. .. powei‘
The second major basic causal variable used to explain regime development is 
political power. Power can either be used to enhance the values of specific actors 
within the international system, or it can be used to secure optimal outcomes for the 
system as a whole. Therefore, power is either an individualistic or a collectivist 
instrument in achieving specific goals. Scholarly writings that focus on power 
suggest that under certain configurations of interest, there is an incentive to create 
regimes and the provision of these regimes is a function of distribution of power. 
Robert Keohane, for instance, in his "theory of hegemonic stability”, put forward 
that hegemons play a critical role in supplying the collective goods that are needed 
for regimes to function effectively. However, hegemons provide these goods not 
because they are interested in the well-being of the system as a whole, but because 
regimes enhance their (hegemons') own national values.^^ The h^e of argument 
associated with individualistic power elaborates on the likelihood of altering the 
strategies of weaker actors by the powerful actor(s). In such contingencies, power 
becomes much more a central concept, or rather an element of compulsion. In 
investigating the process through which the nuclear non-proliferation regime has 
come about, power of the two hegemons in particular, and the respective powers of 
several other influencial states such as Great Britain, France, F. R. Germany, Sweden, 
Canada, and India in general, prevailed as determining factors in the formation of 
the norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of the regime. There was almost 
unanimous agreement on the non-proliferation principle.
c. .. values
Values embedded in the principles and norms of a regime, which are critical in 
defining the characteristics of any given regime, and which influence a regime in a
f^^See, Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International 
Economic Regimes, 1967-77", in Ole R. Holsti er al.. Changes in the International System, 
Boulder, Colorado, Westview press, 1980.
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particular issue-area, may not be directly related to that issue-area, but they can be 
regarded as explanations for the creation, persistence, and dissipation of regimes. 
Diffuse principles and norms in the societies may condition international behavior in 
specific issue-areas. In International relations, the most diffuse principle is 
sovereignty. However, sovereignty is not an analytic assumption but a principle that 
influences the behavior of actors. According to Krasner, in areas where sovereignty 
is not applied are either governed by vulnerable regimes or lack of regimes. The 
principle of sovereignty has been a major issue of concern during the multilateral 
negotiation process of controlling the world-wide proliferation of atomic energy.
ii... Relations Between Regimes and Outcomes & Behavior
As stated at the beginning, international regimes are said to be intervening 
variables between basic causal factors and related outcomes and behaviors of states 
in the international arena. Thus far, the relationships between basic causal factors 
and international regimes were briefly investigated also from the point of view of 
their significance for the emergence and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. Now, the right-hand side of the relationships, i.e., the ones between 
international regimes and related outcomes and behaviors of states, need some 
elaborations.
a... "regimes and behaviors, are inextricably linked...”
For some scholars like Oran Young, Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins, 
international regimes and behaviors of states are inextricably linked. All three 
contended that, regimes are pervasive phenomenon of all political system, and that, 
no patterned behavior can sustain itself for any length of time without generating a 
congruent regime. Puchala and Hopkins believe that, regimes exist in all areas of 
international relations, even those, such as major power rivalry that are traditionally 
looked upon as clear cut examples of anarchy. They further argue that, statesmen
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almost ever perceive themselves as constrained by principles, norms, and rules that 
prescribe and proscribe (condemn) variaties of behavior. Hence, the concept of 
regime moves beyond a realist perspective which, Puchala and Hopkins believe, is 
too limited for explaining an increasingly complex, interdependent, and dangerous 
world. According to them, their argument is not only applicable to areas where one 
might expect communalities of interest, but also to ones where conflictual relations 
would normally be expected. They also believe that, taking regimes into account 
contributes to explaining international behavior by alerting students of international 
relations to subjective and moral factors that they might otherwise overlook. And, 
once this subjective dimension of international relations is included, explanations of 
international behavior can be pushed beyond factors such as goals, interest, and 
power.^l In the same regard, Oran Young argues that patterned behavior inevitably 
generates convergent expectations, and this leads to conventionalized behavior in 
which there is some expectation of condemnation for deviating from ongoing 
practices. In other words, patterns of behavior that persist over extended periods 
are infused with normative significance, and tend to lead to the creation of regimes, 
and in turn, regimes reinforce patterned behavior.
b... "regime is a misleading concept..."
In contrast to what has been said above, a few scholars such as Susan Strange 
argue that regime is a misleading concept that obscures the basic economic and 
power relationships, and also rejects that principles, norms, rules, and decision­
making procedures have significant roles in international relations. Thus, instead of 
asking what makes regimes and how they affect behavior. Strange raises a more 
fundamental question as whether the concept of regime is really useful to students
international relations, there are, according to Hopkins and Puchala, revered principles, 
explicit and implicit norms, and written and unwritten rules, that are recognized by actors that 
govern their behavior. Hence, adherence to regimes may impose a modicum of order on 
international interactions and transactions. See, Raymond Hopkins & Donald Puchala, ibid., p. 86.
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of international political economy or world politics by challenging the validity and 
usefulness of the regime concept on five separate counts.^2 this school of thought, 
it is believed that regimes, if they can be said to exist at all, have little or no impact. 
They are merely epiphenomenal, and the underlying causal schematic is one that 
sees a direct connection betwen changes in basic causal factors and changes in 
behavior and outcomes.^3 other words, all those international arrangements 
dignified by the label regime are only too easily upset when either the balance of 
bargaining power or the perception of national interest change among those states 
who negotiate them. Hence, in this approach, international regimes are either 
excluded completely, or their impact on outcomes and related behavior of states is 
regarded as trivial.
c... "regimes coordinate behavior to achieve desired outcomes ..."
In explaining the significance of the relationship between international regimes 
and outcomes and related state behavior, proponents of a third approach argue that, 
in the international system, regimes derive from voluntary agreements among 
juridically equal actors.^^ Looked from a realist perspective, in a world of sovereign 
states, each actor seeks to maximizing its interest and power. And, the basic function 
of regimes is to coordinate state behavior to achieve desired outcomes in particular 
issue-areas. Such coordination, according to Keohane and Stein, is attractive under 
several circumstances such as when Pareto-optimal outcomes cannot be obtained 
through uncoordinated individual calculations of self-interest. Regimes cannot be 
relevant for zero-sum situations in which states act to maximize the difference
^^The five counts, what Susan Strange calls "dragons", are that, the study of regimes: is, for the 
most part, a passing fad; is imprecise and woolly; value-biased, as dangerous as loaded dice; 
distorts by overemphasizing the static and underemphasizing the dynamic element of change in 
world politics; and is narrowminded, rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits vision of a wider 
reality. See, "Susan Strange, Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis", in Krasner (ed.), 
ibid., p. 337.
^^Strange, ibid., p. 345.
^'^Keohane, ibid., p. 146.
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between their utilities and those of other. Hence, Robert Jervis points to scarcity of 
regimes in the security area, which more closely approximates zero-sum games than 
do most economic issue-areas. In such circumstances, pure power motivations 
preclude regimes. Thus in this third approach, regimes are seen as emerging and 
having a significant impact, but only under restrictive conditions.^^
B... Definition of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
As the result of the developments taken place within a quarter of a century in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons came into being in July 1968 and entered into force in March 1970. 
According to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the states that have not hitherto 
possessed nuclear weapons were required to accept the comprehensive safeguards 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency \vhich was created in 1957 and 
mandated principally with furthering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
promoting nuclear safety, and applying safeguards in order to verify that nuclear 
materials were not being used to make nuclear weapons. Creation of a universal 
treaty fostered the formation of an international regime in the domain of nuclear 
proliferation whose principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures, as well 
as its constituent elements could be defined. The nuclear non-proliferation regime 
constitutes a substantial accomplishment in institutionalizing a collective interest, and 
it has evident successes to its credit in slowing the pace of weapons spread.^^
i... Non-Proliferation Principles
The principles of an international regime reflect the aims and the premises of 
the members of the regime, and the purposes the members are expected to pursue.
^^Krasner, ibid., pp: 7 - 8 .
^^Michael Brenner, "Progress and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy", in Emanuel Adler & Beverly 
Crawford (eds.). Progress in Postwar International Relations, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1993, p. 176.
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They are mostly expressed in the preambles of the treaties. The basic principles of 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime have been set forth in the belief that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear 
war. Whereas, the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be 
available to all parties to the NPT. Furthermore, the cessation of the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all of the existing stockpiles and the elimination 
of nuclear weapons from national arsenals for general and complete disarmament, 
and strict and effective international control in these regards are the principal desires 
as well. The fundamental aim of a comprehensive regime would thus be to 
contribute to the realization of the purpose and principles of the United Nations 
Charter in general, and the prohibition and elimination of all weapons of mass 
destruction in particular.^^ Therefore, as its guiding principle, the nuclear non­
proliferation regime presumes that the spread of nuclear weapons into many hands 
would further jeopardize prospects for international peace and security. 
Consequently, the appropriate behaviour for nuclear armed states would be to not 
assisting others in attaining a similar capacity, and for states without a nuclear 
armory to forego acquiring one.^^
ii... Non-Proliferation Norms
The norms of an international regime can be regarded as a mandate for the 
rules and procedures of the regime. They indicate what members of the regime 
must or must not do, that is, what is legitimate or illegitimate.^^ The general 
principles of the non-proliferation regime have been translated into specific norms
^^Thomas Bernauer, The Chemistry o f  Regime Formation, UNIDIR, Dartmouth; Aldershot, 1993, 
p. 55.
^^The hypothesized cause-and-effect relationship underlying this presumption is that while 
weapons, even nuclear weapons per se, do not cause conflict, they can significantly exacerbate 
tensions, since there exists the destructive potential of such weapons. Roger K. Smith, 1987, 
"Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations 
Theory", International Organization, Vol. 41, No: 2, pp: 253-281.
^^Bernauer, ibid., p. 56
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through two sets of mstitutions: first, the series of treaties banning the deployment 
of weapons of mass destruction from set geographical boundaries, such as the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and the Seabed Arms 
Control Treaty of 1972; and secondly, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970. 
The more important institution is the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for it explicitly lays 
out the essence of the nuclear bargain between the nuclear haves and have nots7^ 
Thus, the basic norms of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is the clear cut 
differentiation of non-nuclear weapon states from nuclear weapon states, and their 
respective rights and liabilities defined in the first three Articles of the NPT.^^ The 
basic bargain that the NPT signifies was that, in return for foregoing the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapons states extracted from the nuclear 
states a commitment to provide them nuclear technology suitable for the 
development of their nuclear industries. Then, underlying the explicit bargain was a 
tacit agreement: non-nuclear weapons states would not seek to acquire nuclear 
weapons so long as the nuclear states sustained a robust and expanding 
international economy and a system of relative free trade in conventional 
weaponry.72 Such a reasoning would stem from a de facto  situation as that, if 
conventional arms were not provided to the non-nuclear weapons states, then there 
would be strong incentives for them to acquire nuclear weapons. It may be argued 
that, the more acutely vulnerable a state considers itself to a massive conventional 
attack, the less likely is it to renounce a nuclear deterrent. However, there are 
countries which had both a well organized conventional armory but also strong 
incentives for going nuclear7^
70Smith, ibid.,
71 Accordingly, a nuclear weapon state undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly to any non-nuclear weapon state, while a non­
nuclear weapon state party to the NPT undertakes not to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive device from other countries.
72Smith, ibid.,
73xhe motives and incentives behind the political will of these countries which made them go 
nuclear can be enumerated as territorial disputes, ethnic conflicts, religious animosities, and
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iii. .. Non-Proliferation Rules
The rules of an international regime are prescriptions and guidelines for actions 
the member states are expected to perform or refrain from performing. They define 
the relevant actors, the expected behaviour, and the specific circumstances under 
which the rules are operative. Rules make the principles and norms operational, 
measurable and verifiable, and they institutionalize procedures. Rules are often 
established by an international treaty. They may, however, also be issued, 
supplemented or expanded by an international or a supranational authority.^'^ The 
IAEA Safeguards pursuant to the documents INFCIRC/ 66 and IX'FCIRC/153, and 
the IAEA Statute describe the rules that the member states to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and those otherwise accepted the IAEA safeguards agreement must follow in 
using nuclear energy. A group of nuclear suppliers states put some restrictions on 
certain items that might also be used to advance non-peaceful nuclear programs. 
Such restrictions, or item lists, constitute the basis for the rules set forth by the non­
proliferation regime.
iv. .. Non-Proliferation Decision-Making Procedures
Decision-making procedures of an international regime are those mechanisms 
that deal with situations requiring collective choice, which may, for example, be 
necessary to amend or interpret the principles, norms, rules or procedures of the 
regime, and to deal with compliance issues, including monitoring, verification and 
sanctions against violators.^^ In this regard, implementation of safeguards 
procedures by the IAEA pursuant to INFCIRC/66 or INFCIRC/153 requires 
monitoring the activities of the member states by a group of inspectors. In case of
ambitions to gain universal recognition and prestige. Some infamous proliferators from different 
regions of the world such as, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Libya, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, may be 
counted. For an excellent compilation of the states that have gone nuclear see, Leonard S. Spector, 
Going Nuclear, Cambridge, Mass. : Ballinger Publishing Co. 1988,
^^Bernauer. ibid., p. 57.
^^Bernauer, ibid., p. 59.
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non-compliance determined by the inspectors, it is the task of the Director General 
of the IAEA to call for that state to come to line vvdth its obligations under the Treaty. 
If a state fails to comply with the terms of the Treaty, Director General brings the 
case to the attention of the IAEA's Board of Governors, which adopts a set of 
measures in order to make that state comply with its obligations. In case of failure 
again, the Board can bring the case to the attention the UN Security Council.
V ... Elements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
The foremost principal elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and its Statute. Apart from these two 'backbones' of the regime, several other 
institutions are established, either formally or informally, with the purpose of 
preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and/or the spread of nuclear 
material and technology used in the manufacture of nuclear explosives. Some of 
these institutions, such as EURATOM, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco were established 
prior to the efforts to work out the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Some other important 
elements of the regime are established as reactions to the post-NPT developments in 
the field of nuclear industry. Their "raison d'être" was said to cope with the loopholes 
and shortcomings of the regime. The establishment of the Zangger Committee, and 
the emergence of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG or the London Club) are such 
developments. Other regional/multilateral attempts to prevent further nuclear 
proliferation that can be cited here are the efforts to establish other nuclear- 
weapons-free zones and the zones of peace, such as the African Nuclear-Weapon- 
Free Zone, and the South Pacific Zone of Peace. Similarly, the bilateral regional 
nuclear cooperation arrangement between two threshold states, namely Argentina 
and Brazil (ABACC), has become one of the most efficient and succesful elements of 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The above mentioned elements of the regime 
will be elaborated in the following parts of this study with a view to see what can be
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achievable among the states in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear material and techonology. Insights to be gained from such an elaboration 
may shed light to the proposals for strengthening the non-proliferation regime.
C... Concept of Securitii Regimes
As it was previously stated above, a wide range of authors have proceeded to 
identify regimes in different issue areas such as money, trade, oceans and 
environment. However, little scholarly analysis have been devoted to the study of 
regimes in the domain of security. One principal exception to this general rule, came 
about as the original work of Robert Jervis. Jervis suggests that the lack of scholarly 
study is not the result of neglect but rather inherent in the nature of the subject. The 
reason why there is little security regime analysis is because regimes are more 
difficult to establish in the security area than in the economic realm because of the 
inherently competitive character of security concern, the unforgiving nature of the 
problem, and the difficulty in determining how much security the state has or 
needs.^6 Similarly, the works of Harald Müller^^ particularly those concerning the 
formation and the operation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the works 
of Thomas Bernauer^^ who analysed the "chemistry of regime formation" in the 
field of chemical weapons, are more recent and comprehensive studies in the field of 
security regimes. Harald Müller defines security regimes as systems of principles, 
norms, rules and procedures regulating certain aspects of security relationships 
between states. According to MüUer, an international regime exists when all four 
elements can be identified and when the regime controls enough variables in a given 
issue-area to affect (if obeyed) parties' behavior by channelling or terminating
^^Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes", in Stephan D. Krasner (ed.). International Regimes, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca: New York, 1983, pp. 173-194.
^^See, Harald Müller, "The Internalization of Principles, Norms and Rules by Governments: A 
Case of Security Regimes", in Volker Rittberger (ed.). Regime Theory and International Relations, 
Clarendon Press, London, 1993.
^^Thomas Bernauer, The Chemistry o f  Regime Formation,
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unilateral self-help with regard to regulated variables. Using these criteria, Müller 
identifies the following existing security regimes: the strategic nuclear weapons 
regime;^^ the European military order;^^ regime for the prevention of nuclear 
war;^l and the nuclear non-proliferation regime.^2 Given the general criteria used 
to confirm the existence of an international regime in the field of nuclear non­
proliferation, there is indeed a regime with its existing principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures. As most regime analysis have studied international 
economic issues, the criteria they developed may not be completely appropriate to 
security regimes. Therefore, in order to examine whether the international 
arrangements over nuclear non-proliferation conform to the prerequisites 
established for the existence of a security regime, it would be, first of all, useful to 
understand the nature of security regimes in general.
i... Robert Tervis and the Concept of Security Regimes
For Jervis, a security regime means those principles, rules and norms that 
permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will 
reciprocate. This concept implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate 
cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the pursuit of short-run 
self-interest. If patterns of international relations can be explained by the distribution 
of military and economic power among the states, than the concept of regime will 
not be useful. However, if the connections between outcomes and national power 
are indirect and mediated, then there is more room for choice, creativity, and
^^SALT 1 and II, ABM Treaty, parts of INF Treaty and of the Outer Space Treaty, and START. 
Müller, ibid., 361.
SOin f  Treaty, Stockholm/Paris agreements on confidence-building, CFE Treaty, 2+4 Treaty, 
practices such as doctrine seminars and mutual visits of military personnel, the Crisis Control 
Centre, and the recent mutual promises of unilateral reductions of short-range nuclear weapons. 
Müller, ibid., pp: 361 - 362.
^^More than ten different agreements, aspects of the SALT Treaties and the adopted practice of 
not keeping nuclear weapons in a high state of readiness. Müller, ibid.,
^^The NPT, The London Suppliers' Guidelines, the IAEA Statute, the safeguards rules in 
INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153, the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties. Müller, ibid., p. 362.
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institutions to restrain and regulate behavior, and consequently, there is room for 
producing a security regime.^3
a... diffei'ences between security and non-security regimes
Security regimes, according to Jervis, are both especially valuable, and 
especially difficult to achieve. Security regimes are valuable because individualistic 
actions are not only costly but also likely to yield dangerous outcomes. And, security 
regimes are difficult to achieve because the fear that the other is violating or will 
violate the common understanding is a potent incentive for each state to strike out 
on its own, even if it would prefer the regime to prosper. Even though, these 
dynamics can be present in non-security areas as well, there are four main 
differences between the regimes in security and non-security issue-areas. First, 
security issues often involve greater competitivenes than do those involving 
economics. The second difference is linked to the problem that, conflicts can be 
inherent between the states as regards the security issues. Offensive and defensive 
security motives of states often lead to a security dilemma, a concept which is central 
to many other aspects of interstate relation.^'  ^ Since, the policies that are said to 
enhance the defensive structuring of a state may be perceived as a threat by another 
state, then one state's security may be seen and defined as another state's insecurity. 
Hence, from such a web of relations a "security dilemma" may arise.^^ A third
^^Jervis, ibid., pp: 173 - 174.
'^^As discussed by Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, as a consequence of an international system 
composed of sovereign states, each state must in the end look out for its own security, protection 
and survival. If there is no legitimate authority to enforce order and punish rule breakers then 
there is no legal or formal recourse if allies and friends fail to assist a state. Thus, self-help in the 
international system means that each state must take measures to provide its own defense. A tragic 
flaw of the formally anarchic state system is that the requirement for self-help leads to the 
"security dilemma. See, Bruce Russett & Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu fo r  Choice, W. H. 
Freeman and Company, New York, Third Edition, 1989 , pp: 6 0 - 6 1 .  See also, Manfred Efinger, 
"Preventing War in Europe Through Confidence and Security-Building Measures ?" in Volker 
Rittberger (ed.). International Regimes in East-West Politics, Pinter Publishers, London and New 
York, 1990, p. 120.
85as a suggested reading in this topic see, John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security 
Dilemma," World Politics, No: 2, January 1950, pp: 157 - 180; See also, Robert Jervis, 
"Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, No: 30, January 1978, pp: 167 - 214.
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difference in the security and non-security issue-areas is that stakes are higher in the 
former. Not only is security the most highly valued goal because it is a prerequisite 
for so many things, but the security area is unforgiving. A fourth difference is that, 
in security issue-areas, detecting what others are doing, and measuring one's own 
security are difficult.
b... conditions for forming a security regime
Robert Jervis's conditions in that respect are divided into two sets. The first 
group relates to broad systemic circumstances, and the second to more narro^v 
variables that directly bear on the security dilemma. Under the heading of broad 
systemic conditions, Jervis identifies four such conditions that are most essential for 
the formation and maintenance of a security regime: First, the great powers should 
prefere a more regulated environment to one in which all states behave 
individualistically. Second, the actors must believe that the value they place on 
mutual security and cooperation is shared by other states, as cooperation will not 
occur if states believe that they are confronted by a defector with strong anti-status 
quo ambitions. Third, all the major actors must accept the status quo.^^ Finally, war 
and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as more costly than 
cooperative action.^^ Indeed, all these four conditions are replicated, at least in part, 
in today's world. First of all, half a century ago, mankind's most costly war in terms 
of lives and treasure lost was· concluded, and with the incentives of the two 
superpowers a more regulated international environment emerged. Secondly, given 
that nuclear weapons are indiscriminate in their effects, and that their effects are 
widespread, aU of the nuclear weapon states, and most, if not all, of the non-nuclear- 
weapons states, placed (and stiU do) a high value on non-dissemination of nuclear
^^However, even if all major actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes, according to 
Jervis, cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by 
expansion.
87Jervis, ibid., pp: 176 - 178.
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weapons. Third, the international arrangements for preventing the spread of nuclear 
explosive devices, as they now stand, represent a modified but fundamental 
acceptance of post-Second World War status quo. Finally, in today’s world, it is a 
truism that nuclear war is exceptionally costly not only in its effect but also in its 
preparation.^^
ii... An Analysis of a Security Regime in Practical Terms
Jervis analyses the Concert of Europe as the best example of a security regime 
with the belief that such an analysis can provide a complementary perspective to his 
theoretical discussion.^0 During the Concert of Europe era (1815 - 1823), the great 
powers behaved in ways that sharply diverged from normal "power politics". They 
did not seek to maximize their individual power positions, neither did they take 
advantage of others' temporary weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. They moderated 
their demands and behavior as they took each other's interest into account in setting 
their own policies. This is not to deny that each state in the Concert placed primary 
value on its own security and welfare, and did not care much about others' well­
being as an end in itself. What is crucial, however, is that "self-interest" was broader 
than usual, in that statesmen believed that they would be more secure if the other 
major powers were also more secure. There was a sense that the fate of the major 
powers were linked, that Europe would thrive or suffer together. Much of the 
restraint adopted was dependent on each statesman's belief that if he moderated 
demands or forebore to take advantage of others’ temporary weakness, they would 
reciprocate. For this system to work, each state had to believe that its current 
sacrifices would not renege on their implicit commitment when they found
^^The modification is that, basic nuclear science and technology should be shared with the 
majority.
89Smith, ibid.,
detailed historical discussion about the Concert of Europe taken as a case study in Jervis' 
work is far from being relevant to the subject matter of this study. Nevertheless, the general 
implications of Jervis' analysis are thought to be useful in providing hints for the establishment of 
the theoretical framework of this study.
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themselves in tempting positions. This implies the belief that, conflicts o f interest could 
be limited and contained by shared interests, including the interest in maintaining the 
regime. Because cooperation was much greater than usual, diplomatic procedures 
involved more consultation and openness and less duplicity than usual. The power 
of these norms (i.e., consultation and openness) is shown in the reaction to their 
being broken. The Concert was supported by the shared stake that the major 
powers had in avoiding war. All feared that high levels of conflict would destroy 
their security, not enhance it.^l
Although the above mentioned conditions and common interests explain why 
the Concert was formed, what is more important is that the regime influenced the 
behavior of the states in ways that made its continuation possible even after the 
initial conditions had become attenuated. The regime was more than a reflection of 
causally prior variables; it was a force in its own right, exerting influence through 
several paths. First, the expectation that the Concert could continue to function 
helped maintain it through the operation of familiar self-fulfilling dynamics. I f  an 
actor thinks the regime will disintegrate -or thinks that others hold this viezo- he will be more 
likely to defect from the cooperative coalition hiinself On the other hand, if  an actor believes 
the regime is likely to last, he will be more willing to 'invest' in it (in the sense o f accepting 
larger short-run risks and sacrifices) in the expectation o f reaping larger gains in the future. 
Important here is the expectation that peace could be maintained. Thus, part of the 
explanation for the Concert's success was that its health was generally seen as quite 
good, and that each state stopped being restained in the belief that the system 
would not last long enough for moderation to be reciprocated. Although, no states 
were completely satisfied with the Concert, all felt that it was better than the likely 
alternative arrangements, and placed a high priority on maintaining it.^2
 ^^Jervis, ibid., pp: 178 - 181. 
^2jervis, ibid., pp: 181 - 182.
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A second way in which the regime perpetuated itself was the greater 
opposition it was expected to foster against attempts forcibly to change the status 
quo. Under the Concert, the states were discouraged from expansionist moves that 
would have looked attractive if others were expected to follow individualistic 
security policies. Thirdly, the regime became an independent factor by developing at 
least a limited degree of institutionalization. In an age of limited communication and 
travel, the opportunities for direct conversations among national leaders were rare, 
formal machinery was lacking, no supra-national secretariat was formed, and all 
decisions and their implementation remained in the hands of national leaders. But 
coordination was facilitated, and information and expectations were fairly quickly 
and effectively shared.^^ The Concert of Europe did not last forever due to several 
factors. As Jervis reasoned, by controlling the risk of war and not yet becoming 
institutionalized and developing supra-national loyalties, the Concert may have 
contained the seeds of its own destruction. Since world politics did not seem so 
dangerous, pushing harder seemed sensible to individual states. But, seeking 
individualistic gains raised doubts in others' minds as to whether moderation and 
reciprocation would last, thus giving all states greater incentives to take a narrower 
and short-run perspective.
iii... Implications of Tervis' Analysis for Non-Proliferation Regime
From the above discussion which is confined to the distinguished work of 
Robert Jervis, there arises two important aspects that should be considered in an 
attempt to approach nuclear proliferation as a problem that threatens international 
security and stability (and that such a problem can be controlled and ameliorated, if 
not completely solved, within the context of a well established and effectively 
operating international security regime). One of these aspects relates to the 
perceptiori of the actors of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (i.e., states parties to
^^Jervis, ibid., pp: 182 - 184.
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the NPT in particular) vis-à-vis the general countenance given to the regime 
regarding the likelihood of its continuance and effectiveness in the long-run. That is 
to say, the behavior of several states may strongly determine the fate of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime into the next millenium. Such states are said to be those 
which are highly industrialized and very capable of manufacturing nuclear explosive 
devices in case the political will exists at governmental levels (e.g., Germany and 
Japan); and also those states which are less developed but ready to devote a great 
proportion of its national resources to a project that may end up with a nuclear 
bomb for the sake of either fostering their national security vis-a-vis a perceived 
nuclear threat, or improving their military might in their region (e.g., Iran> and some 
South Asian and South Pacific states which are parties to the NPT).^^ ^n important 
factor that may affect the behavior of such states (i.e., whether to defect from the 
regime or not) is said to largely depend on the strength ("health", as Jervis called) of 
the regime in detecting and punishing the actors that violate common principles, 
norms and rules.
This observation gives way to the second aspect that can be drawn from 
Jervis's analytical discussion: importance of institutionalization at supra-national level 
for the continuance of a regime. Nuclear non-proliferation regime is indeed well 
enough institutionalized with the IAEA which is in charge of the verification of the 
basic undertakings of the states that became parties to the NPT. Also, the NPT 
Review Conferences that are held every five year after the entry into force of the 
Treaty, under the auspice of the United Nations, have provided a degree of 
institutionalization. The past experience of the the IAEA on safeguards 
implementation has become a source of complaints for many states with regard to
^^Giving the names of a few states in this paragraph does not reflect the judgement of the author, 
but does however reflect a general consensus of many scholars, scientists and policy-makers, in 
their writings, about the likely moves of several actors in the international arena with regard to the 
proliferation problem of nuclear weapons.
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its effectiveness in detecting the violating states. Loopholes and shortcomings of the 
non-proliferation regime emanate from a lot many factors. And the main source of 
these factors can be singularized by stating the following: behaviors o f the states 
throughout the process o f the formation o f the nuclear non-proliferation regime^^ have 
affected the strength and effectiveness o f the verification institutio7t (i.e., IAEA). Therefore, 
the regime does not seem to be as healthy as its proponents would expect for 
solving the apparently ever growing nuclear proliferation problem in the post-Cold 
War era. Therefore, the causes lying behind the behaviors of states that are said to 
have stirred the effectiveness of the regime in preventing the further spread of 
nuclear explosive devices need extensive elaboration. And, this is the task of the 
following Part.
^^While the creation of the IAEA and safeguards documents, and drafting the NPT.
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CHAPTER III. EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
In the wake of the tragic event caused by the atomic bombs dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945, the newly established United 
Nations Organisation (UN) held its first General Assembly (GA) meeting in London 
in January 1946.^^ Prior to that first UNGA meeting, another important 
international gathering had taken place in Washington in November 1945. With the 
participation of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada (the three states 
that possessed the knowledge of using atomic energy, and those that had taken part 
in the manufacture of the first atomic bomb) issued a joint declaration concerning 
their future policy on the development of atomic energy. Accordingly, the heads of 
the three governments jointly noted that the scientific discoveries concerning the 
atomic energy placed an unprecedented means of destruction at man's disposal. 
They further pointed out that there was a need for international action to prevent 
the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes while promoting the peaceful uses 
of the advances in the scientific knowledge, particularly in the atomic energy field.
In the joint declaration, it was also noted that the military exploitation of the atomic 
energy depended in large part upon the same methods and processes as would be 
required for industrial uses. This would mean that no clear-cut distinction could be 
made between the military or civilian purposes, or intentions, of the states that 
would like to develop atomic energy in the future. In the same joint declaration, the 
three states proposed that the United Nations should set up a commission to study
its first meeting, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted its first Resolution 
calling for the establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission under the auspices of the United 
Nations in order to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other 
related matters.
^^"Joint Declaration by the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada, November 15, 1945, "in U.S. Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959, Pub. No. 7008, 2 vols., Washington D.C., U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1960, vol. I., p. 1., cited in Lawrence Scheinman, The International 
Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order, Resources for the Future, Washington D.C., 
1987.
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the problems related to the present and future use and the development of the 
atomic energy. Accordingly, the proposed commission was expected to make 
proposals for the control of atomic energy to ensure its peaceful uses, because it was 
proposed to extend the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful 
purposes.^^
R... Creation of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
Following the joint declaration of Washington, the foreign ministers of the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States met in Moscow, in 
December 1945. It then came out that the Soviets were most concerned with the role 
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Therefore, the first General Assembly Resolution, which was 
adopted on 24 January 1946, recognised the primary responsibility of the UNSC in 
that respect. Hence, the Resolution gave the Security Council the power to issue 
directions to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) -which 
would be established by the same Resolution. Regarding the composition and the 
competence of the UNAEC, the Resolution went on to state that the Commission 
was to inquire into all phases of the problem of atomic energy, and to make 
proposals on the specific aspects (that were defined in the Washington Declaration) 
as the exchange o f information, control to ensure peaceful uses, and effective safeguards. 
The UN Atomic Energy Commission composed of the members of the UNSC and 
Canada when the latter was not in the Coundl first met on 12 June 1946 and became 
a forum for the presentation of the U.S. initiative for the international control of 
atomic energy. The work of the Commission members revealed the fundamental 
differences between the Eastern and the Western Block countries in their approach 
to the concept of controlling the atomic energy. Because of these differences the
^^Therefore. the commission was expected to study and then propose an effective safeguards 
system in order to protect complying states against the violating states.
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Commission held the last meeting in July 1949, and the consultations of the 
Permanent Members of the UNSC and Canada ceased in December 1949.^^ Though 
short lived, the negotiations in the Commission in the mean time worth studying so 
as to understand the pace of development of atomic safeguards.
i... Issues Discussed in the UNAEC
Following the trilateral discussions of 1945 among the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Canada, and then among the United States, the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union, and anticipating the first United Nations Resolution, the U.S. 
Secretary of State appointed a committee of five to advise on the problem of atomic 
energy and on the aspects of controls and safeguards.100 The work of the 
committee is culminated in what would later be called as the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Rcpori. 101 The Report, in essence, proposed an international authority that would 
monopolize (i.e., an authority that would own and manage as well as inspect) all 
dangerous atomic activities, while leaving safe and productive activities open to 
individual countries and private interests. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report concluded 
that the ability to produce special nuclear material was a critical step toward nuclear 
weapons, thus a system of inspection superimposed on an otherwise uncontrolled 
exploitation of atomic energy by national governments would not be an adequate 
safeguard, and that international safeguards alone could not therefore assure 
effective separation of civil and military uses of nuclear energy.
99rhe issue of which government should be seated as the Government of China in the wake of the 
communist revolution was one important factor in not furthering the consultations among the big 
Powers.
lOOihe committee consisted of Dean Acheson, General John McCloy, Professor Vannevar Bush, 
Professor James B. Conant and General Leslie R. Groves. The committee engaged a board of 
consultants comprised of C. I. Barnard of the Bell Telephone Company, Robert Oppenheimer who 
was in large part the creator of nuclear weapons, C. A. Thomas of the Monsanto Chemical 
Company, H. A. Winne of the General Electric Company, and David Lilienthal, chairman of the 
Tennessee Valey Authority. For further details see, Allan McKnight, Atomic Safeguards: A Study 
in International Verification, New York, UNITAR, 1971.
' 0 * See, A Report on the International Control o f  Atomic Energy, prepared for the Secretary of 
State’s Committee on Atomic Energy, Washington, March 1946. See also, Lawrence Scheinman, 
The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order, p. 17.
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a... Baruch Plan
Further proposals of the United States to the UNAEC were presented by 
Bernard Baruch -the then U.S. representative to the UNAEC- on 14 June 1946. 
Although Bernard Baruch made substantive modification in the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Report, he ultimately supported the Report's basic concept of an international 
agency with broad responsibilities for ownership and management, as well as 
research and development in the nuclear field. The United States' proposals, or the 
so-called Baruch Plan, consisted of two memoranda dealing, on the one, with the 
general problems of atomic energy, and, on the other, with its control. Regarding 
the general issues pertaining to the atomic energy, the Baruch Plan proposed the 
establishment of an international atomic development authority with a treaty. The first 
memorandum also listed which matters of substance should be included in the 
treaty of the proposed authority. Accordingly, the Baruch Plan proposed the 
followings in an extensive format
1.. . the provisions that the treaty should contain;
2.. . the purposes of the authority that the charter should state;
3.. . the specific provisions governing the functions and powers of the authority 
that the charter should contain;
4.. . and the provisions of enforcement that should be included in the treaty.
The second U.S. memorandum set forth the arguments for control that were 
formulated in the first memorandum, and particularly in favour of the proposed 
functions and powers of the authority. Since the aim of the treaty was to prevent 
the destructive uses of atomic energy and to promote the peaceful uses for the
*®^Crucial among the functions and powers of the atomic development authority proposed in the 
Baruch Plan was the authority's exclusive control or ownership of all uranium, thorium and other 
material which may be a source of atomic energy wherever present in potentially dangerous 
quantities, and the authority's right to acquire, construct, own and exclusively operate all facilities 
for the production of U-235, plutonium and such other fissionable materials.
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benefit of the mankind, then the general framework of argument contained the 
following reasonings:
1.. . the nuclear chain reaction depends on uranium, and all initial processes in 
the production of uranium and some subsequent processes are identical whatever 
the intended uses might be;
2.. . the core of any control system should thus be an effective dominion over all 
uranium and its fissionable derivatives;
3.. . control must attach to uranium from the moment of production and 
continue as long as there is any danger of destructive uses;
4.. . the exploitation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes required initial 
operations identical with those in a weapons programme;
5.. . the functions of preventing destructive use and promoting peaceful use 
should be vested in one agency; and
6.. . such a single agency can be more effective with its positive responsibility to 
promote, than would be an agency with mere duties of inspection and policing.
The memorandum thus addressed itself to specific functions envisaged for the 
proposed agency. Therefore, the Baruch Plan suggested the agency should:
1.. . own all source materials;
2.. . obtain and maintain complete and accurate information of world supplies of 
source material;
3.. . be the sole manufacturer and owner of fissionable material;^^^
4.. . have complete control as the owner and operator of all facilities which 
might contribute to weapons production;
103According to Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the term 
"special fissionable material" means Plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the 
isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing. The term "uranium 
enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233" means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both 
in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is 
greater than the ration of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature.
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5.. . have the right to lease nuclear material for peaceful purposes under proper 
safeguards;
6.. . have unhindered access to facilities that use nuclear material;
7.. . have exclusive rights of research in the field of atomic explosives;
8.. . not have a right to stockpile atomic weapons.
With a third memorandum, the United States proposed to eliminate the veto 
power of the permanent members of the Security Council with a view to punish 
immediately any violation. Hence, the plan proposed that there must be no veto to 
protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic 
energy for destructive purposes.
b... Soviet reaction
The Soviet response to the U.S. proposals came soon in the Commission 
meetings. The Soviets stressed the need for an immediate international convention 
for the prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons, and for the 
destruction of existing stocks. The response included the Soviet point of view with 
regard to the system of control. It was proposed to be an elaborate system which 
would ensure the observance of the convention. The Soviets equally emphasized the 
need for practical measures that should be adopted for a full and free exchange of 
scientific information in the atomic field. Though, both the Soviet and U.S. proposals 
seemed to suggest similar modes of action with respect to the prevention of spread 
of nuclear weapons while promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy, one important 
point of disagreement was the insistence of the Soviets to give the ultimate authority 
to the Security Council with regard to compliance issues. This 'ivould mean that the 
veto power of the permanent members of the UNSC would be active. As to the 
question of the functions of the proposed international atomic energy authority 
(which was suggested to be extended to all the national facilities) the Soviets were
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concerned with the principle of sovereignty. Accordingly, they argued that such a 
function of an international authority would be incompatible with state sovereignty 
and that it would mean an unlimited interference in the economic life of the 
countries on whose territories such controls would be carried out. In essence, the 
Soviets were unwilling to accept the U.S. insistence on international inspection and 
on the control of atomic energy to prevent production of atomic weapons. Hence, 
they asserted that a declaration outlawing these weapons would be sufficient. 
Despite Soviet opposition and obstruction, the Baruch Plan was discussed for several 
months in the UNAEC, and reported favourably in the UNAEC's first report 
submitted to the UNSC by a vote of ten in favour, with the Soviet Union and Poland 
abstaining.
The subject of control 'ivas discussed separately in the Commission, particularly 
in the Scientific and Technical Committee, consisting of one scientist from each 
country having a seat in the Commission. A broad exploration of the technically 
possible methods controlling atomic energy would inevitably lead to the 
consideration of problems of a non-technical or political nature which would have to 
be taken into account in a system of control. Therefore, it would be feasible for the 
Scientific and Technical Committee members to limit themselves to the scientific and 
technical aspects of the question of control. Though the information at the disposal 
of the Committee was limited and incomplete which would make a great deal of the 
conclusions in the Committee's findings hypothetical and conditional, it was equally 
argued that there was no basis m the available scientific facts for supposing that 
effective control would not be technologically feasible. The findings of the 
Committee were presented as some of the elements which should be incorporated 
in any complete and effective plan. These findings were set out in the UNAEC's first
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report to the Security Council, dated 31 December 1946 and they were elaborated in 
UNAEC's second report of 11 September 1947.104
11.. . UNAEC’s First Report to the UN Security Council
a... types of misuse of atomic enei'gy
In their report submitted to the consideration of the Security Council, the 
members of the UN Atomic Energy Commission put the emphasis on three distinct 
kinds of misuse of atomic energy. Accordingly, atomic energy would be used for 
military purposes through diversion of nuclear material from declared activities. 
Secondly, the same result would become possible by means of clandestine activities of 
states. Finally, unauthorised seizure of material or plants would result in removing 
them from the reach of the control agency. To overcome these difficulties the UN 
Atomic Energy Commission has come up with several suggestions. Regarding the 
problem of diversion of material from peaceful to military purposes, the report 
stated that:
1 .. . a single international control agency should be responsible for all 
safeguards;
2.. . the safeguards should be flexible enough to be adaptable to rapidly 
changing technology;
3.. . the objective of safeguards must be to provide effective control with the 
least interference in normal activities.
To deal with clandestine activities of states, on the other hand, the Commission 
assumed that:
1.. . governments should be required to submit frequent reports on all relevant 
matters;
no time were they unanimously accepted because the Soviet Union dissented, but they 
constituted the foundation for the consideration more than ten years later of the IAEA safeguard 
system. Allan McKnight, Atomic Safeguards..., p. 14.
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2.. . the international authority should co-ordinate all relevant information for 
the purpose of determining what areas were suspect of harbouring clandestine 
activities;
3.. . the authority's privileges of movement and inspection should include rights 
to conduct by ground and air.
The problem of seizure of materials or plants was recognised as primarily a 
political question, therefore it was considered only in a preliminary way.105
b... safeguards tei'minology
The United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, in its first report also brought 
clarity to the meanings of some of the terms used in the safeguards terminology, 
such as control, inspection, supervision, management, and licensing. Among them, 
control was taken as a general term which included any and all types of 
safeguards. Inspection, on the other hand, meant close independent scrutiny of 
plant operations which could include observation of points of entrance and exit from 
the plant and of activities within the plant. Supervision, however, meant continuous 
association in management's day-to-day operation.^^^ Whereas management meant 
direct authority over daily operations, licensing meant the granting of permission by 
the international authority to conduct certain activities under specified conditions.
lOSxhe main problems needing attention seemed to be the geographical dispersal of plants and of 
stocks of materials, and the reduction of material inventories and procedures for the emergency 
destruction of plants and materials before they could be seized.
106jypes of safeguards were defined as accounting for materials which meant the systematic 
measurement and reporting in prescribed form of quantities of key materials entering or leaving a 
plant, or in process or in storage. It would cover specification of the points at which measurements 
should be taken and the manner of presenting the resulting data in the accounts. 
l^^Supervision might require that plants be designed and constructed in a particular manner, or 
that the inspector have the right to order cessation of operations for the purpose of taking an 
inventory of materials in process.
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c... natural uranium &furthei' steps
As it was the case in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, the utmost importance of 
natural uranium for further steps in the manufacture of atomic bombs was also 
stressed in the first report of the UN Atomic Energy Commission. Consequently, 
the members of the Commission reasoned that mines and ore deposits of uranium 
would occupy a key place in any control system. Hence, an adequate system of 
safeguards would be possible provided that the inspectors had unrestricted access to 
all operations and equipment. For uranium enrichment plants, that is isotope 
separation plants, the Commission pointed out the virtual impossibility of obtaining 
a material balance regarding the technological level of mid 1940s. Because of the size 
and complexity of enrichment plants, the great amount of uranium which would be 
in process at any time made precise inspections difficult. As to reactors and chemical 
reprocessing plants which serve to extract plutonium from the irradiated fuel, the 
Commission reasoned the same way as it did for uranium enrichment plants. Taking 
into consideration that, either in the reactor or in the reprocessing plant there could 
be in any time significant quantities of plutonium or fissionable uranium U-235, any 
material diverted could directly go to the production of the bomb. Therefore, the 
Commission concluded that the management should be in the hands of the 
international agency. Considering the whole fuel cycle, from uranium mine to the 
end stages of reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel, the Commission suggested that 
the international agency should check the material content independently with both 
shipper and receiver in all transfers of nuclear material. The Commission also 
suggested that the international agency should control storage and shipment of 
materials, particularly highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
iii... UNAEC’s Second Report to the UN Security Council
The second report of UNAEC amplified the first report, but also attempted to 
meet some of the objections that international control constituted a restriction on the
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development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Thus, the proposed 
international agency would not be authorised to define the policy to be pursued in 
the production and use of the atomic energy. The second report also spelled out the 
limitations on the rights and duties of the inspectors. Accordingly, the second report 
suggested that:
1.. . inspections should be conducted only for purposes related to atomic 
energy;
2.. . domestic laws and customs in regard to personal privacy and property 
should be respected to the fullest extent consistent with effective safeguards;
3.. . confidential and private information acquired in the comse of inspection 
should not be disclosed;
4.. . and the international agency should pay just compensation for damage 
caused by its personnel in the course of inspection.
iv... Dissolution of UNAEC
The fundamental and unalterable opposition of the Soviets to the U.S. 
proposals affected the fate of the second report, too. Hence, the Soviets cast the only 
negative vote against the second report of the UNAEC. Clearly, by 1948, policy 
makers in the United States had decided that there was no further basis for 
negotiations on international control of atomic energy in the UNAEC, primarily 
because the Soviet Union opposed essential elements of a system of control as 
supported by the Western and Third World states, and also because the Soviets 
refused to accept the level of participation in the world community that would be 
required in the field of atomic energy. According to the U.S. government, 
fundamental points of disagreement were those that emerged in the immediate 
aftermath of the presentation of the Baruch Plan, and included ownership of source 
material; ownership, management and operation of dangerous facilities; research;
lOSsee, Allan McKnight, Atomic Safeguards ..., pp: 17-18.
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elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments; inspection (safeguards); 
and enforcement (sanctions). Then, the U.S. government recognized an impasse in 
the UNAEC negotiations and recommended they be suspended. This position was 
largely reflected in the third and final report of the UNAEC. The third report stated 
that the Commission has been unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union 
to even those elements considered essential from the technical point of view, and 
that the Commission has been forced to recognize that such an agreement was itself 
dependent on cooperation in broader fields of policy. Therefore, the Commission 
concluded that no useful purpose can be served by carrying on negotiations at the 
Commission level, and recommended that consultations be continued among the 
sponsors of the UNGA Resolution establishing the UNAEC.
Despite the failure of the UNAEC to come up with an agreed text for 
controlling atomic energy, it seems that even at a very early stage of the 
developments in that field the members of the Atomic Energy Commission have 
successfully foreseen the difficulties that the succeeding generations would 
experience in their efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This 
observation should not be surprising, since those who have come up with specific 
proposals to control the development of atomic energy were those scientists who 
had taken part in various stages of the development of nuclear energy in their 
countries that were advanced in the nuclear field. It would therefore be in their 
knowledge and expertise the 'side-effects' of nuclear energy beyond its peaceful uses 
in agriculture and medical science, and the ways and means to prevent misuses. 
Starting with the Acheson-Lilienthal report which prompted the U.S. proposals 
submitted to the UNAEC meetings by Bernard Baruch, the United States 
administration in particular committed itself to do its utmost in every international
^®^See, Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency ... pp. 53-55.
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forum to contain further proliferation of nuclear weapons.HO However, several 
members of the developing world, as well as the ones from the industrialised world, 
were not so keen to restrict themselves to making use of the 'benefits' of nuclear 
energy option. Hence, in the decades that followed the dissolution of the UN Atomic 
Energy Commission in 1949, the debate about disarmament and the control of 
atomic energy still continued in the United Nations.
B... Creation of the International Atomic Enerqg flgencg (IREfl)
If one is to mark the period between 1946-1953H1 from the point of view of 
the United States, secrecy and denial would well identify the U.S. policy to prevent 
spread of nuclear technologies and material. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946 
prohibited any peaceful nuclear co-operation of the United States until the U.S. 
Congress was satisfied that effective safeguards were in place. However, detonation 
of the first atomic bomb of the Soviet Union in 1949 and that of the United Kingdom 
in 1952 made it clear that the dissemination of nuclear technology was already 
underway.H2 British success with a fission bomb had increased pressure to 
share more secrets with this ally while it also threatened the U.S. sense of nuclear 
predominance. Moreover, the United States was concerned that the British might 
challenge their supremacy in the world nuclear market. The United States 
consequently revised its nuclear control policy.
1 ^^Notwithstanding such efforts, some U.S. politicians and private companies were criticized in 
the public domain in several instances for exporting the material and technology to the 
developing countries that were allegedly going nuclear (e.g., Israel and Pakistan).
1  ^ ^That is the period between the enactment of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act in 1946 and the U.S. 
President Eisenhower's famous "atoms for peace" speech in the UN General Assembly in 
December 1953.
 ^ H jh e  policy of nuclear denial upset a panoply of actors, not the least the wartime allies of the 
United States, namely France, the United Kingdom and Canada. All three countries had 
participated the Manhattan Project and considered the denial strategy a breach of the wartime 
arrangements for nuclear sharing. See, Darryl A. Howlett, EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards, 
London, The MacMillan Press, 1990. pp: 37-38.
 ^ H r  Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Congress and the Control o f  Peaceful Nuclear 
Activities, Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1985, p. 58.
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i... Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" Speech
On 8 December 1953, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the 
United Nations General Assembly on the subject of atomic energy and proposed the 
establishment of an international atomic energy agency. In his speech Eisenhower 
stressed the need for an international effort to use atomic energy for the welfare of 
humanity. He suggested that peaceful applications of atomic energy could be done if 
those governments that were principally involved would make contributions from 
their stockpiles of natural uranium and fissionable materials to an international 
atomic energy agency. A peaceful purpose, he suggested, was the production of 
electric power from special fissionable material which necessarily required supplies 
of natural uranium as well. Subsidiary uses of radioactivity in agriculture, medicine 
and other fields were also meant to be peaceful uses of atomic energy. In a period 
marked with Cold War polemics and discussions on destructive potential of nuclear 
power, Eisenhower's speech was received with tremendous acclaim.^'^
In the environment created by Eisenhower’s speech amplified with the 
enactment of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 195411^, many countries negotiated 
agreements with the United States in 1955.11^ In the General Assembly meeting of 
1954, the United States made it clear that the proposed agency would not interfere 
with the traditional methods of bilateral trade and scientific co-operation, but would 
be an additional channel for obtaining assistance for an atomic energy programme. 
It was also made clear that in the event of an international organisation being set up 
with a safeguards function, the two states would consult with a view to transferring
 ^ ^^Hovvever, while the Soviets' attitude was in line with the ideals presented in the atoms for peace 
speech and that they expressed their willingness to participate in discussions on Eisenhover's 
proposals, they equally questioned whether the means proposed in the speech would truly realise 
the ideals presented. Therefore, the Soviets contended that the atoms for peace proposal neither 
meant to halt the growing production of atomic weapons, nor to restrict the possibility of their use.
* ^^Significance of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is that it allowed the United States to 
enter into bilateral nuclear transfer agreements after a period of secrecy and denial.
 ^ * ^ h e  United Kingdom and Canada were also present in the suppliers market of nuclear 
material, equipment and facilities.
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to the organisation the administration of the safeguards obligation.^^^ No later 
than a month after the atoms for peace speech, the United States and the Soviet 
Union started to exchange views on Eisenhower's proposals. In the mean time, the 
USAEC and the U.S. Department of State were set on devising an outline of the 
proposed agency which would embody the vision of Eisenhower. The outline 
proposed contributions of uranium and fissionable material to be allocated by the 
agency for peaceful purposes.
ii... Multilateral Discussions on an International Authority
«... eight-nation group meetings
In mid 1954, the United States began discussing the modalities of an 
international atomic energy agency \vhth a group of states comprising Canada, 
France and the United Kingdom all of which had advanced nuclear programmes, 
and South Africa, Belgium, Portugal and Australia which were the producers of 
uranium. This group of states would soon be called as eight-nation group. During 
1955, the eight-nation group went on to consider the proposal circulated to the 
group member states by the United States as a first draft of a statute of the 
international agency envisaged to control the uses of atomic energy.^^O J q further 
these efforts, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the holding of an 
international scientific conference on atomic energy. In August 1955, a conference 
met in Geneva. The participants discussed the safeguards that would be required for
^Bilateral agreement between the United States and a recipient state provided for safeguards 
over any assistance given by the United States and for their administration by inspectors of the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC).
^^^Hence, the supply of nuclear material received by the agency would be used to encourage 
world-wide research and development of peaceful uses of atomic energy by assuring that 
engineers and scientists of the world have sufficient materials to conduct such activities and by 
fostering interchange of information.
 ^ ^^he Soviet Union was notified separately by the United States about these consultations, and 
these bilateral negotiations proceeded, albeit slowly, along with the discussions in the eight-nation
fX ^ ·I'^'^he first draft was discussed in the eight-nation group and the resulting second draft including
the changes was submitted to the consideration of the Soviet Union.
64
peaceful uses of atomic energy undertaken through an international agency. It was 
concluded that: physical security complemented by material accounting would be required 
for the international agency's safeguard systemX^^
b... tivelve-nation group meetings
At the end of the Geneva Conference, the United Nations distributed the 
second draft of the statute to eighty-four states or specicdised agencies of the United 
Nations with a request for comments from all states. The draft statute was then 
discussed in the Tenth Session of the General Assembly held in the last quarter of the 
year. In the mean time, with the addition of Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India and the 
Soviet Union, the eight-nation group enlarged to twelve-nation group. The twelve- 
nation group was to prepare a draft statute taking into consideration the views 
expressed in the General Assembly debate. That draft would be submitted to a final 
conference in the United Nations. The draft produced by twelve-nation group was 
substantially different from the one prepared by eight-nation group. India and the 
Soviet Union put their emphasis mostly on the safeguards provisions. It was then 
decided that: the obligation o f  a state to submit to safeguards should not derive fivm 
membership in the agency, but from the application for and reception o f agency 
assistance.
iii... Debate Over Safeguarding Bilateral Agreements
«... the British view
During the so-called private discussions among the nuclear powers, bilateral 
agreements between the supplier and receiver countries were seen as a problem. 
The British argued that unless safeguards were applied to bilateral agreements as
^^^This was a theoretical conclusion that would later be reflected in the practice of International 
Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards provisions.
^^^This would mean that those states with advanced nuclear technologies would be exempted 
from safeguards application, for it would be hardly likely that these states would apply to the 
agency for technical assistance.
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well as Agency assisted projects, the safeguards system would not work efficiently. 
If bilateral agreements were to be exempt from control, this would provide 
countries that needed help with the possibility to go ahead with nuclear research and 
development while at the same time avoiding control. For the control to be 
effective, it was, furthermore, necessary that all big supplier countries should agree 
on control of bilateral agreements. If such an understanding could be established, it 
would be likely that countries that did not want to be controlled, would still end up 
by accepting control in order to get assistance. 1^3
b... the U.S. and the Soviet vieivs
Before the start of the twelve-nation group discussions in March 1955, the 
Americans raised the question of control of bilateral agreements suggesting 
informally that the major nuclear supplier countries might agree to insert safeguards 
against diversion of fissile materials to military purposes into their bilateral 
agreements with other countries. It was suggested that this could be agreed outside 
of the international agency. The Soviets did not want to commit themselves at that 
stage, but promised to come back to the question once the treaty on the 
international atomic energy agency would be ratified. However, the question could 
not be avoided at the twelve-nation group meeting. Already during the discussions 
at the Tenth session of the UN General Assembly, there had been numerous 
negative reactions regarding the safeguards contained in the draft that was then 
discussed. The message to the nuclear powers was that few countries would 
willingly comply with the strict safeguards attached to receiving agency assistance if 
the same assistance could be procured through bilateral agreements with no 
safeguards attached. At the twelve-nation group meeting, a new paragraph was in 
fact added to the safeguards provisions that made agency controls of bilateral *
*23see Astrid Borland, "Hope Over Fear: The Establishment of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency", Forsvarsstiidier, The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo, 3 /1995, pp: 15 - 16.
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agreements possible, by authorising the agency to verify compliance also with 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements if the parties requested it.
iv... Issues in the Conference on the IAEA Statute; pros and cons
The conference on the statute of the proposed international atomic energy 
agency commenced on 20 September 1956 with the participation of eighty-one states 
that were then represented in the United Nations. The natural tendency for the 
twelve-nations and the widespread recognition among the participants was that the 
draft statute tabled represented the maximum consensus attainable, and thus it was 
a comprise document. However, there were also objections of a group of states 
which argued that a compromise was reached beyond their knowledge, therefore 
the document did not fully satisfy their needs and expectations. Hence, they 
proposed amendments to the draft statute. But, most of the amendments were 
relatively uncontroversial. The Conference finally endorsed the Statute^^^ ^nd the 
drafting of the Statute of the international agency ended with its approval on 23 
October 1956 at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. Following the 
eighteenth ratificationl^S^ the Statute entered into force on 29 July 1957. Thus, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally came into being since then, 
and the first General Conference of the Agency was opened on 1 October, 1957, in
Vienna.126
a... disarm am ent obligatiùn
One of the principal issues of debate in the Conference on the Statute of the 
IAEA were those related to disarmament obligations of the nuclear "haves" versus
124of some eighty proposals for amendment, about sixty were considered and about thirty were 
passed. See, Lawrence Scheinman, ibid., p. 71. See also, Allan McKnight, ibid., p, 23. 
l^^In order for the Statute to enter into force, three of the required eighteen ratification had to 
come from among the following states: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, 
France, or Canada.
^ 2^ ’he year 1957 also witnessed the first hydrogen bomb test by the United Kingdom, and the 
launching of Sputnik I by the Soviet Union.
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the safeguards undertakings of the "have-nots". These could be considered as 
'follow-up debates' on linking the establishment of the Agency to various kinds of 
disarmament measures. During the initial phases of negotiations Americans had in 
mind to make the international agency an instrument for the promotion of 
disarmament by refusing agency assistance to countries that had military nuclear 
programs. However, Canadians rejected this idea but insisted that such 
disarmament issues should be handled separately. The British on the other hand, 
concluded that linking the disarmament issues to the functioning of the agency 
would not be practical because, they believed, it would not work due to the reason 
that it would not be accepted by all the countries, particularly by France.1^7
For the sake of reaching a universal agreement, the objectives relating to 
complete disarmament could not have been made part of the Statute. In their part, 
the Soviets wanted to make the establishment of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency dependent upon an agreement on a nuclear test ban. 128 Though these 
states maintained their pre-Conference views during the Conference on the Statute, 
ultimately no linkage was envisaged in the Statute between the disarmament goal 
and the functioning of the IAEA.
early 1950s also witnessed the effort of the Western European countries to establish their 
own international organization which' would coordinate and control the development of nuclear 
energy in the frontiers of the six countries that established the European Economic Community 
(EEC). That organization, namely EURATOM, was central to debates both between the Eastern 
and Western blocks, and among the Western European countries themselves. In those years France, 
under the leadership of De Gaulle, was committed to "going nuclear" at all costs, and the French 
Parliament became an arena of ideological confrontations on whether the country should pursue 
atomic ambitions or not. Ultimately, the prevailing decision was going nuclear. For an excellent 
elaboration of these events that led to the emergence and evolution of EURATOM, see, Darryl A. 
Howlett, EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards,
128j[,e Soviets argued that the American proposal for the establishment of the IAEA did not 
meet with its basic purpose, that is the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. They maintained 
that helping countries to establish a nuclear power industry would not lead to a reduction of the 
stocks of nuclear materials that were needed for the manufacture of nuclear bombs, but would, on 
the contrary, lead to a world-wide increase of fissile material stocks. The Soviets therefore 
proposed to prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to establish appropriate 
international control over this prohibition. Americans found this proposal totally unacceptable. 
See, Astrid Forland, ibid., p. 13.
/
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b... safeguards on source rnateiHal
Many states voiced objections about safeguards provisions of the proposed 
statute. Particularly, India argued that the safeguards provisions of the Agency had 
to be applicable to all states, and not merely to recipients of assistance. One subject 
of controversy on safeguards were whether source materials would be safeguarded. 
The draft statute proposed safeguards over such material, that is natural uranium. In 
case safeguards were to be applied to source material, Belgium, Australia, Canada 
and the United Kingdom would be among those states which would be directly 
affected. The main argument against the application of safeguards to source 
materials was that natural deposits of uranium were widespread in the world, and 
that if safeguards attached to uranium supplied by the international agency, many 
states would be obliged to extract uranium from indigenous ores at a high cost. 
Therefore, uranium producers would be badly affected financially. The counter 
argument in support of safeguards over source material rested on the reasoning 
that a state could construct both a reactor and a reprocessing plant without external 
assistance, and that the supply of uranium through the international agency would 
be a cause of applying safeguards to verify non-military use. The proposals that 
were advanced to amend the draft statute regarding application of safeguards to 
source material were rejected.
c... safeguards on produced m ateiial
A related issue of debate during the Statute Conference was on the provision 
of the draft statute to apply safeguards to produced material. Since the most likely 
path to manufacturing an atomic bomb required supply of uranium and a reactor to 
irradiate that uranium, and chemical reprocessing of the irradiated fuel for the 
extraction of plutonium (U-239) then aU these steps were envisaged to be taken 
under the scope of safeguards. According to the draft statute, in case the 
international agency provided any recipient state with either natural uranium or
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such equipment as reactors or chemical reprocessing plants, then the supply of any 
of such ingredients would necessitate the application of safeguards to the supplied 
material and to any subsequent generations of produced material resulting from the 
use of the initial produced material. Many developing countries objected to 
safeguards on produced material per se, apparently on the ground that these 
materials were partly the result of their indigenous efforts too. That is, these 
materials were produced by plants for which the countries carried considerable 
managerial and financial responsibility. This objection was reinforced by the 
statutory rights proposed for the international agency to approve the means to be 
used for chemical reprocessing, and to require deposit with the international agency 
of any excess of plutonium over what was required for peaceful research and 
industrial utiüsation.l29 On the contrary, the argument in support of the statutory 
provisions was that access to the free use of a stockpile of plutonium was the last 
step before fabrication of a weapon, and that if a stockpile resulted from the 
assistance provided by the international agency, then the use had to be limited to 
peaceful purposes and verified by the international agency.
d... state sovereignty
Beyond the modalities of application and the nature of international agency 
safeguards, several other issues were also debated during the Conference on the 
IAEA Statute. For instance, many states advanced the Soviet argument of 1947 (in 
the UNAEC meetings) that the safeguards function of the international agency 
would lead to interference in the varied fields of the life of a state. The sovereignty 
argument was accompanied by the discrimination argument. Less developed 
countries contended that the countries with advanced nuclear technologies would
129xhe purpose of the right to require deposit was to prevent the stockpiling in national hands of 
material suitable for weapons, a purpose clearly stated in the Baruch Plan as desirable in an 
international system. A further purpose was to avoid the risk of seizure by another state. See, A. 
McKnight, ibid., p. 34.
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not require international agency's assistance in contrast to the growing need of 
assistance of developing countries for diverse uses of atomic energy. Hence, the 
countries from the less developed parts of the world would then be obliged to 
accept international agency safeguards because of accepting that agency's assistance. 
This would clearly mean discrimination.l^O
e... definition of military activities
Throughout the negotiations there was a recurring debate on whether 
"military activities" as opposed to "peaceful activities" should be given a definition in 
the Statute. "Military" and "peaceful" are terms that are used repeatedly in the Statute 
to designate either the kind of the activities which the international agency- 
sponsored project should have no relation with, or the kind of the projects that the 
international agency is to promote. During the negotiating process there seems to 
have existed a kind of tacit majority view, which ruled that it was best to avoid 
defining the terms. At the final Conference, the French defied this consensus and 
submitted an amendment suggesting that "military applications of the atomic 
explosion and of the toxicity of radioactive products" were the only uses of nuclear 
energy that shoiild be regarded as military uses.^^l The uncertainty created by the 
definition of the terms led the IAEA to be very careful about the kind of the projects 
it would be involved. Therefore, the projects that would be receiving international 
agency's assistance had to be unambiguously peaceful. It thus meant that the term 
military would be interpreted as meaning an imambiguously war or defence related 
activity. Consequently, the main and perhaps the only abuse of Agency assistance 
that the Agency sought to prevent would be the production of nuclear bombs. ^ 32
ISQphe discrimination argument was to be high on the agenda of many states in the course of the 
1960s and 1970s, as a ground for objection to IAEA safeguards, particularly during and after the 
negotiations on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
l^^Whatthe French wanted was a confirmation that nuclear propulsion of ships should be 
regarded as a peaceful activity. See, A. Forland, ibid., p. 15.
132pau| Szasz, The Law and Practices o f  the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna; IAEA, 
Legal Series No. 7, 1970, p. 352.
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/... discrimination
One of the issues that caused most trouble in the final stages of the negotiation 
process was the discriminatory aspects of the Statute. The Statute was in fact 
fundamentally discriminatory in that it was not membership of the Agency that 
determined a country's relationship with the Agency, but whether the country was 
at the supplying or receiving end of Agency assistance. The difference in status was 
expressed through the Articles on safeguards; on composition of the Board of 
Governors; and on the distribution of power between the Board and the General 
Conference.
C... Statutoru Prouisions of the IREfl Relating to Safeguards
The basic authority for the application of International atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards is its Statute. In so far as safeguards obligations are incurred, the IAEA 
Statute established a framework for implementation. The Statute comprises twenty- 
three articles encompassing a lot many issues extending from the objectives and 
functions of the Agency to its relationship with other organisations and to the 
provisions for the settlement of disputes. From among these articles and paragraphs 
and/or sub-paragraphs within the articles, some are directly relevant to application 
of the Agency safeguards. These articles and the paragraphs are; Article II; Article HI, 
paragraph A, sub-paragraph 5; Article XII, paragraph A, sub-paragraphs 1 thru 7. It 
is important to note before spelling down the above noted articles and paragraphs 
that, according to the statutory provisions, states are not obliged to submit to 
safeguards unless they receive Agency assistance; or supplier states request the 
application of safeguards to bilateral agreements; or the states themselves 
voluntarily ask for the application of Agency safeguards. That is, though the Agency 
is legally authorized to engage in and conduct the activities set out in the Statute, this 
is not a discretionary authority to impose unilaterally the statutory rights of the 
Agency on the states.
72
1.. . Objectives (Article II)
The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic 
energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far 
as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or 
control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. ^ 33
11.. . Functions (Article 111)^ 34
A. The Agency is authorised:
5. To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that, special 
fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made 
available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not 
used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at 
the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the 
request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy;135
111.. . Agency Safeguards (Article XII)
A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the 
Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the Agency shall 
have the following rights and responsibilities to the extent relevant to the project or 
arrangement:
1. To examine the design of specialised equipment and facilities, including 
nuclear reactors, and to approve it only from the view-point of assuring that it will
133j{^e twelve-nation draft statute contained no definition of "military purpose". Two definitions 
were proposed. The first read: " Any military purpose shall mean the production, testing or use of 
thermonuclear or radiological weapons." The second stated that "The only uses of atomic energy 
which shall be regarded as uses for non-peaceful purposes are military applications of the atomic 
explosion and of the toxicity of radioactive products." Both proposals were withdrawn, and the 
IAEA statute contains no definition of "military purpose". See, Allan McKnight, ibid., pp: 35 -36. 
^34^rticle III comprises four paragraphs A, B, C and D, and total of 12 sub-paragraphs.
^35jn paragraph D of the Article III, it was made explicit, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Statute, that the activities of the Agency would be carried out with due observance of the sovereign
rights of the States.
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not further any military purpose, that it complies with applicable health and safety 
standards, and that it will permit effective application of the safeguards provided for 
in this article;
2. To require the observance of any health and safety measures prescribed by 
the Agency;
3. To require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in 
ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or produced 
in the project or arrangement;
4. To call for and receive progress report;
5. To approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of irradiated 
materials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will not lend itself to 
diversion of materials for military purposes and will comply with applicable health 
and safety standards; to require that special fissionable materials recovered or 
produced as a by-product be used for peaceful purposes imder continuing Agency 
safeguards for research or in reactors, existing or under construction, specified by 
the member or members concerned; and to require deposit with the Agency of any 
excess of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product 
over what is needed for the above-stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of 
these materials, provided that thereafter at the request of the member of members 
concerned special fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency shall be 
returned promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the same 
provisions as stated above;
6. To send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, 
designated by the Agency after consultations with the State or States concerned, 
who shall have access at all times to all places and data and to any person who by
is often noted that stringency of EURATOM's safeguards provisions stems from a similar 
clause in the EURATOM Treaty which authoizes the EURATOM inspectors to have access at all 
times to all p laces  within the frontiers of the member countries. It is however worthy of noting 
that, in contrast to the statutory limitations on the IAEA concerning unlimited access, the 
EURATOM member states are bound to accept EURATOM inspectors at all times to all places in
74
reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, and facilities which are 
required by this Statute to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source and 
special fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to determine 
whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any 
military purpose .... with the health and safety measures .... and with any other 
conditions prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States 
concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency shall be accompanied by 
representatives of the authorities of the State concerned, if that State so requests, 
provided that inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the 
exercise of their functions;
7. In the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or States to 
take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate 
assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the 
Agency or a member in furtherance of the project.
The actual application of safeguards is conducted on the basis of safeguards 
agreements negotiated between the Agency and the safeguarded state, within the 
framework of the Statute and the Agency safeguards documents that have been 
developed by the IAEA members and the Secretariat and approved by the Board of 
Governors and confirmed by the General Conference. These documents have put 
the basic concepts of the Statute into operational form and have in some cases 
narrowed the Agency's authority, although always consistent with the principle of 
ensuring that the Agency can carry out its safeguards responsibilities.
order to carry out their inspections. On the other hand, as Lawrence Scheinman observed, the 
apparently sweeping authority of the IAEA to have "access at all times" itself was limited in the 
Statute. This authority is tied to data, places, and persons related to safeguarded material, 
equipment, or facilities and does not constitute a right for inspectors to roam freely in the territory 
of the safeguarded state. L. Scheinman, ibid., p. 126.
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D... Organizational Structure of the IflEfl
The IAEA is a member of the general United Nations system of organizations, 
and is requested to report to various UN organs (e.g., reporting to the UN Security 
Council in cases of non-compliance). But, with its 122 member states, is an 
independent agency, and it doesn't receive directions from any of the UN organs. 
The Agency consists of three principal organs, namely the Board of Governors, the 
General Conference, and the Secretariat headed by the Director General.
i... The Board of Governors
Of the three organs of the IAEA, the Board of Governors acts as the executive 
organ, therefore it is the most important for the operation of the Agency. The Board 
has a very strong position relative to the General Conference, and it has played a 
key role in the development of the safeguards system. During the Conference on 
the Statute of the IAEA there were several arguments and counterarguments 
concerning the composition of the IAEA Board of Governors. The discussions in this 
regard revealed the differences between the nuclear haves and have-nots over 
representation on the Board, and the relationship between the Board and the 
General Conference. Developing countries seeked for wider representation in the 
Board, and minimum contribution to financing the Agency. These countries were 
not satisfied with the American outline of the direction of the Agency. Throughout 
the negotiating process the original American idea of a relatively small and powerful 
board was gradually modified into a bigger organ losing power to the General 
Conference, where all members had a seat. Thus at the twelve-nation group 
meetings, the composition of the Board was expanded from 16 to 23, and 
geographic distribution was emphasized at the expense of competence, and 
currently the Board of Governors consists of 35 member states.
^3^The 39th Regular Session of the IAEA's General Conference was held in Vienna from 18 to 
23 September 1995. It was attended by 103 member states which elected eleven new members of 
the Board of Governors for a two-year term. The new members are, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark,
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Furthermore, the exercise of some of the functions of the Board of Governors 
was made subject to rules approved by the General Gonference, thus increasing the 
influence of the Conference over the Board.^38 gy ¿gg terms of the Statute it was 
agreed that the Board of Governors would comprise of the countries that were most 
advanced in the technology of atomic energy as well as countries that were 
producers of the uranium ore.^^  ^ Among the legislative po^vers of the Board of 
Governors are the decisions on membership applications to the Agency, the Agency 
budget, and the programs and projects to be assisted by the Agency. The Board also 
approves all safeguards arrangements between the states and the Agency, as well as 
the safety standards in the nuclear installations. The responsibility to appoint the 
Director General rests on the Board of Governors. The Board operates by majority 
vote, with no veto.
ii... The General Conference
The General Conference can be viewed as analogous to the General Assembly 
of the United Nations. The Member States to the IAEA are represented in the 
General Conference, and discuss the general issues relating to the Agency programs 
and the annual reports of the Director General, the Agency budget for the 
forthcoming year, applications for new membership in the agency, and to elect the 
members of the Board of Governors. The General Conference meets only once a 
year generally in Vienna. On several occasions, in response to invitations from
Egypt, Rep. of Korea, Kuwait, the Netherland, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Romania, and Saudi Arabia. 
The other twenty-four members of the Board which have either been designated by the General 
Conference in 1994 are; Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, Ghana, India, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Slovak Rep., South Africa, 
Spain, Thailand. Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. See the IAEA 
document, GC(39)/28, 20/9.
138 Paul Szasz. The Law and Practices o f  the International Atomic Energy Agency, pp: 40-41. 
*^^As Lawrence Scheinman observed, the method of choosing the Governors was considered with 
particular care during the Statute Conference. The formula that was finally agreed upon balanced 
the geographic considerations with the capacity of the cooperating nations to supply technical or 
material support to Agency projects.
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member governments the annual meetings can be convened elsewhere.l^O The 
General Conference has the authority on matters referred to it by the Board or "to 
propose matters for consideration by the Board and to request from the Board 
reports on any matters relating to the functions of the A g e n c y " .The true value of 
the General Conference lies not in its limited formal powers, but in its role as a 
forum where those not represented on the Board of Governors can express their 
views and exchange information, and where Member States can finalize 
bilateral/multilateral agreements in the nuclear field. 1^2
iii... The Secretariat
The Secretariat is the operating organ of the IAEA and is headed by the 
Director General who is appointed by the Board of Governors, and approved by the 
General Conference, for a four-year term that can be extended.1^3 pive Deputy 
Directors assist the Director General in the Administration, Technical Cooperation, 
Nuclear Energy and Safety, Research and Isotopes, and the Safeguards 
Departments.144 Two advisory bodies, namely the Scientific Advisory Committee 
(SAC) and the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), 
make recommendations to the Director General on technical matters. The members 
of SAGSI, although not formally government representatives, are appointed in
140phe General Conference has been held in Tokyo in 1965. in Mexico city in 1972, in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1976, and in New Delhi in 1979. The meetings are usually held in September every 
year and last for a week.
^41statute of the IAEA, Article V. F.2.
^42Lavvrence Scheinman, The IAEA dnd World Nuclear Order, ... p. 83.
143jj^e first Director-General of the IAEA was the U.S. Congressman W. Sterling Cole. At the 
end of Cole's four-year term, the Swedish nuclear scientist Sigvar Eklund took over the office and 
served for more than two decades (1961-1982). Since then, the third and the present Director 
General of the IAEA is again a Swedish, but this time a diplomat. Dr. Hans Blix. In September 
1993, Dr. Blix has been reappointed to this fourth four-year term in the office.
^44l . Scheinman noted (in 1987) that ever since the departure of Sterling Cole in 1961. the 
deputy director general for administration (who has staffing, external relations, and a general 
oversight responsibility) has been an American. The technical cooperation post, established in 
1964, has been filled by a national from the Third World; research and isotopes by a national 
from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nation; nuclear energy 
and safety, by a Soviet national; and the safeguards post has been occupied by an Australian, two 
Swiss, and a German.
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consultation with the governments of their states. While this committee serves as a 
source of technical advice to the Director General, it is argiied that its usefulness has 
been hindered by the inevitable government connection.145
David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, London: 
Taylor and Francis, 1985, p.67.
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CHAPTER IV. EVOLUTION OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS
DOCUMENTS
H... Oueruietu
Among the principal activities of the IAEA, enlarging "the contribution of 
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world" constitutes an 
important proportion^^b However, it is the Agency's prime responsibility of 
applying safeguards to the nuclear activities of the states that makes it really 
significant with regard to its role in international politics. The concept of safeguards 
itself changed substantially between the post-Second World War period and the U.S. 
President Eisenhower’s famous "Atoms for Peace" speech at the United Nations in 8 
December 1953. Initially, the atomic safeguards were conceived as an integral part of 
a system of international ownership, management and control of sensitive nuclear 
facilities. 147 However, present day nuclear safeguards are based on a fundamentally 
different approach that was developed as a result of the change in the United States 
policy on nuclear cooperation which was reflected philosophically in the Atoms for 
Peace speech, and practically in the revision in 1954 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 
1946 to permit international nuclear cooperation. The new approach abandoned the 
earlier notion o f an international monopoly in favour o f a system o f international verification 
o f obligations accepted by states with respect to nationally owned and controlled nuclear 
activities. An important underlying assumption of the new approach is that it is 
possible to achieve a separation between peaceful and military nuclear activities if 
appropriate assurances, in the form of national undertakings and pledges, are 
established and maintained -and, of course, if such assurances are subject to an 
effective verification system based on international safeguards including inspection. 
Hence, in this framework safeguards are not an arm of a supranational authority as
146ia e A Statute, Article II.
147j|^g Baruch plan of mid-1940s, had proposed direct control of the nuclear material that were 
essential for the manufacture of nuclear explosives.
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they would have been if the Baruch plan and the UNAEC's reports had been 
materialised.
Safeguards may be comprehensive or Limited to specific materials and facilities 
depending upon the scope of the underlying commitments to which they apply. 
Safeguards are not intended to seek out clandestine operations or undeclared activities or to 
govern or regulate national action. Their function is to monitor, audit and report, and to 
verify that states are in compliance with their voluntary undertakings not to use nuclear 
materials and facilities under safeguards for military purposes. They are not intended to 
prevent national accumulation of safeguarded weapon-usable material. Safeguards 
are important because many of the institutions and instrumentalities that collectively 
constitute the nuclear non-proliferation regime rely on their effects. The Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), The Nuclear Supplier Guidelines (NSG), and the nuclear 
cooperation policies of the principal nuclear suppliers are dependent on effective 
international safeguards for their own utility in supporting nuclear non-proliferation 
and international cooperation and trade in nuclear materials and technology. Thus, 
safeguards have become the crux o f an effective international nuclear regime. However, 
safeguards need the reciprocal support of other non-proliferation institutions and 
intrumentalities .148
Soon after the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 
Board of Governors faced the problem of applying safeguards when Japan asked 
the Agency for three tons of natural uranium, in October 1956, for a small size 
research reactor that was under construction. Hence, pursuant to Article XI of the 
IAEA Statute, an agreement between the Agency and Japan had to be signed in
^48(^hanging circumstances and conditions arising from developments in the nuclear field or 
from the international environment may give rise to still other mechanisms or institutions to 
complement and reinforce safeguards in the future. See, in these regards. Lawrence Scheinman, 
ibid., pp; 121 - 123.
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order to make sure that the natural uranium supplied to Japan would not be used 
for military purposes.1^9 Japanese request for Agency assistance accentuated
two important aspects of safeguards implementation. The first aspect was that 
general regulations for safeguards were needed in preference to a series of ad hoc 
approaches. And, the second was that, the ad hoc approach to the Japanese 
agreement would cover only the initial stage and would need further specifications 
at subsequent stages. It was also anticipated that in the decades to come, much 
larger national atomic energy programs of many developing and industrialized 
countries u'ould involve a lot many such activities. Hence, the Board of Governors 
could then be called upon to make hundreds of such ad hoc decisions on relevant 
safeguards. Thus, the IAEA Director General Sterling Cole proposed, in June 1959, a 
set of general safeguards regulations and presented to the consideration of the 
Board of Governors.
B... The First IflEH Safeguards Document: INFCIRC/26
The IAEA Board of Governors discussed at length the proposals presented by 
the Director General, and referred to a drafting committee. The resulting draft was 
further discussed by the Board. After the final alterations by a group of experts, the 
Board adopted the draft document. Following the confirmation by the General 
Conference after lengthy discussions, Board again took up the subject in
^49^ draft agreement was placed before the Board in January 1959 and discussed over several 
days. In addition to the undertaking against military use, Japan also agreed not to transfer the 
safeguarded material outside Japan. These two obligations extended to both the uranium supplied 
and to any special fissionable material (in this case, plutonium) produced by its use. The 
safeguards clause provided that (1) the safeguards provided for in Article XII.A of the Statute 
were relevant and (2)SubJect to any relevant general regulations that may be adopted by the Board 
the details of the application of Agency safeguards shall be determined from time to time by the 
Board after consultation by the Director General with Japan. See McKnight, ibid., p. 46.
^^^Both Allan McKnight and Lawrence Scheinman note that the lengthy discussions both in the 
Board of Governors and the General Conference were of political rather than technical in 
character. Allan McKnight further notes that, some countries even though they had voted for the 
safeguards provisions of the IAEA Statute maintained in the Board the political objections which 
they had advanced in the Statute Conference. Ibid., p. 48. Lawrence Scheinman remarks that the 
first IAEA Safeguards Document INFCIRC/26 was negotiated at a time when the political 
environment in the Agency still put a strain on constructive cooperation in the field of safeguards. 
India, supported by the Soviet Union, had sought to impede progress in implementing safeguards.
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January 1961 and adopted the Agency's first safeguards document, namely the 
INFCIRC/26.1^1 During the course of discussions both in the Board and in the 
General Conference, several issues attracted much attention of the member states, 
and were hotly debated.
1.. . Debate Over Safeguards Method
The question of whether applying general safeguards provisions to bilateral 
agreements between the Agency and the states seeking assistance, or considering 
each application separately (i.e., case by case approach) was one particular issue of 
concern. Those who preferred case by case approach were concerned with the lack 
of knowledge and experience on safeguards, both in the Agency and in national 
administrations. On the other hand, those who favoured the adoption of general 
rules argued that it was impossible for the Agency to know the general state of 
development in each member states. They then advanced the foUo%ving arguments 
in favour of general principles and against the case by case method; 1^2
1.. . states contemplating requests for the assistance of the Agency in a nuclear 
project would want to know in advance what the safeguards would be;153
2.. . states desiring to request the Agency to apply safeguards to multilateral or 
bilateral arrangements would want to know in advance what the safeguards would 
be;
3.. . two regional organizations in Western Europe were considering schemes 
for the application of safeguards.1^4 IAEA, by adopting general rules, would 
thus set the standards and prevent divergence among the various safeguards 
systems. *
viewing them fundamentally discriminating against developing nations. Ibid., p 128. Similar views 
regarding the same matter were expressed by Darryl Howlett of the University of Southampton to 
the author during an interview.
* ^^lNFCIRC/26 was designed to apply only to reactors of less than 100 megawatts (thermal). 
^^^See, A. McKnight, ibid., pp: 49 -50.
153jj^g adoption of general rules was therefore a pre-requisite to the Agency's supply function. 
154xhe two organizations were ENEA (the nuclear branch of OECD), and EURATOM.
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4.. . the establishment of rules for IAEA safeguards would encourage 
disarmament negotiators by demonstrating to them the possibility of framing rules 
for verification of sensitive national activities.
11.. . General Rules For Inspectors
The IAEA Board of Governors also considered a set of general rules regarding 
the Agency inspectors. It was however clear that the rules would not operate unless 
they would be incorporated into a legal agreement between the state and the 
Agency. Those who opposed the adoption of general rules argued that the 
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA which had been adopted 
by the Board in October 1959 would s u f f i c e . On the contrary, those who 
favoured general rules argued that the Agreement in mention lacked some essential 
provisions, such as rules to govern the designation of inspectors. In the result of 
lengthy discussions, the Board decided that the Inspector General and all officers of 
professional grade in the Division of Inspection would be appointed by the Director 
General as staff officials of the Agency, after the Director General had submitted 
applications recommended by him to the Board for approval. 1^6
C... The Second IHEfl Safeguards Document: INFCIRC/66
The Indian nuclear development program that included the installation of two 
large power reactors that were planned to be bought from the United States and 
Canada, revealed the limitations of the INFCIRC/26. Because, the U.S. domestic 
nuclear regulations required that a bilateral agreement be signed with India
155jhe Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities applies to the Agency itself as a corporate 
juridical personality; to the representatives of member states to the Agency; and to the staff 
officials and experts on missions for the Agency. The Agreement was designated to cover all 
IAEA staff while engaged on official duties, but it contains some special provisions regarding 
inspectors.
156a  few years later, in 1964, the Board decided, on the recommendation of the Director General, 
to amalgamate the Divisions of Safeguards and Inspection into a single division, and the Inspector 
General was appointed as departmental head assisted by a Divisional Director. See, McKnight, 
ibid., pp: 51- 52.
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providing for the application of safeguards. Moreover, the U.S. nuclear policy of the 
period was endorsing the transfer of the administration of such bilateral safeguards 
agreements to the IAEA. The clear aim was to promote the IAEA. In the early 1960s, 
there were also several other countries, particularly Japan, seeking for large nuclear 
power reactors. It then became quite obvious that the scope of the INFCIRC/26 
would not meet such requests. Hence, in February 1963 the representative of the 
United States in the Board of Governors proposed that the scope of the existing 
document be expanded to cover the large power reactors. Discussions took place in 
the Board upon the draft prepared in that regard by the Director General, and the 
expansion was adopted by the B o a r d . I t  was equally decided to review the 
existing safeguards document. The committee of the whole Board to review the 
Safeguards Document met in April-May and October 1964 and in January 1965. 
During the total of thirty-two meetings the technical content in the discussions was 
high. When the Board came to consider the proposed new document in February 
1965, the arguments like 'discrimination' and 'lack of universality' were again raised 
by some Governors, particularly by the Indian Governor. It was furthermore 
argued that there should be no safeguards on equipment components for nuclear 
plants. This argument was met by providing for safeguards only where a facility 
was substantially supplied by the Agency rather than merely substantially assisted 
by it. A working group within the Board attempted to draw up a list of items of the 
equipment which would justify the supplying authority, whether the IAEA or a 
state, in requiring safeguards over the equipment, the facility which incorporated it 
and the nuclear material passing through it.^^  ^But agreement could not be reached 
on the adoption of the list. In the result, the Board provisionally adopted a new 
safeguards document by a vote of twenty-one in favour, none against and two
l^"^Following the decision of the Board, the General Conference confirmed the extension with 57 
votes in favour, four against and six abstentions. McKnight, ibid., p. 55.
1587he items listed were substantial prerequisites to the construction of reactors and included 
only such items as pressure vessels for American type power stations, and on load refuelling 
machines for British and Canadian type power stations.
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abstentions. In September 1965 the General Conference unanimously endorsed the 
decision of the Board. The new document of 1965, namely the INFCIRC/66 was 
more direct and comprehensible when compared to INFCIRC/26 of 1961. It was 
constructed so as to be applicable to bilateral agreements as well as IAEA projects, 
and its provisions could be readily incorporated by reference in bilateral agreements 
between states.l^^ The Safeguards Document of 1965 is reviewed twice in 1966 and 
1968, and its scope is extended to include the reprocessing plants and the 
conversion/ fabrication plants.
1.. . Inclusion of Reprocessing Plants
The reprocessing plants had always been regarded as the crucial plants in the 
nuclear fuel cycle, because in them the plutonium is separated from the used fuel 
and is in its most accessible form for ready diversion and instant use in a weapon 
program. Accordingly, the Board decided that the application of safeguards should 
commence of the procedures for reprocessing plants. In paragraph 7 of 
INFCIRC / 66 it is said that "provisions relating to types of principal nuclear facilities, 
other than reactors, which may produce, process or use safeguarded material will be 
developed as necessary".1^0
11.. . Inclusion of Conversion & Fabrication Plants
In February 1967, the United States proposed to extend the safeguard system 
by drawing up special procedures for conversion and fabrication plants. In June, the 
Board decided to proceed again by means of a working group. A Secretariat draft 
was discussed by the group and an amended version was adopted by the Board in
159According to Allan McKnight, INFCIRC/66 was more acceptable politically than its 
predecessor.
'^^In February 1966, the Board decided to set up a working group with participants of the whole 
member states to frame such procedures. The Secretariat prepared the draft, which the working 
group discussed and amended, and the Board adopted, as annex I to INFCIRC/66, some special 
procedures for reprocessing plants.
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June 1968. The definitions of the conversion and the fabrication plants adopted by 
the Board were: "conversion plant means a facility (excepting a mine or ore- 
processing plant) to improve unirradiated nuclear material that has been separated 
from fission products, by changing its chemical or physical form so as to facilitate 
further use or processing. The term conversion plant includes the facility's storage 
and analytical sections. The term does not include a plant intended for separating the 
isotopes of a nuclear material. Fabrication plant means a plant to manufacture fuel 
elements or other components containing nuclear material and includes the plant's 
storage and analytical sections." With the two extensions of the scope of the 
safeguards, all plants in the nuclear fuel cycle were then covered except for 
enrichment plants, which are referred to in the INFCIRC/ 66 (Rev. 2) as plants for 
separating the isotopes of a nuclear material.
iii... An Analysis of INFCIRC/66
The revised and extended IAEA safeguards system as described in 
INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 is the basis for safeguards agreements concluded since then, 
except those concluded with states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco. The INFCIRC/66 consists of a basic document and two annexes 
that extend its provisions to reprocessing plants, and fuel fabrication and conversion 
facilities. It has no provisions for enrichment or heavy water production facilities 
although in 1967 the Soviet Union recommended that procedures be drawn up for 
uranium enrichment plants. The INFCIRC/66 safeguards agree?nents are based on the 
concept o f applying IAEA safeguards to nuclear material or items listed in an inventory. 
Usually this inventory lists only materials and items imported from a supplier state; 
nuclear material which has been produced, processed or used in any of the listed 
facilities; or equipment and non nuclear material which have been designed, 
constructed or operated on the basis of relevant technological information provided 
by the supplier state. The safeguards document INFCIRC/66 consists of four parts.
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a. .. general considerations
General considerations cover the purpose and the general principles of the 
safeguards document and the IAEA safeguards system. It must be noted that 
INFCIRC/66 only gives general guidance for the safeguards agreements to be 
concluded. There may be significant differences between individual agreements and 
the text of the INFCIRC/ 66. In order to determine the IAEA's rights and obligations 
under such agreements, it may be necessary to examine each case individually. In 
other words, INFClRC/66 is an instrument designed to establish a si/stem o f technical 
principles and procedures to permit the IAEA to comply its statutory obligation to ensure 
that assistance or activities under its supervision or control are not used to further any 
military purpose. The INFCIRC/66 thus establishes only a loose technical framework, 
and serves as a statement of what is minimally acceptable by the states. Because 
during the negotiations, some states were unwilling to accept comprehensive 
safeguards, the concluding safeguards document is not full-scope in implementation.
b. .. circumstances requiring safeguard
Under INFCIRC/66 type safeguards agreements, nuclear materials and 
facilities in which such materials are used, processed, stored or contained are subject 
to application of safeguards. The facilities included are reactors for research and 
power production, spent fuel reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication and conversion 
facilities, and storage sites. The INFCIRC/66 largely resolved an issue that was 
debated extensively in the early years of the Agency. That issue was whether only 
nuclear materials or facilities as well would be subject to safeguards. Principal 
suppliers of equipment favoured applying safeguards to any assistance that could 
end up contributing to the production of fissionable material. But, developing 
countries that were dependent on equipment supply, and industrial states that 
eventually would be in a position to manufacture their own equipment favoured 
restricting safeguards to the supply of nuclear material. In the end, it was agreed
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that itzuas primarily nuclear material that would be subject to safeguards, but that facilities 
could be submitted to safeguards. Likewise, safeguards could be invoked even with 
respect to indigenous nuclear material if the latter were produced, processed, or 
used in a nuclear facility that had been "substantially supplied" to the recipient.l^l In 
other words, while it was essentially nuclear material that was subject to safeguards, 
the supply of certain equipment, facilities, or non-nuclear material could invoke 
Agency safeguards. Safeguards do not extend to uranium or thorium mines or mills, 
as these are considered ores and therefore are excluded from the definition of 
"source materials" in the IAEA Statute. However, nuclear material "produced by the 
use of safeguarded nuclear material" is subject to safeguards.1^2 'p];^e obligation 
underlying INFCIRC/66 does not entail a commitment by the state to place all of its 
nuclear activities under safeguards, but the commitment encompasses only those 
activities that have been submitted to safeguards.^^^
c ... safeguards procedures
The actual safeguards procedures of INFCIRC/66 are similar to those of its 
predecessor, INFCIRC/26. These procedures include design reviews, records, 
reports, and inspection, aU of which are specified in Article XII of the IAEA Statute. 
Record-keeping provide a basis for reports submitted to the Agency. Records are
l^^The concept of "substantial supply" was central to the resolution of this question of the 
conditions under which safeguards would be brought into play. The first safeguards document 
had provided that IAEA safeguards would attach to "specialized equipment and non-nuclear 
material supplied by the Agency which in the opinion of the Board could substantially assist a 
principal nuclear facility." (INFCIRC/26, "The Agency's Safeguards", paragraph 37.) This 
provision was offensive to a number of countries , and was one of the key targets of the review to 
which INFCIRC/26 had been submitted. Seeing that it would not be feasible to limit safeguards to 
transferred source and special fissionable material, India urged substituting the notion of 
"substantial supply" for that of "substantially assisted." The rationale was that, at least this would 
eliminate the triggering of Agency safeguards merely as a consequence of providing know-how, 
financial assistance, design drawings or similar aids, and therefore it would avoid intensifying what 
developing nations perceived as discriminatory arrangements in the first place. See, L. Scheinman, 
ibid., pp: 132 - 133.
162iNFCIRC/66/Rev.2, paragraph 19e.
163it assumes the possibility that some nuclear material may be located in the safeguarded state 
that is not subject to IAEA safeguards, and contains provisions allowing for exemption and 
suspension of safeguards as well as for substitution of unsafeguarded for safeguarded nuclear 
materials under carefully specified conditions. Ibid., p. 133.
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important since auditing and accounting procedures form the basis for international 
safeguards. According to Article XII.A.l of its Statute, the Agency examines the 
designs of facilities and approves them to ensure that they will not serve any military 
purpose and that they will permit effective application of safeguards. Inspection is the 
most essential of the safeguards procedures in the sense that it is the means by 
which the credibility of the other elements can be established. It is also the most 
contentious because it is the most intrusive from the sovereignty perspective.
d... sensitivity to sovereignty
An important feature of international safeguards is that they are developed 
and evolved with particular sensitivity to state sovereignty. The IAEA Statute itself 
limits the Agency's right to exercise safeguards "to the extent relevant to the project 
or arrangement" in question. And those arrangements are to be based on a 
safeguards agreement negotiated between the Agency and the state. Paragraph 4 of 
INFCIRC/66 reaffirms that the safeguards provisions elaborated in that document 
come into force only with a safeguards agreement. The same point is reiterated in 
paragraph 15 of the same d oc u m e n t .A l th o u g h  INFCIRC/ 66 provides that the 
principles and the procedures set forth are subject to "periodic review in the light of 
the further experience gained by the Agency as well as of technological 
d e v e l o p m e n t s , t h e  safeguards document has never been reviewed. The reasons 
for this are largely political. The risk was that, opening up the document to review
164gygf, among the supporters of international safeguards, L. Scheinman notes, many of them are 
inclined toward minimalism when it comes to formulating specific inspection arrangements. Ibid., 
p. 135.
165jyfumerous other provisions in the safeguards document emphasize obligations of the IAEA to 
states with whom it negotiates safeguards agreements. The Agency is admonished: to implement 
safeguards in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development 
of the state under safeguards (INFCIRC/66, paragraph 9); to implement safeguards in a manner 
designed to be consistent with prudent management practices (INFCIRC/66, paragraph 10); to take 
every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets (INFCIRC/66, paragraph 13); and to 
ensure that no commercial or industrial secret or any other confidential information acquired by 
reason of safeguards implementation be disclosed except under designated circumstances and to 
designated individuals (INFCIRC/66, paragraph 14).
I661NFCIRC/66, paragraph 8.
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could lead to the emergence of a weaker, rather than a stronger instrument. 
Moreover, INFCIRC/ 66 was negotiated when optimal political conditions existed in 
mid-1960s for establishing an international safeguards system.^^^
iv... Remarks on the Safeguards Document INFCIRC/66
INFCIRC/66 has certain inherent weaknesses and is, by its nature, subject to 
some important limitations. INFCIRC/66 remains a framework, and a set of 
principles, but not a model for an agreement. In this respect it is different from the 
NPT safeguards document INFCIRC/153. The lijnitations to which INFCIRC/66 is 
subject derive not from the document itself but from external considerations. The 
fundamental problem is that the obligations that it covers constitute only partial non­
proliferation measures. States that accept safeguards under this document do accept (and did 
in the past) only limited undertakings, agreeing only not to use certain specified items for 
military purposes. They have not agreed to place all o f their nuclear activities under 
international safeguards. Neither have they accepted the non-proliferation commitment 
associated with the NPT, as have parties to that treaty. Under the INFCIRC/66, states do 
not pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons or explosives, and they remain legally 
and politically free to develop nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices from 
material, technology, and equipment that is not subject to international 
safeguards.l^^ As a result of the decisions taken by the Board of Governors, or by 
the efforts of the Secretariat to incorporate new provisions into the safeguards 
agreements, the following changes occurred in the IAEA safeguards procedures.
i^^However, by the time experience in implementing the document had been gained, the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty had come into force, and divisions had appeared among the Agency's 
membership according to whether or not the member was party to the NPT and had accepted non­
proliferation undertakings and thus full-scope safeguards. Agency priorities, in the view of some 
states, became warped, and political confrontations over priorities, values, and resource allocation 
sharpened. These conditions were not conducive to achieving consensus on a strengthened 
document that would appear like a more comprehensive safeguards document that would 
implement the Agency's responsibilities under the NPT.
'^ “According to L. Scheinman, what the INFCIRC/66 was designed to do, it does well. The 
difficulties lie beyond the scope of the document's competence or authority.
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« . ..  termination St continuation of safeguards
Upon the pressure of a number of Board members, the Director-General 
proposed in 1973 new rules regarding the duration and termination of safeguards 
agreements that were negotiated under the INFCIRC/66.1^9 Originally 
INFCIRC/66 made no explicit provision for dealing with nuclear materials after the 
expiration of a safeguards agreement. Concerning the continuation of safeguards on 
special fissionable material produced as a result of use of the safeguarded material, 
paragraph 16 of the safeguards document mentioned of the "desirability" of 
providing for continuation of safeguards. The likelihood of production of 
subsequent generations of special fissionable material after the termination of 
safeguards were of particular concern to the Board members. Fience, since 1974 the 
duration of safeguards agreements has been tied to actual use in the recipient state 
of materials or items supplied by the Agency, or by another state requiring 
safeguards application. By this manner, safeguards continue on subsequent 
generations of produced nuclear material that is derived from originally 
safeguarded material or facilities until terminated in accordance with the termination 
provisions of the safeguards document.
h...interpretation ofmilitaiy purpose
Another improvement in the safeguards procedures was an initiative taken by 
the Secretariat, and supported by the Board of Governors, in 1974, to redefine the 
undertaking of the safeguarded state. Until that time, states agreed not to use 
nuclear assistance to further any military purpose. Beginning in 1972, the United 
States and the United Kingdom declared that in their view "any military purpose" 
embraced any nuclear explosive devices and that their nuclear supply was 
predicated on the recipients undertaking not to use supplied items for such a
 ^^^More comprehensive and enduring provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that was 
negotiated throughout the 1960s and became effective as of early 1970s might have stimulated 
some members of the Board of Governors.
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purpose. In 1974, the Director General proposed, and the Board of Governors 
accepted, an interpretation of "any military purpose" as including any nuclear 
explosive device. Since 1975, Board approval of safeguards agreements negotiated 
on the basis of INFGIRC/ 66 has been contingent upon inclusion of an undertaking 
by the recipient that none of the supplied items covered by agreement shall be used 
"for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military 
purpose or for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device."1^0
c... transfer o f  information or equipment
Moreover, since the mid-1970s, safeguards agreements have included an 
undertaking by the recipient to accept safeguards on transferred technological 
information as well as on any nuclear facilities or equipment constructed or 
operated, or nuclear material produced, on the basis of such information. 
Furthermore, certain non-nuclear materials such as heavy water and graphite, 
although not specified in the safeguards document, have come to be treated in much 
the same way as nuclear material, and are now both subject to safeguards and 
capable of triggering safeguards on nuclear materials and facilities with which they 
are associated. Similarly, heavy water production plants have been covered in 
safeguards agreements under procedures analogous to those designated to apply to 
nuclear material.
adopting this approach, the Agency took a step in the direction of assimilating the non- 
NPT (INFCIRC/66) and the NPT (INFCIRC/153) safeguards documents in closing an avenue for 
acquisition of nuclear material outside of safeguards and it strengthened the non-proliferation 
utility of international safeguards.
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CHAPTER V. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS OF THE NPT 
H... Prologue to the NPT Negotiations
In contrast to the negotiations on the Statute of the IAEA, the negotiations of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty did not constitute a follow-up of one decisive initiative. 
On the contrary, they evolved gradually from the prolonged and unsuccessful 
negotiations on the general and complete disarmament of the 1950’s. Already in 
1956, it was suggested that measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
could be made part of a wider disarmament package. Such measures were seen as a 
possible supplement to a test ban treaty. The fact that it was possible to construct a 
small nuclear device without having to test it, was perceived as a loophole that 
needed to be filled in order to achieve complete control of nuclear proliferation.^^! 
As the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban dragged out and ran into trouble 
because of superpower disagreement on the issue of inspections, there was an 
increasing awareness of the need for other non-proliferation measures. The spread 
of plutonium that was taking place in connection with nuclear industrialisation 
world-wide at the end of the 1950's also increased the danger of a continuous spread 
of nuclear weapons. The allocation of US plutonium to other countries in the wake 
of the "Atoms for Peace" policy was partly responsible for creating such a potential 
in more and more c o u n t r i e s . T h e  first constructive political initiatives that were 
taken to address this situation were a row of proposals submitted by Ireland to the 
UN General Assembly and other UN organs, beginning in 1958 and resulting in the 
adoption of the Irish Resolution by a unanimous vote on 4 December 1961. The 
essence o f the resolution was that the nuclear weapon powers should undertake not to 
transfer nuclear 'weapons to other states, and that the existing non-nuclear 'weapon states
^Chalmers M. Roberts, The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-70, New 
York, London, Praeger Publishers, 1970, pp: 68-69.
such potential was also the natural consequence of nuclear industrialisation itself, 
especially in countries that chose to construct reactors using natural uranium for fuel and heavy 
water for moderator.
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should voluntarily/ forego their right to make nuclear weapons. The main idea was to 
prevent nuclear anarchy through the establishment of an international treaty that 
would be subject to inspection and control. But, in spite of the resolution and in spite 
of the fact that a new negotiating forum was set up at the end of 1961 by the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and endorsed by the United Nations, there was no real 
progress in talks on a non-proliferation treaty until well into 1965. There seems to 
have been many causes for this lack of progress. Firstly, the US administration 
apparently pursued several lines of policy whose objectives were seemingly 
incompatible. Secondly, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance were more and 
more divided among themselves, with France more and more following its own 
direction. Thirdly, the Federal Republic of Germany feared that eventual arms 
control and disarmament agreements would involve wide-reaching settlements in 
Europe and have negative repercussions on German reunification. Finally the first 
years of the Kennedy-administration saw a deterioration of East-West relations, 
with the Soviet insistence on a peace settlement in Europe such as the erection of the 
Berlin Wall, the unsuccessful US invasion of Cuba, and the American engagement in 
Vietnam. In addition, 1963-64 saw a change of political leadership at the highest level 
in both the United States and the Soviet Union.^^^
Kennedy's promotion of arms control and disarmament, which resulted in the 
creation in September 1961 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
within the State Department, was contradicted by two other policy lines. While 
advocating disarmament, the Kennedy administration in fact implemented a 
massive arms build-up.^^'^ It was a second line of policy which created the most
information provided here is based on the lengthy discussions of the author (taken place 
at UNIDIR, Geneva, from February to April 1995) with Astrid Forland of the University of 
Bergen, Norway, and also on her unpublished manuscript. The N egotiations on the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. March 1995.
^^^Kennedy had come to power maintaining that the United States was lagging behind the Soviet 
Union in the production of missiles, and he proceeded to devote a large amount of resources to 
research and development of new weapons systems.
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problems at the negotiating table, namely plans for establishing a new multilateral 
force (MLF) within NATO. The AILF scheme was seen by the US administration as a 
means to satisfy eventual West German cravings for a nuclear force without having 
to establish a national German one, and they also saw it as a possible precursor for a 
future federal European force. The Germans themselves only reluctantly went along 
with the idea.1^5 The plan was in fact laid politically dead by the British in December 
1964, but it continued to haunt the NPT negotiations until the autumn of 1966.1^^ 
The specicil military and political situation of the Federal Republic made it impossible 
to achieve any real progress in the NPT negotiations until the Americans had 
reached an understanding with the Russians which, to a certain extent at least, 
satisfied West Germany's defence interests.^^^
The two nuclear powers, France and the People's Republic of China that did 
not take part in the negotiations, perceived the NPT as primarily directed at 
themselves. There can be no doubt that the Chinese nuclear explosion of October 
1964 served to underline the importance of reaching an agreement before further 
proliferation took place. The Chinese detonation, furthermore, directly influenced 
India's stance at the negotiating table and consequently also the outcome of the 
negotiations. India was a civilian nuclear power in its own right, and the Indians
German supporters of the plan primarily saw it as a means to keep the Americans in 
Europe. Furthermore, the history of the NPT negotiations seems to indicate that they also came to 
see it as a means to prevent the non-proliferation treaty.
W^German opposition to the NPT was enhanced by the way the Limited Test Ban Treaty was 
negotiated. In the final stages, the superpowers negotiated among themselves in Moscow, and no 
allied consultations took place prior to the agreement. This procedure caused anger as well as 
anxiety in Germany. The West Germans were particularly unhappy about the fact that the 
Democratic Republic of Germany was allowed to sign the treaty. In the 1950's, the Federal 
Republic had likewise reacted strongly to a European aerial inspection scheme involving 
inspections over German territory. Negotiations between the two superpowers on such a scheme 
caused chancellor Konrad Adenauer to go to Washington to insist that disarmament should come 
after, not before the reunification of Europe. See, Forland, ibid., p. 2.
^^^The conventional interpretation of the NPT negotiations is to look upon the MLF issue as the 
greatest impediment to progress in the negotiations. There seems to be good reason to look at it 
the other way round. To prevent the Germans from acquiring nuclear weapons may well have 
been the main reason for Soviet interest in a successful outcome of the negotiations. Thus German 
reluctance to sign a treaty made the Russians more eager to reach an agreement. Ibid., p. 3.
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were the most vocal spokesmen of the non-aligned countries. But in spite of the 
global orientation of the negotiations and the global problem that the non­
proliferation treaty was addressing, it is in fact striking to what extent the European 
context set the framework for the negotiations.
B... Negotiations on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear UJeapons
The most important forum for the NPT negotiations was the Conference on 
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). The ENDC was set up by 
the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva at the end of 1961, and the two 
superpowers co-chaired the meetings of the ENDC right through the NPT 
negotiations. The establishment and the composition of the Eighteen-Nation group 
were endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, but the new body was not 
an organ of the United Nations. However, the UN Secretariat served the 
Conference, and a representative of the UN Secretary-General was present at the 
Conference at all times. Moreover, the Conference submitted reports and records to 
the UN Disarmament Commission and to the UN General Assembly. The ENDC 
was in fact a supplement to the UN fora. The issues that were raised within the 
Eighteen-Nation group continued to be discussed at the UN Disarmament 
Commission, at the annual sessions of the General Assembly.
i T h e  Work of the ENDC
The setting up of the ENDC probably reflected a need for a smaller and more 
informal body than the United Nations organs. It was composed of five NATO 
coimtries (Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States); five 
Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet 
Union); and eight Non-Aligned countries (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic). The composition of the group 
reflected the fact that the non-aHgned had won a position for themselves as a third
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major grouping in the United Nations, besides the East and the West, in matters of 
disarmament.!^^ Although the ENDC became the major negotiating forum for the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, it was never a forum specifically dedicated to the NPT, and 
it started its proceedings in 1962 by continuing the discussions on general and 
complete disarmament.!^^ In 1963 intensive discussions on a limited test ban treaty 
dominated the forum. Definite agreement for putting the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
on the agenda only came on 18 June 1964. In spite of the detonation of the Chinese 
bomb on 16 October 1964, which undoubtedly highlighted the danger of further 
proliferation, the ENTDC was not convoked at the beginning of 1965, partly due to 
disagreement between the two superpowers.!^!*
A breakthrough for serious negotiations only came with the assembling of the 
UN Disarmament Commission, at the request of the Soviet Union, between 21 April 
and 16 June 1965. During this session the non-aligned countries were particularly 
active. India proposed a solution of nuclear weapons proliferation comprising five 
elements, and Sweden argued for a package linking a non-proliferation agreement 
to a comprehensive test ban and a cut-off of fissile materials. The session culminated 
by the vote of a resolution recommending the ENDC to give priority to discussions 
of a non-proliferation agreement.!^! This meant tying the link with the Irish 
Resolution, which already had represented a concept for treating nuclear non­
proliferation separately from other arms control and disarmament problems.
ITSphe first Conference of Heads of States or Governments of non-aligned countries had taken 
place in Belgrade in September 1961. In a declaration from the meeting the non-aligned 
countries had demanded to be represented in all future global conferences on disarmament. The 
Soviet Union and the United States in fact accepted this principle when they set up the ENDC in 
December 1961.
179it was the Cuban missile crisis that finally shifted the focus from general disarmament 
measures to what became known as collateral ones.
ISOMohamed I. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959 
- 1979, New York, London, Rome, Oceana Publications, Inc., 1980, Vol. 1, p. 91.
ISllbid., p. 93.
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11.. . First Drafts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
The first draft proposals put forward by the United States and the Soviet 
Union, respectively on 17 August at the ENDC and on 24 September 1965 at the UN 
General Assembly,!^^ confirmed the fxmdamental disagreement between the two 
superpowers regarding the definition of nuclear spread. While the Americans 
advocated a definition that would allow for the so-called nuclear sharing within the 
military alliances, the Russians were vehemently opposed to it. The question had 
been hotly debated since the creation of the ENDC.1^3 Given that the MLF issue had 
already blocked progress regarding a non-proliferation agreement for several years, 
the representative of the United Arab Republic suggested in the General Assembly 
that the Assembly should not concentrate on the two superpowers' draft proposals, 
but should instead lay down some basic principles upon which a treaty could be 
built. A formal resolution (Resolution 2028 x) was submitted by the eight non- 
aligned ENDC members calling for five basic principles to guide the negotiations:
1.. . the treaty should be devoid of loopholes which might permit proliferation;
2.. . it should embody an acceptable balance of mutual duties and obligations of 
the nuclear and the non-nuclear powers;
3.. . it should be a step towards the achievement of a general and complete 
disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;
4.. . it should include provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty;
5.. . nothing in the treaty should prevent any group of countries to conclude 
regional nuclear-free zones.
^^^Ibid., pp: 94 - 98.
^^^Interestingly enough, only three months before the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet ambassador 
had proposed an agreement between the nuclear powers not to deliver nuclear weapons, control 
over them, or information necessary for their production to states that did not themselves possess 
nuclear weapons. The proposal reflected the Soviet concern about American plans for the creation 
of a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. As always, the Americans refused such an approach, 
maintaining that an eventual multilateral force would not lead to proliferation. Ibid., pp: 87 - 89.
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iii... Concerted Action of the United States and the Soviet Union
These principles represented a summary of years of negotiations, and a 
compromise not only between the positions of the superpowers but also of the non- 
aligned countries themselves. The next year saw bilateral negotiations between the 
superpowers as well as new sessions of the ENDC. A revised American draft was 
presented in March 1966, but the big breakthrough orUy came in the Autumn of 
1966, during the annual session of the UN General Assembly. On 19 October, at a 
NATO Council meeting, a majority of allied countries advocated a definition of 
nuclear spread which would not allow the establishment of a new multilateral nuclear 
force. This decision was prepared first of all through bilateral German-American 
discussions. Secondly, through bilateral Soviet-American talks about the existing 
allied defence arrangements, and through a Senate debate and resolution which 
gave unanimous support to president Johnson's efforts to achieve a non­
proliferation treaty.184 Finally, through the elaboration of a plan for nuclear policy 
planning within NATO, which would give the Germans a say in the planning of their 
nuclear defence, without giving them access to nuclear weapons.185 The 
breakthrough was consolidated by the passing of several resolutions in the General 
Assembly expressing support of the negotiations. One resolution, based on a 
Pakistani idea, decided that a conference of non-nuclear weapon states was to be 
held no later than July 1968, thus putting pressure on the negotiators to achieve a 
result before that time.188
184 Senate passed a resolution to this effect, well aware that an agreement with the Russians 
was conditioned on the relinquishment of multilateral nuclear schemes, and that an agreement with 
the non-aligned powers was conditioned on the superpowers' willingness to give something in 
return for the non-nuclear powers' renunciation of nuclear weapons. The resolution which was put 
forward by senator John O. Pastore on 18 January 1966, was passed on 17 May 1966. See 
Congressional Record - Senate of 17 May 1966.
ISSjf^is concession was reciprocated by a Russian declaration to the effect that they would not let 
misgivings about the American warfare in Vietnam be an obstacle to further progress in the 
negotiations. Forland, ibid., p. 6 
^86shal^er, ibid., p. 103.
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The breakthrough meant that the two superpowers between themselves, and 
probably with bilateral American-British talks thrown in, had more or less come to 
an agreement concerning Articles I and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These 
articles contained the main provisions of the Treaty, namely the obligation o f the 
nuclear weapon powers not to assist in nuclear proliferation and the obligation o f the non­
nuclear weapon powers to forego the right to make nuclear 'weapons as 'well as nuclear 
de'oices for peacefid purposes. The co-chairmen were meant to present identical draft 
proposals at the opening of a new ENDC session on 21 February 1967. Due to West 
German frustrations this was not done. The Germans were furious that the 
Americans once more had reached an agreement with the Russians without prior 
allied consultations. Even if they had reluctantly accepted to sign a treaty, they 
would only do so on certain conditions. Consequently, they wished to be consulted 
regarding additional treaty provisions. West German criticism of the procedure led 
to the postponement of the spring session of the ENDC. Instead there was a round 
of consultations. A string of NATO Council meetings took place in the course of 
April and May. The Federal Republic consulted intensively with other threshold 
countries. Even the Soviet Union held consultations with its allies.
iv... Issues and Debates
The issues of debate were the verification provisions of the treaty and the 
question of what the non-nuclear weapon powers would get in return for their 
renunciation of nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic insisted on substantial and 
procedural limitations with regard to treaty provisions. To achieve this aim 
Germany collaborated closely with other reluctant countries like India and 
Switzerland, but most especially with Italy and Japan. This meant that the 
industrialised countries that did not take part in the ENDC were fighting for their
187The American ambassador, William C. Foster, visited Bonn and other European capitals. The 
British Minister of disarmament. Lord Chalfont, went to Brussels to consult with the EURATOM 
Commission. Forland, ibid.
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interests in civilian nuclear activities. Italy and the Federal Republic, with the support 
of other EURATOM countries, were particularly insisting on the preservation of the 
EURATOM safeguards system. There was furthermore a general concern among the 
non-nuclear weapons states about the consequences of a treaty for their future 
seciiiity.
a. .. verification provisions
On 24 August 1967 the Soviet Union and the United States submitted identical 
draft proposals. The verification provisions were still left open. This marked the 
beginning of a new round of consultations, discussions and presentation of 
amendments at the ENDC. The non-aligned members of the ENDC were no longer 
able to agree among themselves. On 18 January 1968 two identically revised draft 
proposals were presented at the ENDC by the co-chairmen. A compromise formula 
had then been reached regarding Article III, i.e. the verification provisions. 
Consultations and discussions were continuing on a multilateral basis through 
February the same year. A special procedure was established for non-member 
countries to the ENDC to present their comments to the Eighteen-Nation group. At 
that stage it had become clear that India had stopped participating actively in the 
process.
b. .. non-nuclear-weapons states
Neither the 18 January 1968 drafts nor the joint draft proposal that was put 
forward by the co-chairmen on 11 March 1968 contained any provisions regarding 
guarantees for the security of non-nuclear weapon states. However, the three 
nuclear powers presented a proposal for a Security Council resolution, in which they 
would pledge to come to the assistance, through the Security Council, of non­
nuclear weapon countries being under nuclear attack or being threatened by nuclear 
attack. On 14 April 1968 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi confirmed in the Indian
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Parliament that her country would not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The co- 
chairmen maintained that the last draft proposal was the result of prolonged 
negotiations, and that there was by now a small margin for making changes. Yet a 
number of amendments were submitted during a session of the UN General 
Assembly between 24 April and June 1968. Some of these were included in the final 
draft of the Treaty as well as in a Security Council Resolution on security guarantees 
that was passed on 18 June 1968. The Treaty was opened for signature in London, 
Moscoiu, and Washington on 1 July 1968. The U.S. President Johnson and the Soviet 
Prime Minister Kosygin both made a declaration in this connection. Through the 
adoption of the Irish Resolution, the existing nuclear powers namely, France, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, pledged their willingness 
not to assist in the spread of nuclear weapons.
C... Uieius on Definition of Nuclear Proliferation
1.. . The French View
Although France voted in favour, the French opted out of the ENDC and they 
did not take part in the NPT negotiations, nor did they have any intention of signing 
such a treaty. France considered limited arms controls measures as insufficient and 
imbalanced, and saw it as a means not only to preserve the monopoly of the existing 
nuclear powers, but mainly to strengthen the military positions of the two 
superpowers vis-à-vis other powers. Consequently, the French government 
considered general and complete disarmament as the only acceptable approach to 
disarmament negotiations.
11.. . The Chinese View
The People's Republic of China, which was not a member of the United 
Nations, had much the same conception of the NPT negotiations as that of the 
French government, namely that the aim of the negotiations was to preserve the
103
dominance of the two superpowers, and to keep other powers, and in particular 
China herself, down. Thus, only three of the then five weapon states participated in 
the NPT negotiations. And for many years any progress in the negotiations were 
prevented due to disagreement among these states on the definition of nuclear 
spread. With few exceptions, the non-aligned ENDC members did not volunteer 
their opinion on the m a t t e r . T h e  solution of this question was the big 
breakthrough of the negotiations, symbolised by the presentation of the identical 
draft proposals in August 1967. From then on, the wording of Article I remained 
virtually unchanged.
111.. . The American View
As shown above, the heart of the matter was whether the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty should allow nuclear sharing within military and indeed political alliances or 
not. What made the issue a particularly hot one, was the fact that the nuclear sharing 
in question primarily was meant to accommodate the interests of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The first American draft proposal of 17 August 1965 did not 
only keep the MLF option open. By asking for the prohibition of transfer of nuclear 
weapons to the national control of non-nuclear weapons states, and the prohibition 
of an increase in the total number of nuclear weapon states, it in fact held open the 
possibility of two kinds of transfer:
1.. . it opened for the transfer of nuclear weapons from a nation state to an 
organisation provided the total number of nuclear weapon states did not increase.
2.. . it would allow the creation of a new political entity having nuclear weapons 
at its disposal if a former nuclear state turned its nuclear arsenal over to the new 
entity. This alternative was called the "European option", and the intention behind it 
was to keep open the possibility to create a federal European state that would be
^^^Shaker, ibid., pp: 16 7 -168.
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based on a nuclear d e f e n c e . A s  regards the transfers from one weapon state to 
another, the US could never agree to any transfer of complete nuclear weapons in 
peacetime, as this was against their domestic legislation.
iv... The British and the Soviet Views on the American Proposal
The American draft proposal had been subject to debate within NATO before 
presentation. Several of the smaller countries were lukewarm to the idea of giving 
the Federal Republic of Germany more access to nuclear weapons than they already 
had. The United Kingdom was strongly opposed to the plans for a MLF force and 
had in reality laid it dead at the end of 1964. Neither the British nor the French were 
willing to relinquish control of their national nuclear arsenal. During the summer of 
1965 the United Kingdom circulated her own alternative draft proposal which was 
based on a definition of nuclear spread which would not allow nuclear sharing 
schemes. If the majority of NATO countries disliked the idea of German nuclear 
weapons, the Russians abhorred it. On 24 September 1965 they presented a draft 
proposal to the UN General Assembly which explicitly prohibited transfer of nuclear 
weapons through military alliances to national control. They made it clear that an 
eventual creation of new nuclear forces within NATO would be contrary to 
continued East-West détente. And they accused the United States of obstructing the 
negotiations by putting forward demands that the Federal Republic be allowed 
access to nuclear weapons.^^^
V ... The U.S. Deal with the Soviets
The Soviet government insisted on closing all loopholes through which a 
spread of nuclear weapons could be brought about. Although by all accounts, the 
nuclear sharing scheme was politically dead at this stage, the Americans continued in
189ibid., pp: 216-217. 
^^^Forland, ibid., p. 9.
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bilateral talks with the Russians to argue for the necessity to acknowledge the 
Federal Republic's need for adequate defence. They pointed to the fact that hundred 
of Soviet missiles were directed at the German territory, and they claimed that it was 
reasonable that a country in such a position be allowed to take part in nuclear 
planning. They put pressure on the Russians by claiming that unless the West 
Germans were allowed to take part in the planning of their own defence, the 
Americans feared they would demand their own nuclear weapons. President 
Johnson later explained that the U.S. government had sought to get the Soviet 
government to accept three conditions:
1.. . the continuance of the existing two-key arrangements within NATO;
2.. . the establishment of a nuclear planning group within NATO;
3.. . the preservation of the European option, i.e. "the preservation of the right 
of a United Western Europe, if it ever developed, legally to succeed the United 
Kingdom and France as a nuclear power".
In the autumn of 1967, the foreign secretaries of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, Dean Rusk and Andrei Gromyko respectively, came to a mutual 
understanding by which the establishment of a nuclear plarming group as well as 
existing defence arrangements were tacitly accepted by the Russians. As already 
mentioned, the breakthrough followed in the wake of a NATO Gouncil meeting in 
which the majority of the members opted for a definition of nuclear spread that 
would not allow for multilateral nuclear sharing. The compromise probably also 
implied that the Federal Republic had reluctantly accepted that it would have to sign 
the Non-Prohferation Treaty, although disagreement on this issue within the Federal 
government itself created uncertainty about the West German position until the 
Federal German ratification of the Treaty was a fact.
^Shaker, ibid., p. 233.
106
The presentation of identical Soviet and American draft proposals in August 
1967 reflected the agreement that the two superpowers had come to with regard to 
the definition of nuclear spread. The formula reached then was never much altered, 
except for the fact that transfer became prohibited to all recipients, so that 
individuals as well as states and organisations were included. However, a definition 
of a nuclear weapon state was never agreed upon. Analysts have interpreted this 
lacuna as a reflection of the Soviet-American understanding. By avoiding a precise 
definition, the terms could be given a broader meaning than would otherwise have 
been possible, thus allowing for existing alliance arrangements. Nevertheless, the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty defined which countries that were to be reckoned as 
nuclear weapon states; namely those countries that had detonated a nuclear device 
before 1 January 1967.1^2
D... Secuhtu Guarantees : Requests & Offers
From the outset of the negotiations the question of how to guarantee the 
security of states that renounced the right to make nuclear weapons became a major 
issue of debate in the Eighteen-Nation group and in the wider forum of the UN 
General Assembly. The security guarantees issue was perceived as a problem which 
concerned non-aligned countries in particular. But even members of alliances with 
special security problems, like the Federal Republic of Germany, were worried 
about signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty without first getting a kind of guarantee 
from the nuclear powers for their future security.
i... Security Concerns of India
The security guarantees issue first came to a head in the wake of the nuclear 
explosion of the People's Republic of China in T964. China's going nuclear was 
perceived by the government and people of India as a grave threat to India's
1^2porland, ibid., pp : 10 - II.
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Security. The fact that it took place so shortly after the Chinese-Indian border war 
only added to the gravity. In May 1965, the Indian representative to the UN 
Disarmament Commission made a point of the unfortunate coincidence of the 
Chinese detonation with the starting up of serious negotiations on the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty. India's representative further emphasised India's agreement 
with countries which maintained that it was unrealistic to ask countries to forswear 
forever a programme of nuclear weapons production, so long as the existing nuclear 
powers continued to hold on to their arsenals, and so long as new countries 
embarked on nuclear programmes. While reaffirming India's determination not to 
use nuclear energy for military purposes, the Indian representative, nevertheless, 
expressed fears that unless the world community did something to reverse the 
existing situation of proliferation, there was hardly any likelihood of preventing 
further proliferation.
The Indian suggestion for a solution to this problem was the establishment of 
an integrated agreement. By an integrated agreement was meant that, the 
renunciation of nuclear weapons on the part of the non-nuclear weapons states had 
to be reciprocated in the same treaty by commitment on the part of the nuclear 
powers to stop vertical proliferation, and even to reduce existing stockpiles. 
Furthermore, the non-nuclear weapons states would have to get some kind of 
assurance that coxild really be depended upon as to their security. India got much 
support from other non-aligned countries. With regard to assurances, Canada also 
showed much understanding for the position of the non-aligned countries. Prior to 
the presentation of the first American draft proposal in August 1965, Canada had 
advocated the introduction of guarantees from the nuclear powers in the draft, but 
to no avail.1^3
^^^Forland, ibid., p . 12.
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ii... Proposals for Security Guarantees
In the course of 1964-65 both the Unites States and the Soviet Union proposed 
ways to satisfy the quest for security guarantees. The United States offered a so- 
called positive guarantee, and the Soviet Union proposed a negative guarantee.
a. ., positive security guarantees
The American version was first formulated by President Johnson in reaction to 
the Chinese nuclear detonation. President Johnson declared the U.S. willingness to 
come to the defence of non-nuclear countries in case of nuclear attack on any such 
country. The declaration left the impression that the United States was willing to 
become a kind of guarantor against nuclear attack on a global scale. During the UN 
General Assembly session in 1965, U.S. delegates followed up and modified their 
President's declaration by suggesting that assurances given in connection with the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty might take the form of a UN General Assembly resolution. 
That is, a resolution which would imply that any action would be conditional upon 
agreement within the UN General Assembly. This modification might be seen not 
only as a retreat from the earlier U.S. position, but also as a way to accommodate 
countries like Sweden, which maintained that a positive guarantee a la the one 
suggested by President Johnson would be contrary to Sweden's neutrality, and 
could therefore not be accepted.^^*^
b. .. negative seciinty guarantees
The Soviet proposal of a negative guarantee was put forward by the Soviet 
Prime Minister Kosygin in 1965, and became known as the Kosygin forjnula. The 
formula suggested a formal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states not to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that were parties to the treaty. 
It put as a condition that no transit of nuclear weapons must take place on the
■94ibid.,
109
territory of the non-nuclear weapons state.1^5 Kosygin's proposal was at first 
perceived by some countries as a step in the right direction, because it would reduce 
the threat of nuclear attack, and in the course of the negotiations three proposals on 
negative guarantees were submitted at the ENDC, respectively by Switzerland, 
Romania and the United Arab Republic. However, such proposals were not 
generally accepted. India did not consider negative guarantees good enough, since 
China would not be signing a Non-Proliferation Treaty. The U.S. government did 
not like the Kosygin formula either, although the Americans were vague about their 
views in public. The Americans did not welcome the Kosygin formula because the 
formula was both aimed at the F. R. Germany on which territory British and 
American nuclear arms were deployed, and it was aimed at the NATO's flexible 
response strategy which did not exclude the use of nuclear arms in a conflict.1^6
c ... non-aligned reactions
To many non-aligned countries, the Soviet and the American proposals looked 
like mere 'paper tigers'. By the summer of 1967, India seemed to have relinquished 
any hope of reliable guarantees. Security assurances were more and more perceived 
as useless in New Delhi. The negative version had no or very little value for India for 
which China represented the big threat. Indian officials, furthermore, indicated that 
the positive guarantee had lost much of its promise after the six-days-war in the 
N'liddle East. According to one Indian interpretation, the two superpowers had kept 
very quiet during the conflict for fear of confrontation. Thus India did not think 
China needed to worry about superpower retaliation in case they attacked India. 
The main lesson to be drawn from the regional conflict in the Middle East was that - 
with or without guarantees - India had to take responsibility for its own defence.
^^^Mohamed I. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation ¡959  
- 1979, New York, London, Rome, Oceana Publications, Inc., 1980, Vol. II, p.496.
^^^Shaker, ibid., vol. II., p. 497.
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d. .. West Gemían reaction
The Federal Republic of Germany emerged as another strong advocate of the 
interests of the threshold countries, including demands for security guarantees. Like 
India, West Germany too, wanted assurances that could be relied upon. One way of 
achieving binding commitments was to make them part of the Treaty. India had 
already voiced such a request, to no avail. Then, West Germany became a 
spokesman for the same demand. Furthermore, the Germans put great emphasis on 
the inclusion of guarantees against nuclear blackmail, that is threatening to use nuclear 
arms, as well as nuclear aggression. Their demands were presented formally to the 
ENDC in a memorandum on 8 March 1968.
e. .. nuclear powet^s'response
Apparently, serious negotiations among the three nuclear powers on the issue 
of security guarantees only started in connection with the drafting of the two 
identical 18 January 1968 proposals. At that stage, the Soviets were still defending 
the Kosygin formula, which the Western powers could not accept for reasons 
mentioned above. Thus, no mention of security guarantees were made in the draft. 
When a draft for a Security Council Resolution was finally presented in April 1968, it 
included assurances by the nuclear powers that they would come to the rescue of 
countries being threatened by nuclear attack as well as of countries being under 
nuclear attack. The three powers promised each to give a formal declaration to this 
effect in connection with the passing of such a UN Security Council resolution. 
Furthermore, similar assurance would be given in a preambular paragraph of the 
Treaty. During the final discussions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the UN 
General Assembly in May/June, Mexico and Japan submitted amendments to the 
Treaty and the Security Council Resolution, for provisions promoting the principles
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of the UN Charter concerning threat or the use of force in international relations. 
This was meant to strengthen the commitments, and was generally accepted.
/ . . .  current situation
Still, the commitments of the nuclear powers could not be seen as firm 
commitments since any of the permanent members of the Security Council would 
be able to veto any action they might disapprove of. Thus they were generally 
interpreted as totally valueless in real terms, but useful negotiation wise. The Federal 
Republic of Germany wasn't reassured by these guarantees in form of references to 
the UN Charter, and sought to obtain more specific guarantees from the United 
States with regard to European security. The West Germans in particular asked for 
and got American commitment regarding the provision of security in the case that 
NATO was to be dissolved. This request led to several American declarations. 
Further reassurances were given in the course of the ratification p r o c e s s . W i t h  
these US commitments to NATO and the defence of Europe, the government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany had achieved the reassurances it had asked for and 
made its ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty conditional upon. But the effort 
to involve the two superpowers in new and more far-reaching commitments than 
those undertaken in the context of the alliances had not met with success. While this 
probably was a reflection of what was politically feasible, it also reflected that the 
nuclear powers did not accept that remmciation of nuclear weapons was a sacrifice.
l^^Forland, ibid., p. 13.
198The Foreign Committee's report to the Senate cited former Foreign Secretary Rusk to the 
effect that Articles 1 and II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would "in no way" prevent the United 
States from honouring its commitments within the Western Alliance regarding existing defence 
arrangements; deployment of nuclear forces throughout the world; or transfer of nuclear arms or 
transfer of the control of nuclear arms to another nation in the case of war. Again citing Rusk, it 
was pointed out that the Treaty only dealt with what was prohibited, not with what was allowed. 
Thus the Treaty did not prohibit transfer of delivery vehicles, or transfer of control of delivery 
vehicles so long as the transfer did not include bombs or warheads. Neither did it prohibit allied 
consultations regarding nuclear defence or arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons on 
allied soil. The United States was moreover not prohibited from using nuclear weapons in any 
situation wherein non-use would be inconsistent with U.S. security interests. And finally, the 
Treaty did not deal with the question of European unity, and did not prohibit a federal Europe to 
succeed to the nuclear status of one member of the federation. Forland, ibid., p. 14.
1 1 2
E... Issues Discussed on Arms Control and Disarmament
The arms control measures that followed in the wake of the Cuban missile 
crisis: the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT -1963), the later Treaty on the Prohibition of 
the use of Outer Space for military purposes (1966), and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (1968) were not disarmament measures in the sense that they reduced 
existing weapons arsenals. The main objective of these three treaties was to halt the 
spread of weapons, and in particular nuclear weapons, by making it more difficult or 
even illegal to produce them. The Partial Test Ban Treaty furthermore had a very 
positive effect in reducing the radioactive contamination of the earth. But none of 
these treaties by themselves reduced the nuclear proliferation of the existing nuclear 
weapon powers, the so-called vertical proliferation. They were therefore less 
ambitious than the complete arms control and disarmament measures that had been 
discussed in the United Nations in the 1950's, when a comprehensive test ban treaty 
had been the main goal. This goal was given up due to superpower disagreement on 
the number of yearly inspections that were warranted in order to verify an eventual 
ban. The abandonment of the approach of general and complete disarmament in 
favour of collateral arms control measures was a great disappointment to many 
countries. It made France withdraw from the disarmament negotiations, 
maintaining that the Partial Test Ban Treaty as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
would but represent measures to maintain the privileged positions of the two 
superpowers. China, of course, held much the same view, and claimed that the 
American-Soviet agreements were directed toward preventing China from gaining 
parity with them. Many countries participating in the negotiations were also 
unhappy about the fact that the Non-proUferation Treaty would not prevent vertical 
proliferation. For this reason the first draft proposals submitted respectively by the 
Americans and the Russians in 1965 were strongly criticised by many countries. It 
was pointed out that the obligations of the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear 
weapons states, as expressed in Articles I and II, were only symmetrical with regard
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to transfer of weapons and assistance in production of weapons. They were 
asymmetrical when it came to manufacture of nuclear weapons. Whereas the non­
nuclear-weapons states would pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons, the 
existing nuclear powers would not.
i... Non-Aligned Concern with Vertical Proliferation
Already before the presentation of the two draft proposals, India and Sweden 
had made it known that they were not keen on a non-proliferation treaty in which 
the superpowers made no contribution of their own toward slowing down the 
nuclear arms race. And they were supported by other non-aligned countries, like 
Yugoslavia. The position of the non-aligned regarding this issue must also be seen 
on the background of the nuclear arms build-up initiated by both superpowers in 
the early 1960's, the deployment of which was beginning to lurk in the horizon. The 
question of whether to deploy anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems or not, was a 
matter of particularly great importance in this connection because of the 
consequences of such systems for nuclear strategy. If countries started to act on the 
belief that they could survive a first strike, the world would become a much more 
dangerous place. In such a situation, many countries saw a great need for arms 
limitations, and there was considerable fear that once a non-proliferation treaty was 
a reality, the superpowers would lose interest in further arms control measures.
Non-nuclear weapons states were not alone in harbouring such fears. There 
was, of course, a growing awareness of the danger of nuclear war in the public 
opinion world-wide, and the number of organisations and individuals campaigning 
against the nuclear arms race was ever increasing. Consequently, there was strong 
political pressure on the nuclear powers both inside the negotiating fora and outside 
for meeting such fears with substantial measures. Also, the nuclear powers well 
understood that they had to give something in return for the renunciation of nuclear
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weapons by the non-nuclear weapon states. Thus, they accepted the incorporation in 
Resolution 2028 of two guiding principles that acknowledged the need for 
reciprocity. Firstly, the resolution ruled that:
1.. . the Non-proliferation Treaty should be based on an acceptable balance of 
obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear powers; and
2.. . the Treaty should represent a step towards disarmament, and in particular, 
nuclear disarmament.
« . ..  the non-aligned memorandum
The wishes of the eight non-aligned ENDC members regarding disarmament 
were put forward in a joint memorandum. They, in particular, favoured:
1.. . a cut-off of fissile materials production for military purposes;
2.. . a reduction of existing arms stocks; and
3.. . a comprehensive test ban treaty.
While the Western nuclear powers pledged support for such measures and 
even promised to work for agreements of the kind listed in the memorandum put 
forward by the eight non-aligned countries. Nevertheless, the nuclear weapons 
states also warned against making the Non-Proliferation Treaty dependent upon the 
implementation of additional measures. The problem with the kind of measures 
listed in the memorandum was that, although the Western powers supported them 
in principle, the United Stated, in particular, would not agree to such agreements 
unless they included provisions for reliable verification. And the former 
disagreements between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning 
verification were still very much in existence. In addition, both superpowers were 
reluctant to accept restraints on themselves that would not apply to China.
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b. .. nuclear powers' response
Following the breakthrough in the negotiations in the autumn of 1966, the 
question of link between the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other disarmament 
agreements became a major issue in the bilateral discussions that took place 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. In March 1967 it became known 
that the two superpowers were to begin talks on possible ways of Limiting the arms 
race. The Soviet government had agreed to enter into such talks on the condition 
that the talks would cover both offensive and defensive missiles. The presentation of 
the tivo identical draft proposals o f August 1967, on the other hand, made it clear that the 
superpowers were not going to accept links between the NPT and other disarmament 
measures. Like earlier draft proposals, the ones submitted in 1967 only provided 
disarmament and arms control commitments in general terms. And these were not 
made part of the operative text, but were contained in three preambular 
paragraphs.
c. .. non-nuclear weapons states' insistence
The non-nuclear weapons states were still insisting that the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty should represent a step in a process leading towards a complete and general 
disarmament agreement. The more demanding were still asking for specific 
measures to be incorporated in the text. As late as October 1967, the Indian 
ambassador said that a halt of production of fissile materials for military purposes 
was the only possible basis for a NPT. At the very least, they wanted a 
strengthening of the disarmament provisions through a separate treaty article. 
Mexico and Sweden submitted proposals to that effect, and were supported by 
many other countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany. Such an article 
(i.e.. Article VI) was included for the first time in the two identical draft proposals of 
18 January 1968. In Article VI the nuclear weapons states pledged to pursue 
negotiations regarding "cessation of the nuclear arms race". Romania had repeatedly
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put forward proposals suggesting that the nuclear weapons powers should at least 
pledge to undertake adopting specific measures. More conciliatory countries were 
content with a pledge by the nuclear powers to pursue negotiations in good faith. 
Mexico submitted a proposal to this effect which became part of the final treaty text.
ii... Final Phases of Negotiations
During the final phases of the negotiations, the superpowers were particularly 
keen to accommodate Swedish proposals, because they regarded Sweden as a 
leading light among the non-aligned countries. Thus, the first joint treaty draft of 11 
March 1968 incorporated two Swedish amendments to Article VI, in addition to a 
new preambular paragraph on nuclear weapon testing. The main change suggested 
by the Swedes was a qualification of the disarmament pledge by introducing a time 
factor. The superpowers then accepted to pursue negotiations regarding "cessation of 
the arms race at an early date". The wish to introduce such a time factor had been 
expressed by many countries in the course of the negotiations. Amendments 
suggested by other countries were not taken into consideration by the co-chairmen 
at this stage. In the final text the nuclear weapons states pledged "to pursue 
negotiations in good faith to achieve effective measures relating to cessation of the 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." This 
meant that the nuclear powers did not commit themselves to achieve anything, only 
to negotiate in good faith. However, their willingness to negotiate was 
demonstrated already at the opening for signature of the Treaty, when they 
announced their intention of starting negotiations on defensive and offensive 
missiles.1^9 Furthermore, the pressure on the nuclear powers to achieve some 
results with regard to disarmament was increased through the review provisions of 
the Treaty. In order to review the operation of the Treaty, provision for a review
^^ F^orland, ibid, pp: 17 - 18.
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conference to be held after a certain period of time had already been included in the 
first American draft proposal. The paragraph had been added to allay the fears of 
those countries which thought the Non-Proliferation Treaty might not be followed 
up by further disarmament measures.200
iii... Inclusion of Review Conferences
The failure to specify the disarmament commitments of the nuclear powers led 
the non-nuclear weapons states to ask for a strengthening of the review mechanism, 
by suggesting regular reviews of the Treaty. Towards the end of the negotiations, 
the Swedes let it be known that they wanted reviews every five years.201 The West 
German memorandum of 15 March 1968 also asked for regular reviews, and The 
Federal Republic of Germany got support from Belgium and Italy during internal 
NATO discussions of this issue. The Americans were willing to accept regular 
reviews already in January 1968, but the Russians held back until the final 
discussions in the UN General Assembly. They then accepted two amendments, with 
the view to making the disarmament commitments stronger. First, a provision was 
added opening for periodic reviews of the Treaty at interval of five years, if a 
majority of countries wanted it. Second, it was specified that the review would 
include preambular commitments as well as the provisions of the Treaty. Review of 
the preambular paragraphs was included because the disarmament commitments 
were more strongly phrased in the preamble than in the Treaty articles.202
F... Negotiations on the Safeguards Prouisions of the NPT
After an agreement had been reached on a definition of nuclear spread, the 
question of a safeguards article (i.e.. Article III) became the biggest bone of contention 
of the negotiations. Whereas the first Soviet draft proposal did not coritain a text regarding
200shaker, ibid., vol. II., pp: 871-872.
201 Swedish proposal of 8 February 1968.
202porland, ibid., p. 19.
118
safeguards provisions, the first US draft proposal included an Article III which in very 
general terms indicated that safeguards zoould be taken care o f through application o f IAEA 
or equivalent international s a f e g u a r d s .The American draft thus seemed to reflect 
the breakthrough that had taken place with regard to IAEA safeguards in 1964, and 
which had resulted in the negotiating of a whole new safeguards regime by 
September 1965. The breakthrough was due to a change of the Soviet government's 
attitude to international safeguards. At the outset, this change of attitude did not 
seem to affect the Soviet position regarding safeguards in connection with the NET.
i... Issues and Debates on International Safeguards
From the very beginning the Soviets made it clear that they would not accept 
the application of safeguards on their own territory. They were thus insisting on 
establishing the same asymmetry between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states 
with regard to Article III as was already agreed upon with regard to the preceding 
articles (i.e.. Article I, and II). Many countries found this difficult to accept. Some 
countries saw it as a discrimination against the non-nuclear countries. India, which 
had always been opposed to inspections, and which, as an alternative to inspections, 
had advocated during the IAEA negotiations that countries should give assurances 
that fissile material were not converted to military use, then insisted that controls 
should either be applied to civilian nuclear activities in all countries or in none. A 
small number of other threshold countries such as Brazil, shared India's misgivings. 
Apparently, these countries were predominantly concerned about the imbalance of 
obligations.
a... commercial consequences of safeguards inspections
Many more countries were concerned or pretended to be concerned about the 
commercial consequences of asymmetrical safeguards. Canada, Switzerland, Japan,
203shaker. ibid., vol. II., p. 655.
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Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany among others feared that inspections could 
function as industrial espionage and give nuclear weapon powers a commercial 
advantage over non-nuclear states. They therefore demanded the application of 
international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities within the territories of the 
nuclear weapon powers as well as on all transfers of source and fissile materials and 
equipment to these states. The Federal Republic of Germany v^'as particularly 
adamant in its insistence on the danger of industrial espionage, and the Germans 
resented the thought of Russians inspecting German plants. They also feared that 
controls could be used to hamper production of fissile materials in non-nuclear 
weapons states, and that such states as a consequence would lose out in the 
competition of export of reactors because they would not be able to deliver the fuel 
to go with the reactors. The West Germans maintained that they had already had 
the experience of losing contracts due to the fact that they had not been able to 
furnish the reactors with fuel.
b... West German concerns with safeguards procedures
The Federal Republic had succeeded in preventing the presentation of identical 
American and Soviet draft proposals in February 1967, by insisting on the need for 
Allied consultations. More than anything, the Germans feared that the Americans 
and the Russians would agree on a safeguards regime that would be detrimental to 
German interests. The Federal Republic's main interest was the preservation of 
EURATOM controls. And on this issue, the Germans were supported by the other 
members of the European Community, and in particular Italy and Belgium. The 
wish to preserve EURATOM reflected the same Gaullist political aspirations that had 
contributed to making the MLF such a hot issue. EURATOM was strongly identified 
with the European integration process, and a weakening of its functions was 
therefore difficult to accept for the proponents of a federal Europe. In addition to 
such grand political considerations, the West Germans generally preferred
120
EURATOM controls to IAEA controls because the former were less intrusive, being 
only applied to fissile materials and not to facilities. And the Germans maintained 
that international inspections was equivalent to industrial espionage. Another factor 
that caused anxiety among the EURATOM countries in general was fear the that a 
non-proliferation treaty would prevent the United States from honouring its 
agreement with EURATOM, and that consequently the EURATOM members would 
be prevented from receiving fissile materials from the Americans in the future.
ii... Consultations Among the States
The main objective of the consultations held in the spring of 1967 was to 
formulate a common allied position regarding Article III. Giving in to persistent 
demands, not the least from Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom 
accepted to put all their civilian industry under the IAEA safeguards. In July 1967, the 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told his American coimterpart Dean Rusk 
that the Western nuclear powers could do as they pleased, but the Soviet Union was 
not going to accept inspections. Thus, the two identical draft proposals that were 
presented in August did not include any provisions for international safeguards on 
nuclear activities in nuclear weapon states. By this stage, Sweden, by all accounts, 
decided that they had enough of the German-led procrastination, and declared that 
they accepted - albeit reluctantly - to allow the nuclear powers to be their own 
judges as to when to apply safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities' But, the 
Swedes suggested all the sam.e that safeguards on transfer of special nuclear 
materials from one state to another should be applicable to all parties. The reason 
given was that they wished to prevent states that renounced nuclear weapons from 
helping the nuclear powers to maintain their monopoly.204
204por|and, ibid., p. 21.
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a... the U.S. memorandum
In March 1967, the Americans distributed to the other NATO countries a 
memorandum suggesting several concessions to the EURATOM countries. The 
Americans promised to try to negotiate a permission of transfer of fissile materials 
as well as equipment from nuclear powers to non-nuclear weapons states for 
peaceful purposes, even in cases when the materials and equipment might be used 
for military purposes. They furthermore promised to advocate that regional 
controls should be accepted in principle so that the IAEA functions in practical terms 
would be to verify EURATOM controls. The Americans did not themselves believe it 
possible to get Soviet acceptance of these concessions, but they were willing to try in 
order to achieve consensus within NATO.
h... Soviet reaction
There had already been signals that the Soviets were willing to modify their 
position in order to get a West German signature. At the IAEA General Conference 
in September 1966, Czechoslovakia and Poland both offered to accept IAEA 
safeguards of their nuclear installations if the Federal Republic of Germany did the 
same. Later the German Democratic Republic made a similar offer. In May 1967 the 
Soviets told the Americans that they wanted a straight IAEA formula, and by 
September that year the Americans came to the conclusion that the Russians wanted 
safeguards as much as did the Americans. In the end, the Soviets also accepted to 
make exemptions for EURATOM controls. Thus a final paragraph was added 
permitting the IAEA to enter into an agreement with another international 
organisation concerning safeguards. At one point the Americans had suggested that, 
unless such an agreement was reached in three years after ratification of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA safeguards would automatically go into function. Due 
to strong resistance among EURATOM countries to this so-called guillotine-clause it 
was taken out.
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c. .. Soviet-American consensus on Article III of the NPT
The joint American-Soviet draft proposal of January 1968 included for the first 
time a complete Article III, including the final paragraph allowing the IAEA to 
collaborate with other international organisations concerning safeguards. Still, 
Article III made the IAEA safeguards provisions the basic control instrument of the 
NPT. Care was taken to allow for revision of the IAEA safeguards without the 
requirement of an NPT amendment. The safeguards provisions applied to source or 
fissile materials whether it was "being produced, processed or used in any principal 
nuclear facility or outside any such facility". The safeguards applied to all relevant 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the non-nuclear states, under the 
jurisdiction of such states, or carried out under the control of such states elsewhere. 
Transfer between non-nuclear weapon states of source and fissile materials would 
likewise be subject to international safeguards. The nuclear weapon states, however, 
did not accept controls on their imports.205
d. .. reactions to Soviet-American consensus
The threshold countries that had been closely involved in the discussions of the 
safeguards provisions in the autumn of 1967 were not satisfied with Article III. The 
reaction to the text both in Bonn and Stockholm, for example, was that it lacked 
balance. But at the same time it was generally not considered to be politically 
possible to get a better result. The Article did in fact constitute a considerable 
progress compared with commitments entered into in connection with the IAEA 
Statute. Until the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into function, the IAEA safeguards 
only applied to projects receiving Agency assistance or to projects voluntarily placed 
under IAEA controls. With the NPT, aU fissile materials in non-nuclear countries 
party to the Treaty would be safeguarded, as would be the transfers of such material
205shaker, ibid., vol. II., p. 667.
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between non-nuclear weapons states. Furthermore, two of the existing nuclear 
powers had pledged to put their civilian nuclear activities under safeguards.
G... UieiiJS on Promoting Peaceful Uses of Atom
The fundamental asymmetry of Articles I and II of the Non-proliferation 
Treaty with regard to the duties and obligations of the non-nuclear and the nuclear 
weapon states caused much debate at the ENDC. Efforts to reduce the imbalance 
with regard to Article III were generally not considered by the non-nuclear weapons 
states to have been very successful, although the fear that the NET would have a 
detrimental effect on the development of peaceful nuclear activities in countries that 
accepted international controls influenced the formulation of Article III. The Article in 
fact included a paragraph stating that the safeguards regime should not hamper the economic 
or technological development o f safeguarded states nor should it hamper international co­
operation in the field. However, this was not enough to satisfy the non-nuclear 
weapon powers, and in the course of the negotiations two more articles. Articles IV 
and V, were added. The former dealt with the peaceful uses of the atom, and 
whereas the latter concerned with the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, (i.e. a 
programme of using nuclear explosives for engineering purposes, such as digging 
canals or creating oil deposits).
i... The American View
The question of the use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes was 
raised in August 1966 by the Americans. They maintained that there were no 
technical differences between a nuclear bomb and a nuclear explosive used for 
peaceful purposes, and that consequently peaceful useful explosions must be 
reserved for the nuclear weapon states. During the discussions within the ENDC the 
American delegation brought forth research material which indicated that eventual 
peaceful uses of nuclear explosions were very limited. This verdict generated the
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protest of many non-nuclear powers, which interpreted the American position as 
yet another example of favouring the rights of nuclear weapon powers over the 
non-nuclear weapons states.
11.. . The Non-Aligned View
The most adamant proponents of equal access to peaceful use of nuclear 
explosives were Brazil and India. The three nuclear powers were from the very 
beginning determined to include prohibition of nuclear explosives in the general 
provisions of Articles I and III, thus treating peaceful nuclear explosives on the same 
footing as military explosives, and the non-nuclear weapon states were forced to 
accept this position in order to reach an agreement. Brazil in particular was strongly 
opposed to this settlement, and many other coimtries resented it. To compensate for 
the non-nuclear weapons states having renounced the production of all nuclear 
explosives, the nuclear powers accepted the introduction of Article V. In this article 
the nuclear weapon powers pledged to ensure that potential benefits from any 
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear 
weapons states party to the Treaty. The applications were to be carried out under 
appropriate international observations and through international procedures.^^^
111.. . The West German View
The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, was insisting that a non­
proliferation treaty should be concentrated on the prevention of the future spread of 
nuclear weapons, and that it should not unduly interfere with the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy. It ought, on the contrary, to stimulate countries in this field. In 
addition to the danger of industrial espionage and the negative commercial 
consequences of international safeguards, the Germans feared that, due to the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, the non-nuclear weapons states would also be exempt from the
ibid., vol. I., pp: 405-430.
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so-called spin-offs of military research and development in the nuclear field. The 
West Germans were reluctant to accept this, pointing out that civilian nuclear 
research was still young, and that no one knew what the future would hold. And 
they feared that the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be used to forbid nuclear 
programmes under the pretext that these would increase the Federal Republic's 
progress towards nuclear arms.
iv. .. The Italian View
Within the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Italy focused on one 
aspect in particular, namely the securing of fissile material supply. On 1 August 1967, 
Italian Foreign Minister, Amintory Fanfani, submitted a proposal concerning the 
future supply of such materials. He suggested that nuclear weapon powers should 
commit themselves to transfer a certain amount of fissile material at a reduced price 
to non-nuclear-weapon states. The material should come from military 
stockpiles,207 j^ea that had much in common with president Eisenhower's 
original idea for the setting up of the IAEA. The Italian proposal was never taken up 
by the chairmen. However, at NATO meetings, the Americans said that nothing 
could prevent the United States from continuing to supply the EURATOM countries 
with fissile materials
v. .. Final Considerations on Peaceful Uses of Atom
The identical draft proposals of August 1967 included for the first time an article 
on the promotion of the benign use of the atom. The text was taken from the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco, and confirmed the non-nuclear-weapons states' right to participate in 
the fullest possible exchange of information concerning civilian nuclear activities. But 
the demand was for stronger commitments on the part of the nuclear powers. 
Proposals to this effect was submitted by Nigeria and Italy. Italy was adamant that
207shaker, ibid., vol. I., pp: 304-305.
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the Treaty should have concrete reference to the rights to materials and equipment, 
not only information. Mexico put forward several propositions that were taken into 
consideration by the chairmen. The most far-reaching changes were introduced in 
the 11 March 1968 draft proposal and in the final text of the Treaty, negotiated at the 
United Nations in June 1968. A new preambular paragraph in the March 1968 draft 
put greater emphasis on the right of the non-nuclear-weapons states to make 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and it was recognised that they should have access 
to fissile materials.
The final text of 4 June 1968 contained greatly strengthened provisions on the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article IV then specified that all parties undertook 
to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of information. A new provision was added 
whereby signatories would be "able to acquire source and special fissionable 
materials as well as equipment for processing, use and production of nuclear 
material for peaceful purposes". On suggestions from Latin American and African 
countries, a further clause was added specifying that due consideration should be 
given to the needs of the developing areas in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
The formal commitments were confirmed in a statement of the American 
ambassador. Before the political committee of the General Assembly, the American 
ambassador pledged that his coxmtry would share their knowledge and experience 
concerning all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the parties of the 
Treaty. He also mentioned the fact that the American know-how had been acquired 
at great cost, thereby suggesting that giving such a promise was no small matter in 
economic terms.^^^
Articles I and II, which defined nuclear spread in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
were on the whole formulated by the three nuclear powers participating in the
208pQrland, ibid., p. 25.
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negotiations, and they were formulated in such a way that they suited the interests 
of these powers, although the United States had to renounce the idea of multilateral 
nuclear sharing. The final formula would allow for the continuance of the existing 
military alliances, based as they were on nuclear defence and retaliation. It was agreed 
that the Non-Proliferation Treaty would not apply in the case o f war. In such a case, nuclear 
forces, nuclear weapons and control of nuclear weapons could be transferred to 
other countries. Furthermore, such a situation could be prepared for in peacetime 
through transfer of delivery vehicles and control of delivery vehicles, provided that 
they were not equipped with bombs or warheads.
The American-Soviet understanding meant that the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
would also allow for transfer o f weapons or control o f weapons in the case o f a state or an 
association o f states legally succeeding a nuclear-weapon state. The non-nuclear-weapon 
states party to the Treaty were strictly forbidden from manufacturing or helping to 
manufacture weapons or nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. Likewise, the 
nuclear weapon powers were forbidden from transferring weapons or helping 
other countries to manufacture nuclear weapons. Due to the insistence on the part o f 
the most industrialised non-nuclear weapons states, the spread prohibition did not include 
source or fissile materials and equipment, even in cases where such materials or equipment 
could have a dual use, i.e. could be used both for civilian and military purposes. Furthermore, 
the safeguards regime was weakened because o f the demand o f the EURATOM countries for 
the preservation o f the EURATOM controls system, which did not include control o f  
facilities, only o f materials. Preservation of the EURATOM control regime would also 
have implication for the choice of inspectors, and this would again have possible 
implications for the reliability of the safeguards system. At least it would have 
implications for the principle of international controls. Insistence on the principle of 
free nuclear development and free nuclear trade in the civilian field led to the 
inclusion in the treaty of Article IV. This article made it clear that non-nuclear
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weapon states would have free access to information, materials and equipment for 
processing, use and production of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. And not 
only that, parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty pledged to facilitate access to 
relevant information. The Western nuclear powers' acceptance of international 
control of their civilian nuclear activities was of great political significance for the 
negotiations, but hardly of importance with regard to preventing spread of nuclear 
weapons.
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CHAPTER VI. THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS DOCUMENT IN
CONNECTION WITH THE NUCLEAR NON­
PROLIFERATION TREATY: INFCIRC/153.
H... Oueruieiu
One important distinction of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is that, with Article 
III paragraph 1, it requires non-nuclear weapons states to accept full-scope 
(comprehensive) safeguards on all its source or fissionable nuclear materials. With 
the same Treaty, the states are also required to conclude a bilateral (or multilateral 
for groups of states) agreement with the IAEA within a specific period of time. 
Hence, the more comprehensive nature of the safeguards required under the NPT 
covering all peaceful nuclear activities of states prompted demands of a number of 
industrial states with advanced nuclear capabilities that the safeguards system of the 
IAEA be reviewed considering the broadened scope of the Agency's mandate. Japan 
and Germany in particular, were very much concerned with the competitive 
disadvantage in the world nuclear market that the routine and/ or special safeguards 
inspections might cause in their sensitive fuel cycle activities^O^ ^ase they become 
party to the NPT. To deal with this concern of Japan and Germany, the United States 
offered to permit the IAEA to apply safeguards to all their nuclear activities except 
those with direct national security significance.^lO Such voluntary offers were 
followed by the United Kingdom in 1978, France in 1981, and by the Soviet Union in 
1985. In view of Japan and Germany in late 1960s, the international safeguards 
system represented by INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 lacked sufficient certainty and 
predictability to ensure against unnecessary intrusiveness, especially with respect to 
the intensity of safeguards inspection. It was therefore dear that ratification of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty by especially these two states was contingent upon the
^^^Such as uranium enrichment, irradiated fuel reprocessing, and development of fast breeder 
reactors.
^ I^ h is  offer took effect in 1980.
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establishment of satisfactory safeguards arrangements. Securing the collaboration of 
these two states was of utmost importance with regard to the survivability of the 
non-proliferation regime. Hence, the Board of Governors established a committee 
open to all Agency members to advise it on the Agency's responsibilities in relation 
to the NPT safeguards provisions and to determine the content of safeguards 
agreements with NPT parties. The result of this effort, which involved eighty-two 
committee meetings over a period of ten months, was The Structure and Content of 
Agreements Between the Agency and the States Required in Connection with the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons, that is, the INPCIRC/153. This document, 
together with INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 constitute the two basic safeguards documents of 
the Agency's current safeguards system. The INFCIRC/153, which is the third 
safeguards document of the IAEA is also usually known as the model agreejnent for 
the states party to the NPT.
B... Comparison of INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/155
INFCIRC/153 was the result of lengthy deliberations in the Safeguards 
Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors in 1970 and 1971. The document 
contains many compromises reflecting the divergent requirements of the IAEA 
member states. In general, INFCIRC/153 sets tight limits on what the IAEA can do, 
thereby providing protection for states against escalation of safeguards in the 
future.211 The two safeguards documents reveal in a way the political environments 
of their periods that they were being discussed. It may be useful to briefly mention 
the similarities and differences that these two safeguards documents display. *
*This had been a matter of considerable concern to a number of non-nuclear weapon states 
during the course of negotiation process of the NPT safeguards.
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1.. . Similarities
1.. . both safeguards documents envisage similar methods and practices in 
safeguards implementation;
2.. . both documents rely on records, reports, and design information to 
establish the strategies for the actualization of safeguards;
3 .. . in both documents, on-site inspections are essential for achieving 
independent inspections so as to verify that the states do comply with their 
undertakings;
4.. . in both INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/66, it is well defined that during the 
course of conducting on-site inspections the Agency will not hamper facility 
operations or impede peaceful nuclear developments of the states inspected;
5.. . both documents emphasize that the Agency will employ prudent 
management practices, and will not disclose confidential information obtained by 
the Agency.
11.. . Differences
1.. . Under the INFCIRC/66 safeguards system of the IAEA, the purpose of 
safeguards is to ensure that safeguarded material is not used in such a way as to 
further any military purpose. Under the INFCIRC/153, however, the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons is prohibited. Other military uses of nuclear energy, such as 
propulsion of military vessels or vehicles, are not prohibited under the 
INFCIRC /153. On the other hand, the NW  prohibits a non-military activity, namely 
the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, which would 
not be prohibited under INFCIRC/66 type IAEA safeguards procedures.
2.. . Another important difference between the INFCIRC/66 type IAEA 
safeguards and the safeguards envisaged in Article III.l of the NPT, is that the 
former apply to specific nuclear facilities or to specific amounts of nuclear material, 
whereas the latter shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all
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peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the state in question, or under its 
jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere. That is the INFCIRC/153 type 
safeguards agreements are comprehensive (full-scope).
3... Furthermore, the differences between INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/66 are 
also reflected in a number of new concepts introduced as elements of the NPT 
safeguards document in order to improve the acceptability and effectiveness of 
safeguards which can be commensurable with the broadened mandate of the IAEA 
under the NPT. Among these new concepts are:
.) formal provisions for subsidiary arrangements;
.) emphasis on focusing safeguards on strategic points;
.) use of instrumentation and other non-human inspection techniques where 
feasible;
.) explicit recognition of surveillance and containment as important 
complementary measures to material accountancy;
.) a requirement that the safeguarded state establish a national system of 
accounting for and control of nuclear material;
.) the regulation of the intensity of routine inspection.
C... Objectiue of IREfl Safeguards Pursuant to INFCIRC/155
Safeguards are the technical means that the IAEA employs to verify compliance 
of the states with their legal obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons. Put in this 
context, the political objective o f verification is to deter against possible diversion through the 
risk o f early detection. To complement with this political objective, the technical 
objective of the IAEA verification procedures is "the timely detection of diversion of 
significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for 
purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early
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detection."212 xhus, the IAEA's verification system is geared to ensure that any diversion 
of significant quantities o f fissile material to military purpose has to be discovered 'in time' 
before it is converted into a bomb.^^^ Furthermore, the same paragraph mentions "for 
purposes unknown", which indicates that the Agency does not have to seek to 
determine the use to which diverted material is put, nor to prove that diverted 
material is being used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. What falls on the Agency is to conclude that the diverted material 
cannot be accounted for, that is to record that amount in the report indicating the 
material unaccounted for.
Though, in paragraph 28 of INFCIRC/153, the key terms timely detection, 
significant quantity, and the risk o f early detection are indicated as the technical 
objectives, they are nonetheless conceptual in nature and they do need to be 
translated into operational terms by assigning them quantitative measures. Of these 
terms, timely detection is quantified by relating specified nuclear materials, such as 
highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, or thorium, to the time necessary to 
convert material in specified form into metallic components suitable for use in 
nuclear explosive devices. Significant quantity, on the other hand, is the approximate 
amount of nuclear material which the IAEA considers a state would need to 
manufacture its first nuclear explosive device. In defining such quantities, the IAEA 
takes into account matters such as the degree of enrichment of the material and any 
process that may be needed to convert it into a nuclear explosive. This amount is 
generally accepted as approximately equal to 8 kg. of plutonium (P-239) or 25 kg. of 
highly enriched uranium (U-235). Finally, by the risk of early detection, the Agency
212jfvfp(^ [j^ (2;/i53  ^ paragraph 28.
case of Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) in metal form, the conversion takes 
seven to ten days. So, the need for frequent and timely inspection, and challenge inspection in 
some cases, is clear. See, in these respects, Mohammed El Baradei, IAEA Verification : Basic 
Features and Recent Developments, Paper submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
Workshop on the Modalities for the Application of Safeguards in a Future Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zone in the Middle East, 4 - 7 May, 1993.
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aims at a detection probability of 90 - 95 percent and a false alarm probability of 5 
percent or less. Both of these numbers are derived from statistical probability and 
not an objectively defined rationale. The values assigned to the notions of significant 
quantity and timely detection have been adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors 
as guidelines for inspection planning and detection goals. A group of experts 
advisors, namely the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation 
(SAGSI) established within the IAEA, assisted the Board in dealing with problems 
associated with translating principles and procedures of INFGIRG/153 into 
operationally effective and acceptable forms.
D... Basic Tenets of IHEfl Safeguards Pursuant to INFCIRC/155
The IAEA's third safeguards document INEGIRC/153 consists of three parts. 
Part I sets forth the general principles governing the rights and obligations of the 
parties to the safeguards agreements under the NPT. The parties to a safeguards 
agreement are the states or group of states on the one side, and the IAEA on the 
other. The general principles of Part I include: the basic undertaking; application of 
safeguards; implementation of safeguards; provisions of information to the Agency; 
procedures about the Agency inspectors; legal and financial responsibilities; 
measures that can be taken by the Agency in an effort to ensure verification of non- 
diversion; rules for interpretation and settlement of disputes, and related matters.
Part II of INFCIRC/153 spells out these principles that are translated into 
operational arrangements and . the provisions that are deemed necessary to 
implement safeguards, such as the starting point of safeguards; termination of 
safeguards; exemptions from safeguards. The Part II also includes a statement of the 
technical objective of safeguards; materials to be taken under the scope; measures 
such as material accountancy; containment & surveillance; and the methods to be
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used such as design review; records system; reports system; inspections; and 
international transfers.
Part III of INFCIRC/153 consists of definition of key terms and concepts such 
as annual throughput; book inventory; physical inventory; effective kilogram; 
enrichment; facility; key measurement point; man-year of inspection; material 
balance area (MBA); material unaccounted for (MUF); nuclear material; 
shipper/receiver difference; and strategic points that appear in the principles and 
operational procedures sections of the document. The implementation of the 
safeguards document INFCIRC/153 requires the negotiation of three instruments, 
namely the Safeguards Agreement, Subsidiary Arrangements, and Facility 
Attachments which include a Design Information Questionnaire. The Safeguards 
Agreement establishes the basis for the application of Agency' safeguards.
i... Subsidiary Arrangements
Subsidiary Arrangements specify the details of safeguards implementation 
according to the general principles in the Safeguards Agreement. They define what 
information the IAEA will reqmre to meet its safeguards obligations, establish a 
format for record-keeping, and delineate the safeguards arrangements to be carried 
out at each facility. Subsidiary arrangements also include the Facility Attachments 
which contain definitions of the Material Balance Areas (MBA), the Strategic Points 
and the Key Measurement Points at which safeguards will be applied; the 
Containment and Surveillance Measures to be applied; the format and timing of 
reports to be submitted to the Agency; and the mode, timing and the extent of the 
Agency inspections at the facilities of the States to be inspected.
The essential aim of the Subsidiary Arrangements is to permit standardization 
of safeguards implementation as well as preserving confidential information
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acquired by the inspectors during the courses of inspections. These arrangements 
are negotiated between the Agency and the states parties to the NPT, and are not 
imposed by the Agency on the state to be inspected, nor are they submitted to the 
approval of the Board of Governors. The content of the Subsidiary Arrangements 
are kept secret by the parties to the agreement. Theoretically, the Subsidiary 
Arrangements are likely to accommodate developments in the instruments and 
technologies used in safeguards implementation. The paragraph 39 of INFCIRC/153 
provides for the possibility of changing the Subsidiary Arrangement by agreement 
between the state and the Agency without need to amend the Safeguards 
Agreement itself. However, since many crucial and sensitive elements of actual 
safeguard arrangements are established in the Subsidiary Arrangements, including 
the definition of strategic and key measurement points and the designation of actual 
routine inspection efforts at different facilities, it is somewhat unclear whether 
modifications and adjustments can be readily achieved.214
11.. . Strategic Points
One important feature of the safeguards system is the declaration of nuclear 
materials at the disposal of the states party to the NPT. Therefore, an inventory of 
presumably all nuclear materials has to be declared so that the LAE A can make sure 
during successive inspections that these materials remain in peaceful uses. Hence, 
the Agency makes sure through three sets of measures, namely:
1.. . material accountancy;
2.. . containment & surveillance;
3.. . on-site inspections.
^^‘^ The difficulties experienced in seeking to alter earlier safeguards agreement with Pakistan (not 
party to the NPT) under INFCIRC/66 regarding the application of surveillance equipment at the 
Kanupp reactor suggest that agreement to change may be much more difficult to achieve than 
normally believed. L. Scheinman, ibid., p. 155. For a detailed discussion of this case, see David 
Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, London, Taylor and Francis, 
1985. pp: 16- 17.
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Material accountancy is simply counting the initially declared materials at pre­
determined material balance areas. The purpose of counting the materials is to 
determine the material unaccounted for the quantity of which may be alarming for 
some 'unwanted' uses of the materials under safeguards. Due to several reasons 
some negligible amounts of nuclear materials may be lost, or not be present at the 
material balance areas at the time of inspection. However, so long as the material 
unaccounted for (the difference between the book inventory and physical 
inventory) remains to be negligible, it does not create problems between the states 
and the Agency.
Material balance areas are mostly referred to as strategic points indicated in the 
Facility Attachment. In INFCIRC/153 strategic points are defined as the location 
where, under normal conditions, and when combined with the information from all 
strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the 
implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and v e r i f i e d . T h e  principle of 
safeguarding the flow of fissionable material at certain strategic points did not 
originate with INFCIRC/153. It had surfaced earlier at the initiative of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1967 when the IAEA Board of Governors v^as considering 
the extension of Agency safeguards to conversion and fabrication facilities as 
mentioned in INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. Interest in the strategic points approach partly 
reflected concern that safeguards be cost-effective and efficient, and that the risk of 
exposure of proprietary information be kept to a minimum. It also bespoke a desire 
to make safeguards as non-intrusive and non-visible as possible. The same concerns 
explain the parallel emphasis on introducing instrumentation in lien of human 
inspection wherever feasible. Strategic points are justifiable as a basis for efficient.
is also provided that in implementing safeguards the Agency shall make every effort to 
ensure the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material 
subject to safeguards by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the 
extent that technology permits. See, INFCIRC/153, paragraph 6.
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standardized safeguards approaches, and they are logically consistent with the 
concept of material balances, which is the primary method used in international 
safeguards. They offer a rational approach for dealing with the IAEA’s augmented 
safeguards responsibility by emphasizing the concentration of safeguards effort 
where material is most accessible. Strategic points are selected in connection with 
material balance determination rather than with the physical movement of material. 
However, since those points are selected with a view to the ease of determining the 
movement and transfer of nuclear material, they often relate to places where 
material is relatively accessible.
With paragraph 76c of INFCIRC/153, during the routine inspections the access 
of the IAEA inspectors are limited to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary 
Arrangements. This is a contradictory application to what has been defined in the 
Article XII.A.6 of the Statute as that the inspectors shall have access at all times to all 
places and data and to any person?·^^ The normal basis for the selection of strategic 
points is by review of design information made available to the Agency by the state. 
Paragraph 47 of INFCIRC/153 provides that the selection of strategic points should 
be re-examined in the light of changed operating conditions, safeguards technology 
developments, or experience in the application of verification procedures. However, 
since concluding an agreement on the Subsidiary Arrangements requires the 
consent of the states to be safeguarded, re-examination these arrangements 
pertaining to the strategic points and instrumentation can be a result of mutual 
agreement. All in all, the strategic points provide certainty, predictability, and 
specificity, and therefore enhance the objective of improving safeguards 
acceptability.
should be noted once again that while on the one hand application of safeguards are 
compulsory and full-scope under the Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions, on the other hand, 
states are rather free to accept safeguards or not, according to the terms of the IAEA Statute, based 
on the criteria as whether they have acquired any Agency assistance or assistance of any state that 
strictly requires safeguards.
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iii... Containment & Surveillance
The only safeguards technique that the IAEA's second safeguard document 
INFCIRC/66 explicitly covered is material accountancy, that is material 
measurement, records, reports and verification of the data involved to determine 
whether material subject to safeguards is accounted for. In practice, material 
accountancy is often supplemented by containment and surveillance measures. 
INFCIRC/153, however, explicitly incorporates containment and surveillance as 
important complementary measures to material accountancy. Paragraph 74(d) of 
INFCIRC/153 identify containment and surveillance as measures that should be 
used for the purpose of fulfilling inspection responsibilities of the Agency.
Containment and Surveillance provide information on movements of nuclear 
material. These measures can be applied to the flow or inventory verification to 
ensure that each item is inventoried without duplication, and the IAEA instruments, 
devices, working papers and supplies are not tampered with. For containment 
purposes physical barriers are used (e.g., walls, containers, vessels etc..) which in 
some way physically restrict the movement of, or access to information related to 
the quantities or the location of nuclear material, and to the IAEA surveillance 
devices such as automatic cameras and video tape recorders. Accordingly, on-site 
inspections are performed to take measurements, to change camera films, and to 
apply seals to contained materials.^l^ Containment and surveillance measures are 
coming to be regarded as increasingly necessary with respect to effective 
safeguarding bulk handling facilities. These facilities have large throughputs of 
accessible nuclear material, and material accormtancy measures cannot provide the 
desired timeliness of detection of diversion. But they are less amenable to 
quantification than are measures of material accountancy, and hence it has been
217since the IAEA is 'solely' mandated to inspect and report, one should not expect further 
performance, such as acting as an international police force to 'arrest' suspected or actual violators. 
'Use of force' is beyond its scope.
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difficult to arrive at quantified safeguards outcome statements. Even in the case of 
INFCIRC/153 with its explicit inclusion of containment and surveillance, the 
application of such measures is negotiated between the Agency and the state, and 
incorporated in Subsidiary Arrangements which needs the mutual agreement for 
any amendments.
There are significant differences in the safeguards community over the role 
containment and surveillance can play. The argument against considering 
containment and surveillance as anything more than a supplement to material 
accounting is that, paragraph 30 of INFCIRC/153 states that the product of 
safeguards is the material balance statement and that containment and surveillance 
cannot provide such a statement. It is also argued that containment and surveillance 
could not detect a diversion apart from a determination by accounting that material 
was missing and could not be otherwise accounted for. In this view, the most that 
the containment and surveillance measures can do is to support accounting by 
providing confidence that flows and inventories were counted and counted only 
once, and to preserve measurements with material in sealed containers. But, in this 
view, containment and surveillance cannot be an alternative to accounting, and 
cannot provide precision of findings or timeliness of detection beyond what 
accoimting can provide.218
iv... State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC)
An important feature of the NPT safeguards document that distinguishes it 
from the previous IAEA safeguards documents is the requirement that states party 
to the NPT establish and maintain a national system of accounting for and control of 
nuclear material.219 jh e  inclusion of such a requirement reflected practical and
^^^See, L. Scheinman, ibid., pp; 163 -171. 
219INFCIRC/153, paragraph 7.
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political considerations. Practically it was not feasible for the IAEA to run a self- 
sufficient accountability system and to directly verify all flows and inventories. 
Although INFCIRC/ 66 does not require the establishment of state systems, it does 
call for agreement between the IAEA and the state on a system of records and 
reports. Virtually all states with significant nuclear activities have instituted control 
arrangements because of the value and hazardous nature of the materials in 
question, and the IAEA has made use of the records and reports generated under 
those systems.
The NPT safeguards document INFCIRC/153 sets forth the basic elements that 
should be included in a state system of accounting and control in order to provide a 
basis for the application of the Agency safeguards. INFCIRC/153 calls for the 
establishment of :
1.. . a nuclear materials measurement system;
2.. . procedures for taking physical inventories;
3.. . a system of records and reports;
4.. . procedures for submitting reports to the IAEA.
The intensity of the Agency’s safeguards efforts are closely linked to the quality 
and the technical effectiveness of the state system of accounting and control. In other 
words, the closer the SSACs are in form and operation to measures recommended 
by the safeguards document, the. less intensive the safeguards measures the IAEA 
would deem it necessary to impose. The Agency verifies the findings of the state's 
control system while maintaining and implementing the right to make its own 
independent measurements and observations, and to supplement information 
provided by the state to assure itself that diversion has not taken place and that 
safeguarded materials are accounted for. Thus, whatever the technical effectiveness 
of SSACs, they do not qualify as substitutes or alternatives to IAEA safeguards. They
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are an integral part of the IAEA safeguard concept, but separate and distinct from 
the operational system directly controlled by the Agency.
The political considerations related to the provisions for national accounting 
and control systems are largely concerned with the issue of how to minimize the 
intensity of Agency's safeguarding activities. INFCIRC/153 states that, in its 
verification the Agency "shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the 
State's s y s t e m . S i m i l a r l y ,  the paragraph 31 of the same safeguard document 
reiterates the same advice, which also calls on the Agency to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of state's accounting and control activities. The provisions dealing with 
determining the actual number, intensity, duration and mode of routine inspections 
of any facility asserts that one of the criteria to be considered is the effectiveness of 
the State's accounting and control system including the extent to which the measures 
previously specified have been implemented by the state.221
V ... Intensity of Routine Inspections
IAEA's safeguards inspections are the most sensitive issues associated with the 
safeguards system of the Agency. Since, the sovereign rights of the states to be 
inspected are, in a way, undermined because of the supranational rights conferred to 
the IAEA under the terms of the Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 
same holds true for the Statute of the IAEA which gives the Agency broad rights of 
"...access at all times to all places and data..." provided a state acquires Agency 
assistance, or a supplier state asks for Agency safeguards as a pre-requisite for 
assistance, or the state itself asks voluntarily for the application of Agency 
safeguards. INFCIRC/ 66 somewhat diluted that sweeping right of access at all 
times to all places by providing in paragraph 47 of that document that "the number.
220 in fCIRC/153, paragraph 7. 
221 INFCIRC/153, paragraph 81.
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duration and intensity of inspections actually carried out shall be kept to the 
minimum consistent with the effective implementation of safeguards..." To further 
define inspection intensity, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 established a scale of maximum 
routine inspections based on effective kilograms of nuclear material in the 
safeguarded facility or its inventory, and in the case of reactors, the document 
specified several criteria for guiding actual routine inspection frequency. Similarly, 
the NPT safeguards document INFCIRC/153 establishes the maximum routine 
inspection effort for designated categories of facilities or other locations of nuclear 
materials.222 Based on the quantity of nuclear material involved, the document 
specifies the number of man-days of inspection per year that is applicable to each 
designated category, leaving the Agency to decide how to deploy that aggregated 
effort among the different facilities in each category in the safeguarded state.
The actual routine inspection effort, which in practice is agreed, is to be 
determined in light of mainly four criteria spelled out in paragraph 81 of the NPT 
safeguards document.223 Three of these four criteria are straightforward. These are:
1.. . the form of the nuclear material under control;
2.. . the characteristics of the state's nuclear fuel cycle;
3.. . the technical developments in safeguards.
4.. . a fourth criterion relating to the effectiveness and dependability of the state 
system of accounting and control (SSAC) is, however, dependent upon subjective 
judgements and interpretations.224
222i_mFCIRC/153, paragraph 80.
223An agreement is to be reached by negotiating on a facility-by-facility basis between the state 
and the IAEA and by including in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
importance of these criteria is that they create a basis upon which the Agency can exercise 
some flexibility in the application of safeguards and differentiate among situations in a somewhat 
standardized manner. According to Lawrence Scheinman, the Agency is not always able to fully 
protect its independence when it comes to implementation, since states have insisted on specifying 
the actual routine inspection effort in Subsidiary Arrangements, although this was not the intent of 
the NPT safeguards document, thereby placing further real or psychological boundaries on 
Agency discretion. See, L. Scheinman, ibid., p. 162.
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E... UJeaknesses of the Safeguards Document INFCIRC/155
One important weakness of the IAEA verification procedures is that, the 
Agency is enabled to apply its safeguards only to declared facilities. Therefore, 
whatever declared by the states makes up the 'agenda' of the IAEA for that state. 
But, the disclosure of the nuclear weapons programme of Iraq has very ^vell 
revealed that it is possible to conduct clandestine activities in undeclared facilities 
'free' from the risk of detection.^25 Therefore, information is an essential ingredient 
to the proper functioning of verification provisions.226 From a legal standpoint, the 
INFCIRC/153 states that, the Agency has an obligation to ensure that safeguards 
are applied to all nuclear material in peaceful activities. The Agency' has to make sure 
that all measures are undertaken not only to ensure that declared activities are 
under safeguards, but that there are no undeclared activities at all. To overcome 
such difficulties, the IAEA Board of Governors, with the experience gained in Iraq, 
developed a comprehensive data-base, and thus embarked on the establishment of a 
scheme for reporting to the Agency all exports and imports of nuclear material, 
even if intended for non-nuclear use, as well as the export and the import of 
specified equipment and relevant non-nuclear material for nuclear use. As another 
consequence of the Iraqi experience, the Agency's right to access to non-declared 
sites under paragraphs 73 and 77 of the INFCIRC/153 is confirmed. The Agency is 
entitled to draw on all available information, including data submitted by individual 
member states. States are obliged to inform the IAEA about all plans for the 
construction of nuclear facilities and to submit early design information. Needles to 
say, such an interpretation and practice of the paragraphs 73 & 77, are important 
steps for further effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. Expectedly, another 
measure has been the establishment of a dynamic relationship between the Agency
225unless, as ironically argued, such events like the 'Gulf War' occur.
2267'he lack of full information and its adverse effects have, indeed, long been debated both in 
scholarly writings, and among the IAEA authorities, on the grounds whether the Agency should 
have its own intelligence gathering unit, or not. But no concrete outcomes seem to have come 
about.
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and the United Nations Security Council, to provide its full endorsement as 'another' 
deterrent towards the states that may opt to go nuclear. Hence, some features of the 
UN Security Council Resolution 687, such as unlimited access to records, overflight 
rights, and environment sampling (water, air) may promise considerable 
improvements in the safeguards arsenal in the future if they could be incorporated 
in routine safeguards.227 However, it's not clear how the IAEA will fulfill its duty 
concerning undeclared facilities in other countries as they arise problematic. Having 
briefly touched upon in this paragraph the major weaknesses of nuclear verification 
under the NPT in general, and shortcoming of IAEA safeguards inspections 
underINFCIRC/153, the Part IV of this study will deal with the same matters in 
more detail and will accordingly investigate what measures are being taken and 
what else are still needed to overcome the obstacles on the way to proper 
functioning of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
277Ei-ic Chauvistre, The Implications o f  IAEA Inspections under Security Council Resolution 687, 
New York, United Nations, UNIDIR Research Paper 11, 1992.
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CHAPTER VIL THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES
& THE ZONES OF PEACE
fl... Concept of Nuclear-UJeapon-Free Zones
The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) was developed 
predominantly upon the desire of totally eliminating nuclear weapons from various 
parts of the globe. The principal aim has been to spare the nations concerned from 
the threat of nuclear weapons. Hence, the promotion of total and effective nuclear 
disarmament, was believed to be the best means to preserve international peace and 
security. The concept has initially stemmed from the circumstance that, in the 
aftermath of the "atoms for peace" proposal, once espoused by the US President 
Eisenhower, a number of states in different parts of the world could 'go nuclear' and 
acquire the necessary technology and material to build their bomb indigenously. 
Hence, this produced a spill-over effect whereby many other countries felt the urge 
to do the same, due to the threat of the existence of such weapons in their very 
neighbourhood. In such circumstances, nuclear-ioeapon-free zones were thought to 
provide necessary means, among others, to avert nuclear proliferation and to halt the arms 
race. Beyond the risks it caused in political and military terms, the arms race had 
severe economic repercussions. Thus, an important benefit of these zones could be 
the creation of a framework for regional cooperation, particularly in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy.
The practicality of a zonal agreement rests on the willingness and readiness of 
the states concerned. To this end, states must be convinced that their vital security 
interests will be enhanced and not jeopardized by participating in a nuclear-weapon- 
free zone. Particularly in such regions where a state is believed to hold nuclear 
weapons, the mere existence of such weapons is enough to threaten the security of 
all the region, not excluding the possessor (or the déployer) of the weapon.
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Therefore, national security interests must concur with the regional security interest. 
Thus all the states must lean towards the creation of such zones.
A generalization can hardly be made with regard to the rules and procedures 
of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, because of the political, economic, military, 
geographical, and cultural differences between the regions (and even between the 
states within a specific region). But one can safely state the following general 
principles and objectives of nuclear-weapon-free zones:
a. ..obligations relating to the establishment of such zones may be assumed not 
only by a group of states, including entire continent or large geographical regions, 
but also by smaller groups of states and even individual countries;
b. ..nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements must ensure that the zone would be, 
and would remain, effectively free of all nuclear weapons;
c. ..the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come 
from states within the region, and participation must be voluntary;
d. ..whenever a zone is intended to embrace a region, the participation of aU 
militarily significant states, and preferably all states in the region would enhance 
effectiveness of the zone;
e. ..the zone arrangements must contain an effective system of verification to 
ensure full compliance with the agreed obligations;
f. ..the arrangements should promote the economic, scientific and technological 
development of the members of the zone through international cooperation and all 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
g. ..the treaty establishing the zone must be of unlimited duration.228
228see Comprehensive Study on the Question o f  Nuclear-W eapon-Free Zones in all its 
Aspects, Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, New York, United 
Nations publication, 1976, Sales no: E. 76.1. 7, (A/10027/Add. 1) pp: 31-32. For further 
elaborations on nuclear-weapon-free zones and their implications for different regions of the 
world see, Jozef Goldblat, 'Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones : Lessons From Existing Agreements', in 
Darryl Howlett & John Simpson (eds.), East Asia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Papers from the 
Twelfth PPNN Core Group Meeting, Japan, 1992.
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In addition to these principles one can equally state several general objectives 
of the establishment of an NWFZ. These are to:
a. ..spare the zonal states from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
b. ..contribute to the prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
as well as to limit a wider geographical deployment by the nuclear-weapon powers;
c. ..strengthen confidence and improve relations among zonal states;
d. ..contribute to regional and world stability and security and to the process of 
disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament;
As far as the nuclear-weapon-free zones are concerned, the earliest examples 
are the Rapacki Plan of 1957, the Tito Plan of 1958 and the Kekkonen Plan of 1963, in 
Europe; the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1653/XVI of 1961, and the 
Organization of African Unity's Heads of States and Governments Declaration of 
1964 on the Denuclearization of Africa; and the Five Presidents' Declaration (Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico) of 1963 on the Denuclearization of Latin America.
i... The Antarctic Treaty
The Antarctic Treaty of 1 December 1959 was the first international agreement 
as a treaty establishing a demilitarized zone which contained by implication 
provisions to ensure that nuclear weapon states would not be introduced into an 
area. In 1959, governmental representatives of the 12 countries229 participating in 
the International Geophysical Year in Antarctica met in Washington D.C. to conclude 
a treaty that would ensure the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes and the 
continuity of cooperation in scientific research in this area. The Treaty was not 
intended to solve the problem of different territorial claims, which covered 
approximately 80 percent of the whole continent, but rather to ensure the access to
^^^hese countries were: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, the United 
Kingdom (all seven of them had territorial claims on Antarctica) and Belgium, Japan, South 
Africa, the United States, and the Soviet Union.
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all the regions of Antarctica to carry out scientific research and to prevent 
undesirable political rivalries by maintaining the status quo in regard to the territorial 
claims. Article I of the Treaty stipulates that Antarctica shall be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes and prohibits any measure of military nature. Article II aims at 
promoting freedom of scientific investigation and cooperation toward that end. 
Article V, on the other hand, prohibits any nuclear explosions and disposal of radio­
active waste in the Continent. The Treaty created a system of control based on 
national technical means of verification, carried out by observers nationals 
designated by the contracting parties. The Treaty also provides the right of aerial 
observation at any time over any of the regions of the Continent, and the observers 
have full access at any moment to any area or installations, and to all ships and 
aeroplanes at points of discharge and embarkation.230 was a highly intrusive 
verification mechanism for the standards of the time, and no violations of the Treaty 
have been reported, attesting both to its effectiveness and to the good conduct of
the parties.^31
ii... The Latin American Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone: Treaty of Tlatelolco
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, namely 
the Tlatelolco Treaty which was opened to signature on 14 February 1967, is the only 
instrument so far to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely inhabited 
geographical setting. The agreement also led to the creation of one of the first 
agencies for Latin American collective action. Such action was facilitated by the
230see the Comprehensive Study on the Question o f  Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones ... , p. 10. For 
additional information and comments see, Gilles Cottereau, The Antarctic Treaty (1959), in Serge 
Sur (ed.). Verification o f  Current Disarmament and Arms Limitation Agreements: VKay5, Means 
and Practices, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1991, pp: 67 - 94.
^3 1a  principal reason for making such constraints possible in those years of relentless arms race 
might stem from the fact that the area of application of the Treaty was not in the immediate reach 
of the home-lands, thus constituted a less sensitive issue, both militarily and politically. All the 
nuclear weapon states agreed on limiting their freedom of naval and military deployment in 
exchange for participation in the peaceful scientific cooperation in Antarctica. Being aware that 
such limitations were applicable to all of those party to the Treaty, the parties submitted their 
ratification in a very short time.
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uniqueness of Latin America as a group of independent states sharing a common 
history and culture. And it was precisely this characteristic that made Latin America 
particularly suitable for the establishment of a "nuclear-free zone".232 Treaty is 
also the first agreement on arms limitation, disarmament and collateral 
disarmament measures to establish an effective system of control under a 
permanent supervisory organ, namely OPANAL.233 phe Treaty, which comprises a 
Preface, 32 Articles, and two Additional Protocols, defines the terms territory and 
nuclear weapon; establishes an international agency to ensure compliance with the 
Treaty, together with a control system which includes the application of IAEA 
safeguards to all nuclear activities of the contracting parties - reporting, inspection, 
observation of peaceful nuclear explosions, and exchange of information. The Treaty 
further provides for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; envisages 
relations between OP ANAL and other international organizations; and establishes 
measures in the event of violations of the Treaty.234
The Tlatelolco Treaty also stands as an essential element o f the nuclear non­
proliferation regime and brings several contributions to the regime that are not found in the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. First, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is of a permanent nature and
alternative conceptual approach for the Latin American zone comes from Monica Serrano 
who prefers to call this zonal arrangement a "nuclear-free zone" (NFZ). See, Monica Serrano, 
Common Security in Latin America: The 1967 Treaty o f  Tlatelolco, University of London, Institute 
of Latin American Studies, Research Papers, 1992.
233a  gency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. OPANAL comprises the 
three principal organs, namely a General Conference, a Council, and a Secretariat, and subsidiary 
organs as considered by the General Conference. The General Conference is composed of all the 
Contracting Parties and holds regular sessions every two years. The Council consists of five 
Members elected by the General Conference among the Contracting Parties, due account being 
taken of equitable geographical distribution. The Members of the Council are elected for a term 
of four years. The Secretariat consists of a General Secretary, who is the chief administrative 
officer of the Agency, and of such staff as the Agency may require. The term of office of the 
General Secretary is four years and he may be re-elected for a single additional term. The General 
Secretary may not be a national of the country in which OPANAL has its headquarters. For 
further information in this regard see. Dr. Antonio Stempel Paris, Secretary-General, OPANAL, 
The Treaty fo r  the Prohibition o f  Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, paper submitted to the IAEA 
Workshop on the Modalities for the Application of Safeguards in a Future NWFZ in the Middle 
East, in Vienna. Austria, 4-7 may, 1993.
234see the Comprehensive Study on the Question o f  Nuclear-Weapon-Free Z on es  p. 13.
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shall remain in force indefinitely. Secondly, the Treaty does not allow statiorung of 
nuclear weapons anywhere in its zone of application, whereas, the NPT permits 
nuclear weapons to be deployed on a non-nuclear weapons states as long as they 
are under the control of nuclear weapons states that owns them. Third, the Treaty 
does not differentiate between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons 
states, since there are no nuclear weapons states in Latin America. Fourth, the 
Tlatelolco Treaty introduced a novel approach to enforcement that differs from the 
approach provided in the NPT. Accordingly, the Treaty o f Tlatelolco provides that 
signatories may demand inspection o f another Treaty party's nuclear facilities at any time 
and requires that the signatories cooperate fully with the inspectio7-L. These special 
inspections are frequently referred to as challenge inspections. Whereas, the NPT's 
special inspections are initiated by the IAEA rather than at the request of another 
Treaty party, and must be negotiated with the Member-State suspected of violating 
its NPT obligation.235
In Article 15 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco it is agreed that, "At the request of any 
of the Contracting Parties and with the authorization of the Council, the General 
Secretary may request any of the Contracting parties to provide the Agency 
[OPANAL] ^vith complementary or supplementary information regarding the 
extraordinary^ event or circumstance which affects the compliance with this Treaty, 
explaining his reasons." Consequently, with Article 16 "At the request of any of the 
Contracting Parties and in accordance with the procedures established in Article 15 
of this Treat}', the Council may submit for the consideration of the International 
atomic Energy Agency a request that the necessary mechanism be put into 
operation to carry out a special inspection." Article 12 defines the scope for 
verification which includes inspection of devices, services and facilities intended for
ZSSpor further comments in this regard see, Garry T. Gardner, Nuclear Nonproliferation: A 
Primer, Boulder. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994. pp: 59 - 60.
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peaceful uses of nuclear energy, so as to ensure that none of the activities prohibited 
in Article 1 are carried out. Article 16 and 20 provide a number of mechanisms to 
prevent violations of the agreement.236
One principal weakness of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is said to be the ambiguity 
surrounding the treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE). The permission to 
conduct PNE is embodied in Article 18 stating that the Contracting Parties "may 
carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes - including explosions 
which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons - or collaborate with 
the third parties for the same purpose, provided that they do so in accordance with 
the provisions of this article and the other article of the Treaty, particularly articles 1 
and 5." As Serrano observed, there have been some conflicting interpretations of the 
terms of the Article asserting that, the defiiution of "nuclear weapon" in Article 5 was 
loosely written, and thus the resulting PNE were incompatible with the spirit of the 
Treaty.237 An interesting note in this regard is that, prior to the most recent 
adherence of Argentina and Brazil to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994, they have 
jointly disavowed, in 1991, their previous policy favouring so-called peaceful nuclear 
explosion. Argentine-Brazilian acceptance of the view that there is no meaningful 
distinction between peaceful and military nuclear explosions had two important 
results. First, it eliminated any domestic policy justification for a testing program 
and, second, it symbolically, separated Argentina and Brazil from India's 
international posture of PNE advocacy .238
An important feature of the Tlatelolco Treaty is that, with two additional 
Protocols (I & II), it prescribes the basic undertakings of the extra-zonal states.
236gee Monica Serrano, ibid., pp: 43 - 44.
237ibid„
238see, John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: 
Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime", The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, 
18:1, pp: 107 - 122.
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According to Protocol I, extra-zonal states which de jure or de facto are internationally 
responsible for territories lying within the zone would "undertake to apply the 
statute of denuclearization in respect to warlike purposes as defined in Articles, 1, 3, 
5, and 13 of the Treaty" to such territories. As to Protocol II, nuclear-weapon states 
are required to respect the statute of denuclearization as provided in the Treaty and 
to "undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting 
parties." All the five nuclear-weapon states have ratified the Protocol II, this 
constitutes a legally binding commitment of negative security assurances 
undertaken by them.239
iii... The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone: Rarotonga Treaty
The Treaty was opened to signature in 1985, declares the creation of a South 
Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone encompassing Australia, New Zealand and several small 
South Pacific island nations. The Rarotonga Treaty contains prohibition of the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, similar to that provision found in the other major 
nuclear non-proliferation treaties. It also prohibits the testing or deployment of 
nuclear weapons, and the dumping of nuclear wastes anywhere in the South Pacific. 
The most significant difference between the Rarotonga Treaty, and the NPT or the 
Tlatelolco Treaty, is the strict safeguards requirement. Hence, the Treaty requires 
full-scope (comprehensive) safeguards on the peaceful nuclear activities and nuclear 
exports of all non-nuclear weapons states party to the Treaty. On 20 October 1995, 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced that they will sign the 
protocols of the Roratonga Treaty. This means that the South Pacific will really 
become a NWFZ. France also announced that it will close its test site in Muroroa 
after completing its series of nuclear test. 240
239see Edmundo Fujita, The Prevention o f  G eographical Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons: 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Zones o f  Peace in the Southern Hemisphere, New York, UNIDIR 
Research Paper No: 4, 1989, p. 26.
240see for details, PPNNNewsbrief No: 32, 4th Quarter 1995, p. 2.
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iv... The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: Pelindaba Treaty
The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone has been an issue on the political 
agenda, since the French nuclear test in Algeria in 1964 which prompted the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to adopt that year a declaration calling for the 
permanent denuclearization of Africa. Since then, the UN General Assembly has 
adopted a resolution every year calling upon all states to respect the continent of 
Africa as an NWFZ. This resolution also condemned the steps taken by South Africa 
to acquire nuclear weapon capacity. Since, until the official declaration in 1993 that 
South Africa had developed six nuclear weapons, the uncertainty surrounding the 
nuclear activities of that state and its refusal to join the non-proliferation regime 
were the main obstacles to progress. Together with the adherence of Algeria to the 
NPT, actually a de facto NWFZ had come to existence. However, a formal treaty is 
preferable in order to secure the respect of nuclear-weapon states to the nuclear- 
weapon-free status of Africa. Hence, the formal steps taken by African nations to 
advance the process have included joint OAU and UN expert meetings in Addis 
Ababa in May 1991, in Lome in April/May 1992, and in Harare in April 1993.241 
Some of the agreements reached at the first two meetings were the following: The 
Treaty should establish OAU machinery to verify the operation of the Treaty, to 
promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to address the issue of nuclear 
waste dumping; the nuclear-weapon states must provide negative security 
assurances; the Security Coimcil should to ensure that assistance shall be given to 
any party subject to or threatened by nuclear attack (positive security assurances); 
all parties should conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA; the
24lThe Harare Meeting took place one week after the then President de Klerk disclosed that 
South Africa had worked in the past on a limited number of military explosive devices and that 
the relevant facilities, equipment and materials had been subsequently dismantled, destroyed or 
converted to peaceful uses. See, Sola Ogunbanwo, 'Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa', in Serge 
Sur (ed.), Disarmament and Arms Limitation O bligations: Problem s o f  Com pliance and  
Enforcements, Aldershot, Dartmouth for UNIDIR, 1994, pp: 136 - 141.
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Treaty should be permanent; the Treaty should enter into force for the entire region, 
after it had been ratified by a specified minimum number of states.242
The African NWFZ Treaty (known as the Pelindaba Treaty) has been submitted 
to the UN General Assembly. The text of the Treaty was finalized at a meeting in 
South Africa in May-June 1995, between the UN expert group and an 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts of the OAU. It was subsequently submitted to 
the OAU's Council of Ministers which considered at a session in Addis Ababa on 21- 
23 june 1995, and made some amendments. After approval by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU, the text of the Treaty was transmitted 
to the UN Security Council. A Resolution is adopted on the subject by the UN 
General Assembly during its 50th meeting. The Treaty is scheduled to be opened for 
signature at a conference in Cairo in early 1996.^43 With the Pelindaba Text of the 
African NWFZ Treaty, the parties to the Treaty convinced that the zone loill constitute 
an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime, promoting 
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, promoting general and complete 
disarmament and enhancing regional and international peace and security .244
In the light of the nuclear technology programmes of certain African countries 
including the disclosure by South Africa of its capability, the African NWFZ Treaty 
will contain a provision for the declaration of capability for manufacturing and 
stockpiling of nuclear explosive devices. It will also have a provision for dismantling 
and destructing any nuclear explosive devices, as well as production facilities. The 
provisions will also cover the conversion to peaceful uses, under strict and effective
242sge^ David Fischer, Efforts to Establish Other Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, paper submitted to 
the IAEA Workshop on Modalities for the Application of Safeguards in a Future NWFZ in the 
Middle East, Vienna, Austria, 4 - 7  May 1993.
2433ee the UN Document A/50/426, 2/8.
244peijn(jaba Text of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, 4th Perambular paragraph, 
reproduced in PPNNNewshrief, No: 32, 4th Quarter 1995, pp: 19 - 24.
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safeguards. Measures to ensure compliance with this provisions of the Treaty are 
crucial to its successful implementation. Such measures will be accompanied by 
detailed enforcement actions which shall not become the subject of bargaining chips. 
The Treaty on an African NWFZ will fulfil the function of preventing a nuclear arms 
race on the continent by prohibiting the research, development, testing, 
manufacturing and storage of nuclear explosive devices. The establishment of a 
regional agency is envisaged for executing compliance functions, before referring 
such questions to outside bodies such as the UN Security Council, the General 
Assembly and the IAEA. Thus, Annex III of the Pelindaba Text provides for the 
establishment of an African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) to 
determine compliance in the first instance.245
According to Article 12 of the Pelindaba Text entitled VIechanism for 
Compliance, the main purpose of AFCONE is to ensure that the Parties comply with 
their obligations. This concerns the activities prohibited in the interest of non­
proliferation, and those permissible for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. To that end, AFCONE will be responsible for collecting reports and 
information about the nuclear activities of the Parties including any significant event 
affecting the implementation of the Treaty. AFCONE would thereby apply the 
complaints procedure of the Treaty in case of violation of Treaty obligations, and 
request an extraordinary inspection by the IAEA. Hence, Annex IV of the Pelindaba 
Text entitled Complaints Procedures and Settlement of Disputes stipulates that a 
Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another party is in 
breach of its obligations shall bring the subject matter of the complaint to the
^45^P(;;0NE will be composed of 12 Members elected for a three-year period, on the basis of the 
following criteria; their expertise and interest in the subject matter of the Treaty; equitable 
geographical distribution; and the need to include the countries with advanced nuclear 
programmes. A quorum of the meeting of AFCONE will be constituted by two-thirds majority of 
its Members, and decisions will be taken by a two-thirds of the Members present and voting. See, 
Ogunbanwo, 138.
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attention of the party complained of and shall allow the latter thirty day to provide 
explanations and resolve the matter. Such bilateral consultations and arrangements 
may include "technical visits" agreed upon between the Parties. If the matter is not 
resolved, the complainant Party may bring the complaint to AFCONE. The first step 
to be taken by AFCONE is again to give forty-five days to the Party complained of 
to provide explanations. If AFCONE is not satisfied with the explanations, it may 
request the IAEA to conduct an extraordinary inspection as soon aspossible. The 
decision of AFCONE on the need to conduct extraordinary inspections is mandatory 
on the Parties. If AFCONE considers that the Party complained of is in breach of its 
obligations under the Treaty, states parties to the Treaty shall meet in extraordinary 
session to discuss the matter and may make recommendation to the the Party held 
to be in breach of its obligations and to the OAU. The OAU may, if necessary, refer 
the matter to the UN Security Council. '^^^
v... The South East Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
At the 29th meeting of the standing committee of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) the Indonesian Foreign Minister announced that details of a 
South East Asian NWFZ were being finalized . On December 1995, the Treaty was 
signed at the fifth ASEAN summit meeting at Bangkok by leaders of seven 
members of that organization: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and by Burma, Cambodia and Laos. They have 
rejected objections to the Treaty expressed by China and the United States, which 
reportedly see the Treaty as potentially restricting their freedom to move nuclear- 
powered or -armed ships or aircraft in the area. China is also understood to object to 
the fact that the Treaty applies to regions of South China Sea to which it lays 
claim.247 Article 3 of the Treaty determines the basic undertakings of the states
746peiindaba Text, Annex IV paragraph 1 thru 4(g). 
247pp/vyv Newshrief, No: 32, 4th Quarter 1995, p. 2.
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party to the Treaty. Accordingly, states undertake not to develop, manufacture or 
otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; not to station or 
transport nuclear weapons by any means; not to test or use nuclear weapons. States 
party to the Treaty further undertake not to allow on their territory to develop, 
manufacture, station, test or use nuclear weapons, nor to dump at sea or discharge 
into the atmosphere radioactive material. Moreover, each state party to the Treaty is 
obliged to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of full-scope 
safeguards. With the Treaty a Commission is established for the Southeast Asian 
NWFZ which will oversee the implementation of the Treaty and ensure compliance 
with its provisions. And, the Executive Committee, established as a subsidiary organ 
of the Commision, will ensure the proper operation of verification measures in 
accordance with the provisions of the Control System as stipulated in Article 10 of 
the Treaty. Accordingly, the Control System shall comprise the IAEA safeguards 
system, report and exchange of information, and request and procedures for fact­
finding mission. It is agreed that the Treaty enters into force on the date of the 
deposit of the seventh instrument of ratification and/or accession, and that the 
Treaty remain inforce indefinitely.^48
B... Concept of Zones of Peace
The concept of Zones of Peace (ZP), in turn, started increasingly to gain 
currency in the 60's and 70's, in reaction to the growing number of regional foci of 
tension and to the expanding presence of the major powers in the various oceans of 
the globe. These were threatening to introduce external sources of confrontation in 
regions until then free from their rivalries. The Final Document of the United 
Nations First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 pointed out that the 
establishment o f zones of peace in various regions o f the world under appropriate conditions,
248fu1| text of the Treaty including Annexes and Protocols is reproduced PPNN Newshrief No: 
32, 4th Quarter 1995. pp: 24 - 28.
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to be clearly defined and determined freely by the states concerned o f the zone, taking into 
account the characteristics o f the zone and the principles o f the Charter o f the United nations, 
and in conformity with international laio, could contribute to strengthening the security of 
the States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.^^^ In 1981, 
the United Nations prepared a study on all the aspects of regional disarmament, in 
which both the NWFZ and ZP were surveyed as examples of regional initiatives to 
promote disarmament.250 Regarding a precise definition for zones of peace, 
although the study stated that "it cannot be given a universally valid definition in 
terms of one or several specific measures", it nonetheless noted that "in the 
proposals made up to now, several elements can ... be identified, which together 
may serve to characterize the concept." These are the followings:
a. ..keeping of the zone away from the interference of extra-zonal powers, and 
from the global arms race;
b. ..maintenance of regional peace, security and stability by means of political 
cooperation and military restraint;
c. ..promotion of regional cooperation in economic, social, political and other 
fields;
d. ..acceptance and respect of extra-zonal states for the concept and for the 
specific provisions of the zone.
Apparently, the concept of a zone of peace is more fluid, and at the same time 
more comprehensive than the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone, since it 
encompasses not only disarmament measures but also aims at promoting 
cooperation in political and economic terms, and refers not only to nuclear weapons 
but also to measures in the conventional field. The zones of peace were introduced
^ ^ ^ enth  Special Session of the United Nations of the General Assembly devoted to 
Disarmament. Final Document, 30 June 1978.
250see the Study o f  All Aspects o f  Regional Disarmament, United Nations Document, A/35/416, 
1981.
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for the first time at the Second Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held 
in Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964, and was applied primarily to ocean areas. At the 
Third Summit Conference in Lusaka, from 8 to 10 September 1970, a proposal to 
transform the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace was specifically approved and has 
ever since become the object of attention at Non-Aligned meetings, as well as at UN 
General Assembly discussions."251
1.. . The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace came about in 1971, on the basis of the 
initiatives of the Sri Lankan delegation at the United Nations General Assembly. The 
UNGA adopted Resolution 2832 which solemnly declares the Indian Ocean a Zone of 
Peace (lOZP). The Resolution called upon the great powers to enter into immediate 
consultations with the Littoral States of the region, with a view to halting the 
expansion of their military presence, and to eliminating military bases and 
installations as well as nuclear weapons therefrom. The cause behind the mounting 
movement to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean lay in the fears, among 
the non-aligned countries in the region, of a global confrontation between the 
superpowers, in the wake of the Vietnam War, that would spill over to the Indian 
Ocean. Verification and monitoring of the undertakings by the zonal and extra-zonal 
states are thought to be dealt with at a later stage.
11.. . The Zone of Peace and Co-Operation in the South Atlantic
Similarly, the Zone of Peace and Co-Operation in the South Atlantic (ZPCAS), 
was defined as a zone of peace and cooperation, where outside sources of tension 
were to be eliminated and intra-zonal cooperation fostered. The initiative to create 
the ZPCAS was launched by the Brazilian President at the 40th session of the 
General Assembly. The proposal was drafted by 14 countries from the region, and
^^Ipujita, ibid., pp:13 - 15.
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was adopted by 124 in favour (including China, USSR and the UK), 1 against (USA), 
and 8 abstentions (including France, F.R. Germany and Japan). The main objectives 
of the ZPCAS for the benefit of the countries in the South Atlantic zone were the 
promotion of regional cooperation in the economic and social fields, the protection 
of environment and the preservation of the biological resources, as well as the 
maintenance of peace and security in the region as a whole. As for the purposes of 
verification, the first meeting of the states of ZPCAS established a periodical 
consultation mechanism among the states in order to pursue the common objectives 
of the Declaration of ZPCAS. It also instituted the role of a coordinator responsible 
in consultation with all States in the zone, for fostering actions and measures to 
facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of ZPCAS, and for 
receiving, collating and transmitting any relevant information and communications 
among all states in the zone.
There have been (and still are) other initiatives to establish such zones in 
different parts of the globe, including the Northern (Nordic) and Central Europe, the 
Balkans, and the Mediterranean. The fate of these proposals has mostly been 
affected by the conjuncture in world politics, and thus the attitudes of the ’big-five’. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the most successful example of compliance by the 
nuclear weapons states with the denuclearized and demilitarized zone is the 
Antarctic Treaty, where all relevant nuclear weapons states and militarily significant 
states are parties to and have great interest in its smooth functioning.
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CHAPTER VIII. SUCCESSFUL CASES OF EFFECTIVE
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 
NUCLEAR FIELD: EURATOM & ABACC
n... Nuclear Cooperation in lUestern Europe: EURRTOM
The devastating effects of the two World Wars in this century on continental 
Europe, which costed millions of lives and treasures lost, urged politicians, scientists, 
scholars, bureaucrats, all concerned figures from different fields and strata of the 
peoples of Europe, to find a way of putting an end to the hostilities among the states 
in the region, and to promote peace and friendship. Due to the very fact that the 
'war machine', or the 'armoury', was essentially made of steel composed of iron and 
coal, it was thought that keeping these basic elements under control, would 
eventually allow to keep the development of 'armouries' under control. This way of 
thinking, among others, gave way to the emergence of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1950, whose principal actors were France and Germany. 
Hence, the idea of a 'united Europe' practically came about with the ECSC. 
However, the very same years had already witnessed an unprecedented weapon, 
namely the atomic bomb developed and used by the United States. This weapon 
technology was nonetheless bound to spread, in one way or the other, because of 
the never-satisfied 'appetite' and curiosity of the scientists.^^^ Hence, the same 
Europeans who had somehow found a way to control the 'war machine', then again 
had to find a way to prevent further spread of this 'brand new' scientific discovery. 
The Continent's land for science and technology was very fertile. Accordingly, the 
idea of "atoms for peace" had to go beyond mere rhetorics. What would the 
Germans do with an atomic weapon, given what they have done without such a
^^^This should by no means imply that the deliberate attempts of the politicians to acquire such a 
strategic asset at their disposal had a lesser role. One may even think that, the politicians urged the 
scientists to develop their own bomb indigenously.
164
weapon? The European Atomic Energy Organization (later EURATOM) was created 
in such a state of mind.
Nevertheless, giving birth to EURATOM was not an easy process politically, 
nor a straightforward one technically. EURATOM had to harmonise dissimilar and 
somewhat conflicting interests of various states both inside and outside the region. 
In particular, France had 'nuclear ambitions’ on the one hand, and was equally 
committed to not to leave the 'floor' to W. Germany in the nuclear field, on the 
other. The latter aim of France did well coincide with that of the other European 
states, the United States and the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding, the French 
determination to 'go nuclear' was in no way accepted by the United States, nor by 
the Soviet Union. However, it was clear that unless France gave its consent, no talk 
of a European institution which would control the further spread of nuclear weapons 
would be possible, nor might W. Germany be under effective and close scrutiny. 
This was a 'trade-off for the United States which finally culminated in its generous 
support for EURATOM. But a similar 'trade-off was also the case for France. Since, 
unless the United States supported the idea of EURATOM, politically and 
technologically, it would have been very difficult for France to develop its infantile 
nuclear research programme in relatively short time.
Then, the sides agreed that this European institution had to be endowed with 
stringent verification provisions. The degree of stringency had to meet the US 
standards, otherwise the US inspectors themselves would have had to carry out 
inspections in the European nuclear installations. This was something the Europeans 
would like to avoid absolutely.253 Concomitantly, the IAEA was in the process of 
establishing its global safeguards system, and there were concerns that the
253particularly the French always considered such US involvements as an interference in their 
sovereignty.
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EURATOM system might undermine this objective.254 jt argued that the US 
support for EURATOM had "effectively ended any chance that the IAEA would 
develop into a universal safeguards system. Once this Pandora's box was opened, 
little possibility remained that other nations would readily agree to nuclear transfer 
terms more rigorous than those imposed upon EURATOM.255
However, the US support was secured, and much of this was due to the Final 
Report of the Conference convened at the Princeton University in 1956.^^^ The 
Report listed the advantages for the United States if EURATOM adopted a strict 
control system. According to the Report, these advantages were mainly three-folds. 
First, the Western Europe would probably become the most important area of 
nuclear power development^^^, apart from the United States and the Soviet Union.
254j)arryl A. Hewlett, 'Regional Nuclear Co-Operation and Non-Proliferation Arrangements: 
Models from Other Regions', in Darryl A. Hewlett & John Simpson (eds.). East Asia and Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation, Papers from Twelfth PPNN Core Group Meeting, japan, 28-29 November 
1992. pp: 63-71.
2553ee, Charles K. Ebinger, International Politics o f  Nuclear Energy, London, Sage Publications, 
1978, quoted in Darryl Hewlett, EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards, London, MacMillan Press, 
1990. p. 71.
256yhe political agenda in the mid-1950s was dominated by the issues relating to the security of 
Western Europe, the NATO alliance, and the Cold War. While the US authorities were willing to 
foster the European integration, on the one hand, they were equally dubious about the extent of 
this integration would go. They didn't wish for a challenging integration which might have 
adversely affected their nuclear supremacy within the NATO alliance, nor did they want to leave 
Western Europe to the 'menace' of the Soviets. In such a political atmosphere, many scholarly 
figures were interested in these politico-military issues. The result was the establishment of centers, 
either under the auspices of universities or as independent foundations, mandated to carry such 
strategic studies. Indeed, the pioneers of these centers were established in the United States as 
early as the 1920s. Hence, in May 1956, EURATOM and its NATO implications were the central 
themes for discussion at a conference held at Princeton University. The conference was convened 
to provide policy advice to the government regarding the kinds of overtures the United States 
should make towards EURATOM. Among the participants at the conference chaired by Klaus 
Knorr, there were also figures from the US State Department and the US Atomic Energy 
Commission.
257gy investing in nuclear industry and nuclear research not all the states of Western Europe 
opted to pursue "nuclear ambitions". At the time, nuclear energy production was seen as a 
powerful and effective alternative for the industrialized European countries in need of huge 
amounts of energy. In mid-1955 the Benelux countries introduced what was known as the 
Benelux Memorandum, within the forums of the ECSC, calling for closer European unity based on 
measures designed to promote functional integration in the area of nuclear power. A concomitant 
attempt to promote nuclear cooperation surfaced in the Franco-German nuclear agreement of 30 
April 1955 as the result of the desire of these two countries to plan jointly the future developments 
of nuclear energy. During the course of discussions on the modalities of a European organization 
in the nuclear field, it was often stressed that the establishment of a common atomic organization 
would serve as an instrument for closing the gap between domestic energy supplies and the
166
Second, an experimentation with a tight international control mechanism, though in 
a limited area, could set an example for the evolution of a tight universal system 
among nations. Third, the United States would be relieved from the necessity of 
inserting itself actively, through the terms of its bilateral program, in the control 
problem in that part of the world.258
In a way, this report revealed the US point of view on EURATOM's proposed 
safeguards procedures as being more promising than the procedures agreed upon in 
the IAEA's Statute. The latter was indeed a reflection of a compromise under the 
circumstances of the Cold War.259 Therefore, for the US authorities, the idea of 
supporting the European proposal seemed interesting, especially since these 
safeguards procedures were actually derived from the safeguards provisions 
contained within the United States bilateral nuclear transfer agreements, and the 
United States domestic nuclear law. Moreover, the ideas that have been put forth at 
the time of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch Plan were inschrined into 
the EURATOM safeguards provisions. Therefore, these provisions were much like 
an American cloth designed a taille Européenne.
i... Fundamentals of EURATOM's Safeguards System
The fundamental clauses of the EURATOM safeguards procedures^^O can be 
found in Chapter VII of the EURATOM Treaty,261 which comprises Articles 77 to 85.
increasing demand for energy in these countries. Moreover, since the conventional energy sources 
were imported and were subject to external influences, it was thought that indigenous production 
of nuclear energy would reduce this dependency.
^^^Under the system then envisaged, the United States could depend on the French to watch the 
Germans, the Germans to watch the French, and the smaller nations to watch both the French and 
the Germans. See Klaus Knorr, EURATOM and American Policy: A Conference Report. 
Princeton, Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 1956, cited in Darryl Howlett, 
EURATOM.... ibid., pp: 72-73.
2^9^4ostly because of the Indian opposition (and of the Soviets to some extent), the United States 
had faced difficulties in getting an agreement in the IAEA Board of Governors on an effective 
safeguards system.
260pQr a recent and comprehensive survey on the emergence and evolution of the 'EURATOM 
Safeguards System', and its political implications on the relations both among the friends and the
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The significant feature of these nine Articles is that, when taken together, they 
encapsulate a whole range of different safeguards ideas. Some of these were quite 
novel to EURATOM and were therefore largely imtested. Others were drawn from 
ideas developed in different industries. Still others did have a track record in nuclear 
regulation. But what is noteworthy about all these ideas is that they are broadly 
representative of the entire spectrum of safeguards thought up to that time. When 
taken as a whole, the EURATOM Safeguards Articles reveal a concerted attempt on 
the part of their authors to mould together a coherent set of nuclear energy control 
pro visions.
a... article 77
Accordingly, Article 77 of the EURATOM Treaty states that ..the Commission shall 
satisfy itself that, in the territories o f Member States, (a) ores, source materials and special 
fissile materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users, (b) the 
provisions relating to supply and any particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the 
Community under an agreement concluded with a third State or an international 
organization are complied with. Together with this. Article 2 of the EURATOM Treaty 
required the EURATOM Commission to ensure, by appropriate supervision, that 
nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they are intended.
h... article 78
For the attainment of the objectives set out in Articles 2 and 77, the Treaty 
required from the operators, with Article 78, a declaration to the Commission 
concerning the basic characteristics o f the installations set up or operating for the
foes during the Cold-War period see, Darryl A. Howlett, EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards, 
ibid.,
2*^^The EURATOM Treaty was signed on 25 March 1957 at Rome, initially by Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, F.R. Germany, and Italy that had established the European 
Economic Community (EEC).
262Darryl A. Howlett, EURATOM.. p. 87.
168
production, separation or other use o f source materials or special fissile materials or for the 
production of irradiated nuclear fuels. Similarly, an approval by the Commission of the 
techniques to be used for the chemical processing o f irradiated materials was made 
obligatory by the Treaty.
b... article 79
Since the European authorities were determined to secure the US's political and 
technological support without their direct involvement, the proposed US-EURATOM 
safeguards agreement had two basic features: a system of checks to ensure that 
reliable nuclear accountancy records were being kept; and a system of inspection 
implemented by a EURATOM safeguards inspectorate comprised of EURATOM 
nationals only, in order to verify that the information supplied in the accountancy 
records was accurate. Accordingly, Article 79 of the EURATOM Treaty encharged 
EURATOM with setting up a rigorous system of nuclear accountancy. To this end, 
the Commission required that operating records be kept and produced in order to permit 
accounting for ores, source materials and special fissile jnaterials used or produced. The same 
requirement shall apply in the case o f the transport o f source materials and special fissile 
materials. Those subject to such requirements shall notify the authorities o f the Member 
State concerned o f any communications they make to the Commission pursuant to Article 78 
and to the first paragraph o f this Article. With Article 79, the designers of the EURATOM 
Treaty did not only satisfy their American counterparts who insisted on a strict and 
reliable material accountancy system so as to allow transfer of nuclear material and 
technology, but they equally set up a system for themselves regarding their 
potential for nuclear trade and the related security issues
d... article 81
Similarly, to restrict the intrusion of the US inspectors, the Europeans set on to 
draft safeguards inspection provisions in such a way that even the US authorities
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wolild agree on not to carry out their own inspections in European installations. The 
terms of the Article 81 is a clear indicator of this attempt to convince the US of the 
stringency of EURATOM's safeguards provisions. Hence, Article 81 states that: The 
Commission may send inspectors into the territories o f Member States....inspectors shall at 
all times have access to all places and data and to all persons loho, by reason o f their 
occupation, deal with materials, equipment or installations subject to safeguards...in order to 
apply such safeguards to ores, source materials and special fissile materials and to ensure 
compliance loith the provisions o f Article 77... if the carrying out o f an inspection is opposed, 
the Commission shall apply to the President o f the Court o f Justice in order to ensure that the 
inspection be carried out compulsorily.... if there is a danger in delay, the Cotnmission may it 
self issue a written order in the form of a decision, to proceed with the inspection....[then] the 
authorities o f the State concerned shall ensure that inspectors have access to the places 
specified in the order or decision.
e... article 82
In the same regard, in Article 82, the Treaty brought clarity to the task of the 
inspectors and their selection by stating that inspectors shall be recruited by the 
Commission [and] they shall be responsible for obtaining and verifying the records referred 
to in Article 79. They shall report any infringements to the Commission. Thus, neither 
objections to the designation of the inspectors, nor attempts to retard the proper 
inspections were allowed to create a serious problem in the EURATOM Treaty .263 
To ensure compliance, the EURATOM Treaty granted the Commission the right to 
impose sanctions on persons or undertakings operating nuclear installations in the 
event of an infringement.
263as it is the case for the IAEA safeguards procedures, such 'tools' can very well be exploited by 
most of the 'nuclear going' states in order to gain time to hide their secrets. Even under the terms 
of the UNSC Resolution 687, Iraqi authorities 'dragged their feet' either by objecting to the 
inspectors or by not giving them proper 'escort' services to transfer the teams to the inspection 
sites. In a way, Iraqi leadership opted to play a 'cat and mouse' game with the UNSCOM 
inspectors.
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/ . . .  article 83
In Article 83, these sanctions are listed in order o f severity as follows: (a) a 
warning; (b) the withdrawal o f special benefits such as financial and technical assistance; (c) 
the placing o f the undertaking for a period not exceeding four months under the 
administration of a person or board appointed by a common accord o f the Commission and the 
State having jurisdiction over the undertaking; (d) total or partial withdrawal o f source 
material or special fissile materials.^^^ The Treaty deemed important the proper 
implementation of the above measures for effectiveness and credibility reasons, and 
therefore it stated that requiring the surrender o f materials shall be enforceable.
g... article 84
The scope of application of the EURATOM safeguards is elucidated in Article 84 
which satisfied the French that nothing in the Treaty would preclude them from 
developing their atomic explosive device. Hence, Article 84 gave way to the French 
military nuclear programme by not extending the application of safeguards to 
materials intended to meet defence requirements. As Lawrence Scheinman stated, no 
Article of the Treaty limited a nation's right to use atomic energy for military 
purposes.^^^ The United Kingdom, which had "gone nuclear" a decade ago, and 
France stand as the two nuclear weapons states party to the EURATOM Treaty.266 
Though Article 84 exempted materials intended to meet defence requirements from 
safeguards application, it by no means stipulated that these installations were to be 
excluded from the obligation of furnishing information to the Commission. 
However, neither France, nor later the United Kingdom have interpreted these
264^he last sanction, which meant the confiscation of the precious assets of the violating party, is 
quite severe and thus of a deterring nature.
265La^rence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1965, pp: 185-186, quoted in Howlett, EURATOM... p. 96.
266q’a|fjng ¡nto consideration the evolutions of the nuclear energy programmes of both the 
United Kingdom and France, and their privileged seats in the international Council that "governs" 
the international politics, an "excuse" can be apprehended with regard to the Article 84 of the 
EURATOM Treaty which would be totally irrelevant for a treaty establishing other NWFZs in the 
world.
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clauses in the sense of the Commission, nor did they allow inspection in their 
defence oriented facilities.267
h... article 52
One important feature of the EURATOM Treaty is that, with Article 52 in 
Chapter VI, it provides basis for the establishment of the Supply Agency by stating 
that the Agency shall have a right o f option on ores, source or special fissile materials 
produced in the territories o f the Member States and an exclusive right to conclude contracts 
relating to the supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials coming fivm inside 
the Community or from the outside. Similarly, with Article 86 in Chapter VIII of the 
EURATOM Treaty, it is decided that the special fissile materials shall be the property o f 
the Comjnunity. The Community's right o f ownership shall extend to all special fissile 
materials which are produced or imported by a Member State, a person or an undertaking 
and are subject to safeguards provided in Chapter VII. In the same regard. Article 88 
stated that the Agency shall keep a special account in the name of the Community, called 
Special Fissile Materials Financial Account..
767^ clarity was brought to this dispute in mid 1970s, with the Article 35 of the Commission 
Regulation 3226/76. This particular Article provides very explicit instructions about exactly what 
information is to be transferred from the State to EURATOM where military facilities are 
concerned. Hence, Article 35 of the Regulation states that 1. The provisions o f  this Regulation 
shall not apply: (a) to installations or parts o f  installations...assigned to meet defence  
requirem ents...or (h) nuclear m aterials...assigned to meet defence requirem ents....3. It is 
understood in any event that: (a) the provisions o f  Articles I to 4 [Basic technical Characteristics 
and Particular Safeguards Provisions Declaration of the Technical Characteristics], and  7 and 8 
[Particular Safeguards Provisions] shall apply to installations or parts o f  installations which at 
certain times operated exclusively with nuclear materials liable to meet the defence requirements 
but at other times operated  exclusively with civil nuclear m aterials: (b) the [same] 
provisions....shall apply, with e.xceptions fo r  reasons o f  national security, to installations or parts 
o f  installations to which access could be restricted fo r  such reasons but which produce, treat, 
separate, reprocess or use in any other way simultaneously both civil nuclear materials and 
nuclear materials assigned or liable to be assigned to meet defence requirements.
rights and duties conferred to the Supply Agency, and to the EURATOM Commission 
which was to supervise it, were undoubtedly far-reaching. It was argued that these provisions were 
no mere monitoring, or keeping an eye on, but total control of and responsibility for supply. See, 
Howlett, EURATOM..., ibid..
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There are similarities with the wording of the these Articles and that of the 
Acheson-Lilienthal Report which emphasized that the supply of uranium was 
indispensable to the production of nuclear weapons, and that any control would 
have to provide adequate safeguards regarding raw materials. Accordingly, the 
authors suggested the establishment of the International Atomic Development 
Authority (lADA) with far-reaching powers to control every level of activity leading 
from raw materials to weapons.
ii... Commission Regulations
The EURATOM Treaty was signed in 1957, however some additional 
regulations were required to put it into effect. Thus, in 1959 and 1960 the 
Commission of the European Communities adopted two Regulations (7 & 8) which 
formally started the operation of the terms of the Treaty.
a... commission regulation 7
Regulation 7 provided for the Commission to determine the procedure for  
completing the declarations laid down in Article 78 o f the T r e a t y Accordingly, the 
Member States were required to provide the Commission with the following 
informations: the type of the reactor and its principal use; its thermal power rating; 
its fuels (composition and enrichment of fissile material); brief description and 
general plans for the installation; the technical processes employed. Even though the 
scope and the purpose of Regulation 7 was thought to enable the Commission to 
implement Article 78 in the territory of EURATOM countries, differing
269^ccording to the Report, the lADA would be effective if it were given the responsibility for 
the following activities: l..the ownership or the leasing of the world supplies of uranium and 
thorium; 2 ..the construction and operation of all reactors and separation plants; 3..the conducting 
of research; and 4..the inspection of ail activities under its control. However, these proposals found 
little endorsement in the international circles.
270see Official Journal o f  the European Communities - Special Edition 1959-J 962 
(November 1972), p. 23.
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interpretations between the EURATOM Commission and France (and later the UK) 
have made this difficult.
h... commission regulation 8
The Commission Regulation 8, on the other hand, aimed at providing the 
guidelines for proper implementation o f the terms o f the Article 79. It thus required 
operators to furnish information concerning the details of their stocks and 
movements of ores, source materials and special fissile materials. Regarding this 
information the Commission would then be provided with reliable records of the 
whole range of materials used and stored in the nuclear installations within the 
Community. It would then be possible to detect any loss or diversion of nuclear 
materials during the inspections. In the early 1960s the nuclear trade began to 
increase, both in scope and volume, requiring an increase in inspections.
c... commission regulation 10
In order to be cost-effective and to ensure an efficient use of resources, 
regarding the limited number of inspectors vis-à-vis the number of inspections 
required arising from these increasing transactions, the Commission adopted 
Regulation 10 in 1962. With this regulation, the smaller quantities (at most several 
dozens of grams) of nuclear materials which did not need inspection were identified, 
and thus, the EURATOM Treaty allowed the transfer of these materials without 
being subject to safeguards inspection.
iii... The Age of the NPT and EURATOM
In the second half of 1960s and in the early 1970s, the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its safeguards procedures to be 
implemented by the IAEA were of much concern for the authorities of both the 
IAEA and EURATOM. With the entry into the force of the NPT, the IAEA would be
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mandated to carry out safeguards inspections in the territories of the non-nuclear 
weapon states party to the Treaty. However, EURATOM's inspections were already 
imderway in the territories of the European Community Member States. Therefore, 
the latter's regional safeguards would be likely to cause considerable problems to 
the universal aspirations of the former unless an effective way could be found for 
them to co-exist.
a. .. uneasy co-existence: IAEA & EURATOM
The problem was mainly two-fold: First, was the nature of the safeguards 
procedures to be applied to the EURATOM countries; and second, the organization 
to be entrusted with the responsibility of implementing these safeguards. 
Accordingly, a question arose: would EURATOM survive to the existence of the 
IAEA ? However, West Germany and Italy strongly opposed to the abolishment of 
EURATOM, while the Benelux countries tended to support the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. But in general, the EURATOM authorities' view was to keep their primary 
responsibility of carrying safeguards, while letting the IAEA act as a verifier of their 
job. Nevertheless, the IAEA authorities thought in a totally different way. According 
to them, EURATOM had to forgo its safeguarding role and leave the floor to the 
IAEA's safeguards implementation. An underlying cause of concern was the strong 
opposition of the Soviets who had never acknowledged EUIC\TOM's status, 
asserting that it was nothing more then self-inspecting. Hence, for them, IAEA 
inspections would give credible results, and thus could keep West Germany under 
close scrutiny. But in the contrary, EURATOM authorities insisted on the 'non- 
disputable' effectiveness of their safeguards system, and they wanted to retain it.
b. .. a solution fo r  co-existence
Even by the time the NPT was signed in 1968, the lAEA-EURATOM safeguards 
issue had still not been resolved. However, Article III of the NPT, that was
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eventually agreed, did include an acknowledgement of regional safeguards systems, 
thus giving an official recognition (if somewhat obliquely) to EURATOM's continued 
safeguards existence.^^l Paragraph four of Article HI states that non-nuclear-weapon 
States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together loith other 
States in accordance with the Statute o f the International Atomic Energy Agency. For the 
EURATOM authorities, the inclusion of this clause to the NPT which does not insist 
upon individual safeguards agreements, meant the recognition of their safeguarding 
role. Nevertheless the debate had not ended on which organization would have the 
responsibility to carry out safeguards in Western Europe with the entry into force of 
the NPT.
c... IAEA Safeguards Document fo r  EURATOM States: INFCIRC/193
In May 1970, the IAEA Board of Governors established the Safeguards 
Committee to determine the essentials of a standard (model) agreement to be 
applicable to the non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. The result was the 
Structure and Content o f Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in 
Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons, namely the 
INFCIRC/153. Accordingly, following the negotiations between the IAEA and 
EURATOM, both sides agreed on a document designated as INFCIRC/193. In July 
1972, the non-nuclear weapon states of the European Community (i.e.. West 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), EURATOM and the 
IAEA concluded this agreement. The parties signed it in April 1973 with Denmark 
and Ireland. The INFCIRC/193 was very similar to the standard INFCIRC/153 
agreement, and carried out an additional component in the form of a Protocol which 
contained a detailed modus vivendi on how the safeguards agreement would work in 
practice. This was a completely new innovation as it was the first attempt to marry
271 Hewlett, fl/RATOM.., ibid., p. 137.
176
together two different safeguards systems.^^^ xhe safeguards arrangements were 
put into force in May 1975 with the ratification by all the non-nuclear-weapon states 
of the Community. However, this has required the entry into force of the 
Commission Regulation 3227/76 which contained a detailed outline of the provisions 
by which the INFCIRC/193 could be implemented in the territories of the 
EURATOM Member States. The safeguards agreement required the states party to 
the Treaty to set up a State's System of Accounting for and Control of (SSAC) 
nuclear materials (paragraph 32), then EURATOM became the SSAC for the 
INFCIRC/193.
iv... IAEA Inspections in EURATOM Non-Nuclear Weapons States
The IAEA was entitled, by the terms of the INFCIRC/193, to carry three 
different types of on-site inspections in the nuclear installations of the EURATOM 
Member States: First, ad hoc inspections, as stated in Article 71, in order to: (a) Verify 
the information contained in the initial report on the nuclear material ... and identify and 
verify changes in the situation .... (b) Identify and verify if possible the quantity and 
composition o f nuclear material .... before its transfer out o f or upon its transfer into the 
States except for transfers within the Community. Secondly, routine inspections, as 
stated in Article 72, in order to: (a) Verify that reports are consistent with records; (b) 
Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition o f all nuclear material subject to 
safeguards.... (c) Verify information on the possible causes o f material unaccounted for  
[IVrUF], shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory. Finally, the 
third type of inspections allows the IAEA conduct special inspections, as stated in 
Article 73, in order to: (a).... verify the inforination contained in special reports; or (b) If the 
Agency considers that the information made available by the Community including 
explanations from the Community and information obtained from routine inspection, is not 
adequate for the Agency to fidfil its responsibilities.
272ibid., p. 151.
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Therefore, while on the one hand, EURATOM would carry out its own 
inspections based on the terms of the EURATOM Treaty; on the other hand, the 
IAEA would make its own independent verification to ensure that EURATOM has 
done its job properly. Therefore, with the entry into force of the INFCIRC/193, the 
overall scope of the safeguards provisions differed from those readily established in 
the EURATOM Treaty. Specifically speaking, while the latter covered the entire 
nuclear fuel cycle from mining of uranium to the reprocessing of the spent fuel, the 
former did not cover these activities. Accordingly, it was necessary to amend the 
European Community Regulations to secure proper implementation of 
INFCIRC/193 in the EURATOM Member States. Regulation 3226/76 incorporated 
the necessary clauses to this end. Hence, the task of the inspectors, and the duties of 
the operators were adjusted to the NPT 'environment'. The inspection rights that 
were spelled out in the EURATOM Treaty {..inspectors shall at all times have access to all 
places..) were not covered by this regulation.
The IAEA and EURATOM, having gained experience over two decades by 
applying safeguards jointly, are now keeping up much smoother relations in 
comparison with the past. As David Fisher observed, ”[o]n occasion, each agency 
tended to debate, with an almost theological intensity, the abstract principles to 
which it is attached. But by now, there is no doubt on either side that each is fully 
committed to the same objective in the non-nuclear-weapon states of the [EU] or 
that the other agency's operations are technically effective."273 Now, the two 
agencies share, rather than duplicate, the routine safeguards operations. "On 28 April 
1992, it was reported that the IAEA and EURATOM had in fact agreed to a new 
'partnership approach. Under this agreement, their safeguards operations [are]
273i)avid Fischer, 'Innovations in IAEA Safeguards to Meet the Challenges of the 1990s', in David 
Fischer, Ben Sanders, Lawrence Scheinman and George Bunn (eds.), A New Nuclear Triad: The 
Non-Proliferation o f  Nuclear Weapons, International Verification and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Southampton, Mountbatten Centre For International Studies, PPNN Study Three, 
September 1992, p. 33.
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more closely integrated and inspections [are] carried out 'on the principle of one-job- 
one-man'. They .. share analytical resources so as to reduce the number of samples 
to be taken and they .. seek to reduce human inspection by greater use of 
equipment. The new arrangement.. permit[s] each agency to draw its independent 
conclusions about compliance with the IAEA/ EURATOM agreement."274
B... Nuclear Cooperation in Latin America: flBflCC
The nature of the Argentine-Brazilian relations have been complex for about 
half a millennium. The territorial disputes between the Spanish and Portuguese 
colonial empires largely determined the fate of the relations. The deep rooted 
mistrust forged by the competition for the 'leadership' of South America has been 
one motivating factor on both sides to unfold their competition onto the 
international markets, particularly in the nuclear field. Both countries have long 
established nuclear energy programmes.275
274ibid„ p. 34.
275rhe success of Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement in the nuclear field has elevated this issue 
once again high on the agenda of the scholarly research and articles, but this time to mention the 
prospects for collaboration, rather than rivalry. Until very recently, both countries were ranked 
within the group of "threshold states" together with India, Pakistan, Libya, Algeria, South Africa, 
and Israel. Fortunately, in line with Argentina and Brazil, some of these threshold states too, have 
denounced the nuclear option and adhered to the non-proliferation regime. For introducing the 
reader to the past events that have motivated Argentina and Brazil to "go nuclear", and the most 
recent series of events that have paved the way to robust cooperation, references will be made to a 
'subset' of a plethora of articles and books available in these regards, such as: John R. Redick, Julio 
C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the 
Nonproliferation Regime", The Washington Quarterly, 18:1, pp:107 - 122; Paulo S. Wrobel, Brazil 
- Argentina Nuclear Relations: An Interpretation, unpublished manuscript, April 1994; John R. 
Redick, "Argentina-Brazil Nuclear Non-Proliferation Initiatives", Programme fo r  Promoting 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Issue Review, January 1994, No:3; Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, 
'Argentina and Brazil', in Regina Cowen Carp (ed.). Security With Nuclear Weapons ? Different 
Perspectives on National Security, Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1991, pp: 229 - 256; Marco 
A. Marzo, Alfredo L. Biaggio, and Ana C. Raffo, "Nuclear Co-operation in South America: The 
Brazilian-Argentine Common System of Safeguards", IAEA Bulletin, Vol.36, No: 3, 1994, pp: 30 - 
35; Tom Zamaro Collina and Fernando de Souza Barros. "Transplanting Brazil and Argentina's 
Success", ISIS Report, Institute for Science and International Security, Rio de Janero, February 
1995; John R. Redick, "Latin America's Emerging Non-Proliferation Consensus", Arms Control 
Today, Vol. 24, No: 2, March 1994, pp: 3 - 9; Jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, 
"Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil", Arms Control Today, Vol. 24, No: 2, March 1994, pp: 
10 - 14; Darryl A. Howlett, 'Regional Nuclear Co-Operation and Non-Proliferation Arrangements: 
Models from Other Regions', in Darryl A. Howlett & John Simpson (eds.). East Asia and Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation, Papers from Twelfth PPNN Core Group Meeting, Japan, 28-29 November, 
1992, pp: 63-71; Monica Serrano, Common Security in Latin America: The 1967 Treaty o f  
Tlatelolco, University of London, Institute of Latin American Studies, Research Papers, 1992;
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i... Argentina & Brazil: from Rivalry to Cooperation
Argentina's nuclear programme began in the 1950s, and gathered pace in the 
1970s when its first nuclear plant, Atucha I, began operation in 1974. Other 
construction plans followed with the nuclear installations Atucha II and Embalse. 
Argentina also developed indigenous gaseous diffusion capability for uranium 
enrichment. Brazil, on the other hand, pursued a 'twin-track' nuclear development 
policy based on indigenously produced fuel cycle facilities, especially ultra-centrifuge 
enrichment, and imports of nuclear technology.276 And, in 1975 West Germany 
agreed to supply Brazil with reprocessing and enrichment technology as an incentive 
for purchasing nuclear reactors.277 Actually, since the mid 1960s, though the rivalry 
survived between Argentina and Brazil, both countries had one issue of common 
interest. It was the universal effort to curb proliferation of nuclear weapons, which 
equally meant some restrictions for most of the countries' nuclear engagements. 
Such restrictions would presumably adversely affect these two rival states. Hence, 
Argentina and Brazil had no alternative but to cooperate somehow to protect their 
common interest by acting in parallel, if not together, in international fora.278 As the 
Tlatelolco negotiations continued (post 1964s), Argentina and Brazil increasingly 
found their positions in tandem, and contrary to the views of the majority of Latin 
American nations. Argentina and Brazil's shared objective became the mitigation of 
the more restrictive elements of Tlatelolco and the preservation of independence of 
their nuclear programmes from regional or international constraints. This
Thierry Riga, Une approche coopérative de la non-prolifération nucléaire: l'exemple de 
l'Argentine et du Brésil, UNIDIR Research Paper, No: 29. 1994.
77osee^ Darryl Howlett, Regional Nuclear Co-operation..., p. 66. See also, Thierry Riga, Une 
a ^ ro c h e  coopérative...,pp: 12 - 20.
7T7see, John R. Redick et al.
778it is indeed interesting to note that, Brazil was one of the forerunners of the idea of a nuclear- 
weapon-free zone in Latin America. At the XVII session of the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1962, it was the Brazilian delegation whom suggested for the first time such a zonal 
arrangement in Latin America. But the military coup in 1964, which produced two decades of 
military rule, has shifted Brazil's position to the one which opposed such regional or universal 
agreements. Their denial of adherence to the NPT was on the basis of the "discriminatory" nature 
of that agreement.
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represented the first step of an extended bilateral nuclear confidence-building 
process which, despite the traditional rivalry, linked the two nations against a 
commonly perceived enemy: the non-proliferation regime.279 Therefore, when the 
West German deal was seen as a proliferation initiative by the US administration, the 
Argentine-Brazilian collaboration gained momentum.
« ...  joint communiqué
On the same account, the foreign ministers of Argentina and Brazil issued a 
joint communiqué calling for cooperation and technical exchange in the nuclear field. 
This was followed in 1979 by an important agreement establishing a framework for 
the resolution of the problems in the River Plate area.280 This coordination opened 
the door for an across the board improvement in bilateral relations particularly in 
the economic sphere, but also in the politically sensitive nuclear area. In 1980, the 
two nations signed a small but symbolically important agreement (Corpus-Itaipu) 
for nuclear fuel cycle cooperation, which included a clause calling for systematic 
coordination of nuclear policy in all international fora. Consequently, collaboration 
in the nuclear field, rather than competition, was viewed as the best means to 
surmount the barriers represented by the inequitable non-proliferation regime.^^^
b... democratization
Major progress on opening up sensitive nuclear facilities, however, was not 
made until both countries elected democratic governments. Right after these 
elections Argentine authorities announced their country's capability to enrich 
uranium, but equally ensured their Brazilian counter-parts that this enrichment
279john R. Redick, et al., p. 111.
780£)upirig the long period of Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires, neither the clashes 
between them nor the concluding peace agreements succeeded in resolving the territorial disputes 
over the River Plate area, which is rich in water resources. Following independence in the early 
1800's, Argentina and Brazil fought their last direct conflict in the River Plate region, and resulting 
1828 peace treaty established a new buffer state, Uruguay. See, Redick, et al.
281 Redick, et al., pp: 111 - 112.
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facility was intended only for peaceful purposes. With the democratic take-over of 
the regime in Brazil, both leadership agreed to strengthen the Corpus-ltaipu 
Agreement, declaring that mutual inspections of their nuclear facilities was their 
eventual goal. Hence, in November 1985 Argentina and Brazil signed the Joint 
Declaration ofFoz do Igiiacu leading to further agreements on economic cooperation 
and policy integration in the nuclear field.282 (-^^0 nations created a permanent 
committee on nuclear policy to promote technical and scientific cooperation. This 
agreement was followed by further joint nuclear policy declarations of Brasilia in 
1986, Viedma in 1987, Ipero and Ezeiza in 1988, and Buenos Aires in 1990. As 
Goldemberg and Feiveson observed, these achievements are due primarily to the 
return of democratic rule in both countries after decades of military 
governments.283 in November 1990 Argentina and Brazil signed, at Foz do Iguacu, 
the Declaration on the Common Nuclear Policy of Brazil and Argentina.
The significance of this declaration lies in the decision taken to establish a 
Common System of Accounting and Control o f Nuclear Materials (SCCC) to verify that 
nuclear materials in all nuclear activities of both parties are used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. After this declaration, the parties decided to start negotiations 
with the IAEA to conclude a safeguards agreement based on the SCCC. The two 
countries equally decided to take initiatives conducive to the full entry into force of 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, including action relating to the updating and improvement 
of the text. The bilateral agreement implementing the Foz do Iguacu Declaration was 
signed in July 1991 in Guadalajara, Mexico, and entered into force the same year. 
With this agreement the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control o f 
Nuclear Material (ABACC) is established to administer and implement the SCCC 
covering an agreed set of nuclear materials. Both Brazil and Argentina have had
282Marco A. Marzo, et a i,
2^3jose Goldemberg and Harold A. Feiveson, Denuclearization in Argentina and Brazil..
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safeguards agreements in force with the IAEA since the 1960s and 1970s. These 
INFCIRC/66 - type safeguards agreements dealt with specific cases of cooperation 
and did not cover the nuclear materials involved in each country’s autonomous 
programmes. Those then fell under the full-scope safeguards established by the 
bilateral agreement, subject to the SCCC and verified and monitored by ABACC.^ '^^
ii... Bilateral Agreement (ABACC) & Basic Undertakines
By signing the bilateral agreement the Argentina and Brazil agreed to use the 
nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction or control exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. To this end, they agreed to prohibit and prevent in their respective 
territories, and abstain from carrying out, promoting or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or 
from participating in any way in: (1) the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition 
by any means o f any nuclear weapon; and (2) the receipt, storage, installation, deployment or 
any other form of possession o f any nuclear weapon. Bearing in mind that at present no 
technical distinction can be made between nuclear explosive devices for peaceful or 
military purposes, both countries also agreed to prohibit and prevent in their respective 
territories, and to abstain from carrying out, promoting or authorizing, directly or indirectly, 
or from participating in any way in, the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition 
by any means o f any nuclear explosive device. As a basic verification undertaking, the 
parties agreed to submit to SCCC all the nuclear materials in all nuclear activities 
under their jurisdiction or control.285
284Marco A. Marzo, et a i ,  p. 30.
addition to the bilateral agreement, the principal documents defining the SCCC are the 
General Procedures, and the Implementation Manuals for each category of installations. The 
General Procedures set out the basic criteria and requirements of the SCCC. Chapter 1 contains the 
criteria and conditions for the starting point of, exemptions from, and termination of safeguards. 
It also includes general rules for establishing an appropriate level of accountability and control of 
nuclear materials. Chapter 2 lays down the requirements at the State level for the licensing of 
nuclear facilities or other locations and the requirements regarding any relevant information for 
the SCCC, such as the records, the physical inventory, and the traceability of measurement 
systems. Chapter 3 describes procedures for implementation of the SCCC at the State level. The 
provisions relating to the implementation of the SCCC by ABACC, are contained in Chapter 4 . 
This includes specifications for relevant information to be provided to ABACC such as: Design 
Information Questionnaires (DIQ); Inventory Change Reports (ICR); Material Balance Reports 
(MBR); Physical Inventory Listing (PIL); and notification of transfers out of or between States
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iii... Organizational Framework of ABACC
The bilateral agreement gives ABACC the status of an international 
organization, and its officials that of international civil servants. The organs of 
ABACC are: the Commission, a governing body consisting of four members 
empowered to issue the necessary regulations; and the Secretariat, its executive 
body. The Secretariat is located in Rio de Janeiro, and the position of Secretary 
alternates annually between an Argentine and a Brazilian. ABACC's technical staff 
consists of equal number of Argentines and Brazilians. Most of its missions will use 
personnel drawn from a main pool of about 60 members of the Argentine and 
Brazilian nuclear agencies, or state-related institutions. The principal functions of the 
Commission are to: monitor the functioning of the SCCC; supervise the functioning 
of the Secretariat; prepare a list of qualified inspectors from among those proposed 
by the Parties; inform the Party concerned of any anomalies which may arise in the 
implementation of the SCCC; and inform the Parties of any non-compliance with the 
agreement. Any discrepancy or potential anomaly detected through inspections or 
evaluation of reports and records must be reported by the Secretariat to the 
Commission, which must call upon the Party concerned to correct the situation. 
Consequently, the Secretariat has to perform the necessary activities to implement 
and administer the SCCC; receive and evaluate the reports; inform the Commission 
of any discrepancies; and act as the representative of the ABACC. By the late 1992, 
ABACC had reportedly received initial inventories of all nuclear material and design 
informations for all nuclear facilities in the two nations. This was verified by on-site 
inspections, in particular at the Argentine gas diffusion and Brazilian gas centrifuge
Parties. Chapter 4  also describes in general terms the purposes of inspections and discusses access 
for inspection and notification about inspections. The general provisions for the evaluation of 
shipper-receiver differences and of Material Unaccounted For (MUF) are also included in this 
Chapter. The remaining Chapters contain provisions relating to ABACC inspectors in Chapter 5; 
Routine Communications in Chapter 6 ; Document Revision in Chapter 7; Transitional 
Arrangements in Chapter 8 ; and finally, Definitions in Chapter 9. There are also: Annex I 
containing accounting report forms and instructions for their use; and Annex II, containing the 
Basic System of Routine Communications.
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enrichment facilities. These inspections were due to the end of 1993 and, according to 
Argentine sources, this was accomplished.286
iv... The Quadripartite Agreement
The Argentine and Brazilian authorities were well aware that concluding 
bilateral agreements, though they were very significant steps towards fuU adherence 
to the non-proliferation regime, were not enough to assure the international 
community. Therefore, their confidence-building process that had been under way 
for about a decade had to be institutionalized. Hence, the IAEA is integrated into this 
process to further these steps. Accordingly, on December 1991, the Quadripartite 
Agreement was signed in Vienna, by Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the IAEA. This 
Agreement provides the application of fiill-scope safeguards by the IAEA in 
cooperation with ABACC, to all nuclear materials and installations subject to 
bilateral and international agreements. In practice, the Quadripartite Agreement is 
modelled on the EURATOM-IAEA safeguards agreement, and is therefore 
equivalent to verification under the NET. Accordingly, ABACC is given the principal 
safeguarding responsibility, collecting data and carrying out inspections. The IAEA, 
on the other hand, has the right to conduct inspections in each nuclear facility, but in 
practice, works in tandem with ABACC to inspect sensitive parts of the fuel cycle 
such as uranium enrichment activities.287 Among the crucial rights given to the 
IAEA by the Quadripartite Agreement, Article 14, outlining the Measures in Relation 
to Verification o f Non-Diversion, affords the IAEA with important non-compliance 
powers. If a state obstructs safeguards, by denying access to an inspection team for
2863y mid-September 1993, ABACC had reportedly undertaken inspections in slightly less than 
half the total of sixty nuclear facilities in both countries. See, John R. Redick, Argentina-Brazil 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Initiatives...
287'phe Quadripartite Agreement gives the IAEA the right to conduct special inspections under 
the same conditions as specified in paragraphs 73 to 77 in the model agreement, namely the 
INFCIRC/153. Upon the reports produced by ABACC, either at the request of any of the 
governments or on the basis of ABACC reports that nuclear material may be missing, or if the 
IAEA decides that ABACC's information is inadequate, such special inspection may be conducted.
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example, the IAEA Board can order it to comply. If the state continues to obstruct 
the safeguards, the Board can then place the situation with the United Nations 
Security Council, by informing that the IAEA is no longer able to verify the absence 
of diversion. The Protocol to the Agreement also establishes a Liaison Committee, 
similar to an arrangement between the IAEA and EURATOM, to act as a channel for 
assessing safeguards concepts and implementation issues. The Committee involves 
all four Parties to the Agreement and meets annually or at times unusual events 
occur.^^^
Committee involves all four Parties to the Agreement and meets annually or at times 
unusual events occur. Darryl Howlett, Regional Nuclear Co-operation ..., p. 67.
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CH A PTER IX. SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR
VERIFICATION: PROPOSALS FOR 
STRENGTHENING IAEA SAFEGUARDS 
IMPLEMENTATION.
Since the revelations of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program which 
was underway throughout the 1980s; and the more recent safeguards inspections 
squabble bebveen the IAEA and the North Korean government, the shortcomings 
of the existing nuclear verification provisions under the NPT and the related 
safeguards inspections procedures of the IAEA have become much more debated 
issues among the concerned scholars, scientists and policy-makers.289 issues 
which have created problems in the practice of the IAEA safeguards inspections -for 
the purpose of verification of the basic undertakings of the states parties to the NPT- 
need considerable elaboration. Hence, this chapter will, first of all, explore the 
meaning and the scope, as envisaged by the drafters, of the essential documents that 
constitute the legal framework of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (e.g.. The 
NPT and the IAEA safeguards agreements). This exploration will display how 
difficult it may be, in certain cases, to reach a consensus on what these documents do 
cover. Secondly, and accordingly, under the light of the findings of the preceding 
discussion, this chapter will investigate the prospects for enhanced verification 
provisions under the general framework of the NPT as well as prospect for 
strengthened safeguards inspections procedures of the IAEA that would be adequate
289jf,is^ however, should not strictly imply that the overall context of the NPT and the IAEA 
safeguards were totally inadequate or worthless in the past three decades, or that they are useless at 
present. Quite the contrary, it is well acknowledged that, had there not existed such a legally 
binding document and a supra-national institution mandated with controlling the development of 
nuclear energy -even though endowed with limited powers but extended functions- dissemination 
of nuclear technology and material to the countries which had military aspirations would 
probably be much more easy. Such countries would reach their aims without confronting serious 
internationally instituted challenges. In like manner, the quantity and quality of the technical 
assistance provided to the developing countries would not have attained a considerable level.
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for encountering challenges of the world o f neiv order^^^ towards the next 
millennium.
fl... The Scope of Uehfication under the NPT: Drafters' Uietus
The basic undertakings of the states parties to the NPT are indicated in the first 
two articles of the Treaty. Likewise, verification of compliance with these basic 
undertakings is accomplished according to the third article of the same document. In 
a sense, in the first three articles, the drafters of the NPT have determined the norms 
and the rules that they deemed necessary for preventing further nuclear spread. 
Therefore, what was envisaged by the drafters of the Treaty regarding the scope of 
Article III, is certainly important for the researchers as well as for those who are in a 
position to make suggestions as to how the effectiveness of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime can be improved. From time to time, there arise conflicting 
interpretations of the terms of these articles by different interest groups or states. In 
such circumstances, securing first hand information from the drafters would 
certainly contribute to the task of the researchers. Fortunately, with regard to the 
NPT, of those who have been influencial in finalizing the ultimate wording of the 
Treaty, George Bunn^^l and Roland Timerbaev^^^ have recently worked out a
^^^Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and hence the end of the Cold-War there are new 
scholarly investigations about what would be the new world order. And, some of the articles are 
about new world dis-order. However, the author believes that there can be no talk of a world-wide 
order or dis-order at all, since there is no world-wide confrontation between any two (or more) 
ideological blocks any more. In the past, two such blocks existed and were led by the United 
States and Russia both of which were used to extend their spheres of influence to different parts of 
the globe. Now, rivalry, if it can be said to exist at all, between these two powers can be considered 
to be on the issue of consolidation of the democratization process in Russia which would (and 
should) not give way to a renewed threat of nuclear exchange. This is the order of the West to its 
former leading enemy, for sustaining its (Western) financial contribution to that process. 
Therefore, Russia is now much more concerned with its "near abroad" rather than pursuing world­
wide ideological and/or military aspirations. In such circumstances, where world-scale adversaries 
do not exist, a brand new world order is out of mention. Whereas, it would be more logical to 
elaborate on the world o f  new order which will, according to the author, witness regional power 
rivalries in different parts of the world without necessarily being explicitly interlinked.
^^^George Bunn was General Counsel of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and a 
member of the US delegation that negotiated the NPT during the 1960's, becoming Ambassador 
to the Geneva Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee after the NPT was signed in 1968.. 
^^^Roland Timerbaev, before retiring from the Russian Foreign Ministry, after a forty-year career 
as a diplomat, has held the post of Russia's Permanent Representative to the IAEA. He also
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small but extremely significant study.293 jn their study, which can be considered 
worthy as a primary source in the field of nuclear proliferation, Bunn and Timerbaev 
aim at clarifying what the drafters of the NPT, including themselves, intended to 
cover by formulating specifically the verification provisions in Article III of the 
Treaty. Accordingly, the authors describe the verification powers granted to the 
IAEA by the language of the NPT, and using the negotiating record of Article III, 
they identify the basis of the rights ceded by the non-nuclear weapons states to the 
Agency.294 in addition, Bunn and Timerbaev demonstrate that the IAEA is 
authorised to request permission to visit any location on the territory of an NPT 
party in pursuit of this objective, and they assert that, as a matter o f practice not law, 
the IAEA inspectors acting under the authority of the NPT did not search for any 
clandestine weaponization until the disclosure, during and after the Gulf War, of 
Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.295
In another separate study, George Bunn similarly argues that the basic purpose 
of NPT safeguards could be easily thwarted if a non-nuclear-weapon party is able to 
produce nuclear-explosive material and build bombs in facilities that are not declared 
to the IAEA and inspected by the Agency inspectors. In his analysis the author 
attempted to come up with appropriate answers to whether the non-nuclear-
participated in the negotiations of the NPT, as well as the 1978 Nuclear Suppliers' Guidlines 
(London Club) and the IAEA's 1971 model safeguards agreements for the NPT (INFCIRC/153). 
293(}eo[.ge Bunn & Roland M. Timerbaev, "Nuclear Verification Under the NPT: What Should It 
Cover - How Far It May Go", Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, PPNN Study 
Five, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Southampton, 1994.
294such rights that authorize the IAEA to inspect for weaponization, including searching for 
facilities, locations, equipment or weapon components intended or designed to use, process, 
contain or be associated with nuclear material.
295j\s a result, the IAEA Board of Governors reaffirmed the Agency's authority to undertake 
special inspections when information provided by the state being inspected was not adequate for 
the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities to provide comprehensive safeguards in that state. This 
meant that special inspections could be used to search for clandestine manufacture of nuclear 
weapons in non-nuclear-weapons states party to the NPT. See, PPNN Study Five, ibid., pp: iii - 1. 
These issues which are still being debated both inside and outside the IAEA will be the task of the 
following paragraphs in which the legal basis for special inspections as well as the insiders' views 
(pros and cons  ^ will be highlighted. At this stage, priority will be given to what is meant by the 
drafters in Article III of the N ^ .
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weapon states, as they join the NPT, obligate themselves to accept more than the 
inspection of the peaceful activities they reported to the IAEA ? And, what besides 
declared nuclear materials and facilities may the IAEA inspectors look at ? As 
regards whether the IAEA inspectors may inspect undeclared activities where the 
IAEA can show believeable evidence that: (a) nuclear material (declared or 
undeclared) may be present ? (b) nuclear material is customarily used in undeclared 
activities, even though the inspected state says it is not there now? Then the 
language of the NPT, its negotiating history, and the subsequent agreement 
applying its safeguards provisions all support the conclusion that non-nuclear- 
weapon NPT parties agreed to permit inspection activities such as (a) and (b) 
above.
The key issue is whether the verification article of the NPT is broad enough to 
authorize IAEA inspections for steps toward weaponization short of final assembly 
of a weapon. Article in .l requires safeguards pursuant to an agreement with the 
IAEA on, "all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities 
within the territory of such a State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its 
control anywhere." These safeguards are, "for the exclusive purpose of verification of 
the fulfilment of its obligations asstuned under this Treaty with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices." According to Bunn and Timerbaev, this language and the 
safeguards agreements implementing it raise several questions.
296George Bunn, "Does the NPT Require its Non-Nuclear-Weapon Parties to Permit Inspection 
by the IAEA of Nuclear Activities that have not been Reported to the IAEA ?" David Fischer, Ben 
Sanders, Lawrence Scheinman & George Bunn, A New Nuclear Triad: The Non-Proliferation o f  
Nuclear Weapons. International Verification and the International Atomic Energy Agency, PPNN 
Study Three, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Southampton, 1992, pp: 44 - 58.
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i... The Purpose of Article III
The first question, according to Bxmn and Timerbaev, is whether the Article Ill's 
purpose is to verify the Article II obligation not to manufacture nuclear explosives, or 
whether its only purpose is to verify Article Ill's own language designed to prevent 
the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear explosives which \vas, 
indeed, a major fear at the time the NPT was negotiated. For the authors, the 
language of Article III.l does not say that only obligations prohibiting diversion to 
explosives are to be verified. It says obligations, "assumed with a view to preventing 
diversion ..." are to be verified, which is certainly a much broader undertaking. 
Accordingly, the Article II obligation not to manufacture nuclear explosives was 
assumed in order, among other reasons, to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy 
to nuclear explosives. At this stage, Buim and Timerbaev ask themselves whether 
the breadth of "with a view to preventing ..." authorize verification of the full scope 
of the obligation not to manufacture. That obligation, the authors believe, includes a 
ban on production of components which could only have relevance to a nuclear 
explosive device even if they do not contain nuclear material. Thus, making 
prototypes, or even producing or acquiring components especially designed or 
prepared for nuclear explosive devices, raises a suspicion that the state being 
inspected may have diverted nuclear material for weapons, or may intend to divert 
such material.
As a result, the obligation not to manufacture or acquire prototype devices or 
components uniquely related to nuclear weapons is one that can easily be said to 
have been "assumed with a view to preventing diversion ..." Evidence of such 
weaponization steps can, therefore, trigger IAEA requests for additional information 
or special inspections. Hence, the conclusion that the language of Article Ill.l is broad 
enough to authorize inspections for steps towards weaponization is confirmed by its 
negotiating history which clearly shows that, its main purpose was to provide safeguards
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to verify adherence to the Article II obligation not to manufacture nuclear explosive 
devices.^ '^^
ii... Safeguarding Non-Nuclear Components: Are They Accessible ?
The criteria for determining whether an activity constituted manufacture 
depend, first of all, on whether the activity could only have relevance to a nuclear 
explosive device. And, secondly, whether the purpose of the activity derived from all 
available evidence was to make a nuclear device. Assuming the answer to either of 
these questions was yes, a violation of Article II of the NPT would occur whether or 
not nuclear material was present. But, the model safeguards agreement 
INFCIRC/153 does not require reporting of nuclear components. Nuclear material, 
not other components, is the focus o f safeguards as this is what must be accounted for!^^^ 
Moreover, it has not been in the practice of IAEA inspectors to search for 
weaponization activities. Consequently, a second question arise as whether Article 
III of the NPT, and the safeguards agreements interpreting it, authorize the IAEA to 
seek out special inspections when weapon prototype testing or other weaponization 
experiments are suspected ?299
Regarding this, George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev note that. Article III and 
the safeguards agreements focus primarily but not exclusively on nuclear material. 
They further iterate that. Article Ill's first sentence requires safeguards for the 
purpose of verifying NPT obligations assumed with a view to preventing diversion 
of nuclear energy. The second sentence says that the safeguards required by the first 
apply with respect to "source and special fissionable material..." The third says these 
safeguards "shall be applied on aU source and fissionable material..." Hence, except 
for the reference to nuclear energy in the first sentence of Article HI, which describes
297gunn & Timerbaev, ibid., pp: 1 - 10.
298see INFCIRC/153 paragraph 1, and paragraphs 62 - 69. 
299Bunn & Timerbaev, ibid., p. 12.
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the purpose of safeguards, the object of all this language is nuclear material. 
However, nuclear energy was used in the first sentence because it is broader than 
nuclear material.^OO While this does not negate the primary focus of Article III on 
nuclear material, it does suggest that inspecting and accounting for such material 
need not be the only function of the IAEA safeguards. Indeed, it suggests, according 
to the authors, a broader search for components besides nuclear material that can 
contribute to fission or fusion. Moreover, the authors assert, none of Article Ill's 
sentences say that the only places that may be inspected are those where nuclear 
material is present. Hence, zuhile the main focus o f Article III is on safeguarding nuclear 
material, its language does not preclude inspecting items that do not contain such 
material.^^^
B... Legal Basis for Special Inspections In the IflEfl Documents
The procedural matters that relate to the mandate of the IAEA in implementing 
safeguards inspections are, in most part, clearly stated in the Statute of the Agency as 
well as the safeguards documents currently in force namely, INFCIRC/66 or 
INFCIRC/153. There are, however, several points which are still elusive in these 
documents, especially those relating to the right of the IAEA to conduct particularly 
non-routine^^^ inspections in the declared or undeclared sites in the states that are 
party to the NPT. The INFCIRC/153 stipulates that the IAEA shall have the right to 
make inspections as provided in paragraphs 71 through 82 of that document. In
SObphe dictionary meaning of energy, as the authors note, includes both power and the resources 
for producing such power. In the case of nuclear energy, it encompasses both nuclear fission or 
fusion and the nuclear materials which fission or fuse. Bunn & Timerbaev, ibid., p. 13.
30^For example, Iraq is believed to have tested hollow spheres of high explosives that contained 
non-explosive material. This conduct is hard to justify for any other purpose than weapon 
building. It would also be an item that was intended to contain or use nuclear material. Hence, 
upon this information, according to the author, the IAEA authorities should have asked special 
inspection from their Iraqi counterparts, which would perhaps disclose Iraq's nuclear weapons 
programme much earlier. Bunn & Timerbaev, ibid., p. 14.
302a  non-routine inspection means any inspection which is not pre-scheduled by the Agency 
and the states parties to the safeguards agreement.
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general terms, it is stated that the Agency may make ad hoc^^ ,^ routine^^^, and 
special·^^  ^ inspections in order to verify the information contained in the reports 
submitted to the Agency by the national institutions established in each state party 
to the NPT, as required in the safeguards document, for running a State System of 
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.
On the account of conducting special inspections, paragraph 73 reads as follows: 
"The [Safeguards] Agreement should provide that the Agency may make special 
inspections subject to the procedures laid down in paragraph 77 below: ... (b) If the 
Agency considers that information made available by the State, including 
explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is 
not adequate for the Agency to fidfil its responsibilities under the Agreement. An 
inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine 
inspection effort provided for in paragraphs 78-82 below, or involves access to 
information or locations in addition to the access specified in paragraph 76 for ad hoc and 
routine inspections, or both" (emphasis added).
Accordingly, paragraph 77 reads as follows : "As a result of [the] ... 
consultations [between the Agency cind the State] the Agency may make inspections 
in addition to the routine inspection efforts provided in paragraphs 78-82 ..., and may 
obtain access in agreement with the State to informations or locations in addition to 
the access specified in paragraph 76 above for ad hoc and routine inspections. Any 
disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in 
accordance with the paragraphs 21 and 22; in case action by the State is essential and 
urgent, paragraph 18 above shall apply" (emphasis added).
303paragraph 71
304paragraph 72. 
305paragraph 73.
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As for the paragraph 76(c), according to which ad hoc and routine inspections are 
carried out, it is stated that "[f]or the purposes specified in paragraph 72 above the 
Agency's inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the 
Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to paragraphs 51-
58..." That clause well displays the limitations imposed upon the inspections of the 
IAEA.
Under the heading of Interpretation and Application of the Agreement and 
Settlement of Disputes, the paragraph 22 reads as follows: "The Agreement should 
provide that any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application thereof 
except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board [of Governors] under 
paragraph 19 above or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding 
which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the parties 
should, on the request of either party, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed 
as follows: each party would designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so 
designated would elect a third, who would be the Chairman. If, within 30 days of the 
request for arbitration, either party has not designated an arbitrator, either party to 
the dispute may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint 
an arbitrator. The same procedure would apply if, within 30 days of the designation 
or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator had not been elected. A 
majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal would constitute a quorum, and all 
decisions would require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure 
would be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions o f the tribunal would be binding on both 
parties.
The paragraph 19, on the other hand, which relate to the findings of the IAEA 
Board of Governors states that "if the Board upon the examination of relevant 
information reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to
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verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be 
safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the 
Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that 
paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall... afford the State every reasonable 
opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance."
Accordingly, the Article XII.C of the Statute reads as follows: "...The inspectors 
shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon 
transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall report the non- 
compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the 
United Nations. In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to take fully 
corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both of the 
following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided 
by the Agency or by a member, and call for the return of materials and equipment 
made available to the recipient member or group of members. The Agency may 
also, in accordance with Article XIX, suspend any non-complying member from the 
exercise of the privileges and rights of membership."
Regarding the right of the Board of Governors to suspend the privileges and 
membership of any of its Member States, Article XIX.B states that "A member 
which has persistently violated the provisions of this Statute or of any agreement 
entered into by it pursuant to this Statute may be suspended from the exercise of the 
privileges and rights of membership by the General Conference acting by a to)o- 
thirds majority of the members present and voting upon recommendation by the 
Board of Governors" (emphasis added).
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One final article that should be noted here in order to complete the picture of 
the legal basis in the IAEA documents which pave the long way to special inspections 
is the paragraph 18 of INFCIRC/153. In that paragraph it is stated that "... if the 
Board, upon the report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is 
essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to 
safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the 
required action without delay, irrespective of whether the procedures for the 
settlement of a dispute have been invoked" (emphasis added).
C... Seeds of Change in Safeguards' Mode of Implementation
From the above paragraphs and the cited articles of the legal documents, it can 
safely be concluded that, the IAEA Board of Governors is indeed given the necessary 
authority, to dispatch an inspecting team into a suspect state whenever it deems 
necessary in order to investigate about the unusual activities. Fiowever, since that 
authorisation was not unequivocal, it has therefore never been mater ia l ised.This  
issue has been, from time to time, severely criticised by several concerned scholars 
and scientists. Those who were critical about non-conducting special inspections by 
the Agency in the states that they believed clandestine activities were underway, 
have faced the opposition of another group of scholars and scientists. Those in 
opposition to the criticisms argued that according to the annual Safeguards 
Implementation Reports (SIR) of the Agency, no such a necessity arose at all. 
Proponents of this point of view have further argued that, any demand of the 
Agency from a state for carrying out special inspections short of reliable and 
indisputable information about the would-be clandestine activities of that state 
would severely deteriorate the image and the prestige of the Agency especially in
306Qne exception to this, if it can be considered in the same legal framework at all, was the 
creation of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) for implementing the terms of the 
UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).
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the eyes of the developing states. This debate has not fully settled yet, though the 
balance has fairly shifted towards the side of those who were and still are critical 
about the attitude of the Board of Governors and the Secretariat of the IAEA. There 
are however signs of change in this attitude of the Agency. But, apparently, the pace 
of change is observed to be far slower than expected or needed. At this stage, it 
would be wise to refer to the views of the former and the present officials of the 
IAEA about the composition and the administration of the reforms in safeguards 
implementation in the wake of the revelations about Iraq.
i... Insiders' Views: 'IAEA's Management Culture Must Change..."
David Kay, who was with the IAEA from 1983 until 1992 and served as Chief 
Inspector for three of the early post-Gulf War nuclear weapons inspections in Iraq 
that uncovered the extensive clandestine nuclear program, asserts that ”[t]he first 
priority in any effort to strengthen safeguards must be to begin with a change in the 
organisational culture and management ethos of the IAEA."307 According to Kay, 
Iraq demonstrated that the IAEA's previous policy of exclusive concentration on 
material balance accotmting could not effectively address the issues of detecting even 
a large-scale clandestine program centered physically and managerially within Iraq’s 
declared civilian program.308 Until the discoveries were made in Iraq, the IAEA was 
optimistic and, as criticised by Kay, was very self-congratulatory in describing 
safeguards.309 Similarly, Lawrence Scheinman, who has served on the staff of the 
IAEA as a special advisor to the Director General of the Agency, criticises the
307]T)avid Kay, "The IAEA: How Can It be Strengthened ?", in Mitchell Reiss & Robert S. Litwak 
(eds.). Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, Washington, 1994, pp: 309 - 333.
308j[jg  point that David Kay is the most critical about is that, the IAEA inspectors who visited 
Iraq's Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center every six months never looked beyond the narrow 
confines of the three material balance areas where declared materials were held, never asked what 
might be going on in the other seventy-plus buildings on the same site, never attempted to visit 
any but the three areas where declared nuclear materials were held, and never tried to sample the 
radioactive waste areas. See, David Kay, ibid., p. 314.
3093eg Jon Jennekens, "IAEA Safeguards: A Look at the 1970-1990 and Future Prospects," 
IAEA Bulletin, 1/1992, p. 10.
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managerial body of the IAEA for being more conservative, more cautious, and less 
aggressive than the Agency should be. Conservatism and self-constraint, according 
to Scheinman, became internalised to the extent that the Agency occasionally gave 
more ground in negotiating subsidiary arrangements that regulate the operational 
side of the safeguards than was necessary. He, therefore, asserts that, in such a state 
of affairs, the inspectors were not encouraged to raise questions about activities or 
structures outside defined strategic points when conducting routine inspections, 
based on the belief that "asking too many questions would lead to difficulty with the 
state, and ultimately at headquarters."310
Despite the trauma experienced by the IAEA right after the Gulf War, the 
events in Iraq, according to Kay, have not completely washed away the former 
"mind-set" and organisational culture of the Agency. As a proof of his assertion, Kay 
puts forward the way the IAEA has reacted to the growing allegations about 
undisclosed nuclear activities in Iran. Hence, Kay argues that, it was a good 
opportunity for the four senior IAEA staff members headed by Jon Jennekens, the 
Deputy Director General for Safeguards, to demonstrate that the Agency had 
learned the following lessons from Iraq:
1.. .to look beyond the narrow confines of safeguards data;
2.. .to seek out and use information from the press and intelligence sources;
3.. .to be sensitive to the many opportunities that a skilful proliferator has for 
engaging in deception activities;
5.. .to indicate that the Agency understood that safeguarding only declared 
facilities was inadequate; and
6.. .to be careful about drawing sweeping conclusions of irmocence from quick, 
superficial visits.^l 1
3J0Lawrence Scheinman, Occasional Paper, Atlantic Council, p. i., quoted in David Kay, ibid., pp: 
316 - 317.
31 lOavid Kay, ibid., p. 317.
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But in the following words of Jennekens, traces of lesson-drawing from a 
recent traumatic experience can hardly be detected:
"We have reviewed some of the media coverage of the activities alleged to take 
place in Iran and we are very pleased to confirm that there doesn't seem to be a 
shred of evidence of any of these misleading misinterpretations. Everything that we 
have seen is for the peaceful application of nuclear energy. ... As to the possibility of 
the non-peaceful use of Bushehr, we are very confident that the existing safeguards 
systems o f the Agency is fully adequate to provide convincing evidence on a continuing 
basis that declared facilities are being used only for the stated purpose"3I2 (emphasis 
added).
The point to be utmost critical in Jennekens' statement is not the positive 
approach of the IAEA staff members to the Iranian nuclear program. Since, for the 
time being, Iran may not be in a position to reveal any sign of military aspirations at 
all in building up their Bushehr site.313 However, what is annoying in the above 
statement is the lack of suspicion and the still extremely self confident attitude of 
IAEA authorities in the wake of Iraqi affair even knowing how the Iraqi side
2^2prom the press conference of Jon Jennekens held on February 12, 1992 in Tehran, following 
the six-day visit of IAEA staff members to Iran for carrying out special inspections with no 
restrictions and no limitations. Quoted in Kay, ibid., pp; 317-318.
^^^In addition to formal declarations of the Iranian government authorities, in personal 
conversations with the Iranian scholars and diplomats during an international conference in 
Sweden in June 1995, Dr. HadjiHusseini of the Tehran based Institute for Political and 
International Studies (IPIS) told the author that Iran was undergoing a serious economic crisis 
since the drastic falls in the oil prices, and also suffered a considerable decline in the generation of 
electrical energy. Hence, Iran, according to Dr. Hadjihusseini, has no other option but to revitalize 
its already $ 4 billions spent Bushehr project initiated by the Germans but not terminated. 
Notwithstanding this explanation, the former CIA Director James Woolsey stated, in September 
1994, that they paid particular attention to Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear and missile technology 
from the West in order to enable it to build its own nuclear weapons. Woolsey also noted that Iran 
is 8 to 10 years away from building such weapons and that help from outside will be critical in 
reaching this timetable. According to Woolsey, Iran has been particularly active in trying to 
purchase nuclear materials or technology from Russian sources, as well as looking to purchase 
fully fabricated nuclear weapons in order to accelerate sharply its timetable. See, "Challenges to 
Peace in the Middle East," Address of R. James Woolsey to the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, Wye Plantation, MD, September 23, 1994, quoted in Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. 
McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and 
Charts. 1995, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 1995. p. 119.
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successfully deceived the well-trained inspector teams, and achieved to cover their 
nuclear weapons program from the world community for more than a decade.
The totality of a nation's nuclear activities and determining whether any of 
these activities are directed toward non-peaceful ends should be as important for the 
IAEA authorities as achieving greater accuracy in accounting for declared nuclear 
material in the declared nuclear sites. If the scholarly circles were to completely agree 
with Jennekens's line of thought that the "existing safeguards systems of the IAEA 
were fully adequate to provide convincing evidence", then this study would be 
groundless. The restrictions and limitations in the mandate of the IAEA have been 
repeatedly pointed out in this study. Nevertheless, even with its present mandate, 
the IAEA would probably do more by making use of some investigation techniques 
(e.g., environmental sampling -air, water, soil investigation), and hi-tech instruments 
(e.g., practical handhold global positioning satellite GPS which gives one's location 
with an accuracy of ten meters or less). Taking into consideration that, throughout 
the 1980s the IAEA Board of Governors included such Member States as India, 
Pakistan, China, Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria, the inability and/or 
the reluctance of the Board, in the past, to take prompt measures against allegations 
and to adapt new methods within the limits of the terms of the legal documents is 
not difficult to understand.
Whereas, the current safeguards practice severely hmits the equipment that an 
inspector may bring to a nuclear site, and that the inspectors have been discouraged 
by the Agency from taking samples and measurements at locations other than the 
strategic points set out in the individual Facility Attachments, in a recent study 
undertaken within the Agency to reinvigorate its safeguarding power, (i.e., the 
Programme 93+2) it is clearly stated that the Secretariat is proposing the use of
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environmental monitoring techniques for gathering broader information on states' 
nuclear activities in order to achieve greater nuclear transparency.
ii... "Programme 93+2": a Panacea ?
The effective inspections carried out in Iraq under the UN Security Council 
Resolution 687 has led to the consideration of whether the broad, but previously 
unexercised, rights of the IAEA under basic NPT safeguards agreements could not 
be used to carry out inspections beyond the routine inspections directed toward 
known declared activities. The Secretariat of the IAEA, after examining this issue, 
concluded that all along this right had indeed existed, and the Board of Governors in 
February 1992 agreed with this f i n d i n g W i t h s t a n d i n g  this line of thought, 
throughout the 1990's, the IAEA has focused extensively, as reported by Richard 
Hooper from the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA, on measures to make the 
safeguards system more effective and efficient. The major effort in this undertaking 
is called the "Programme 93+2", the IAEA's programme to develop and test a 
comprehensive set of measures to improve safeguards implementation. The formal 
title of the programme is "Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the 
Efficiency of the Safeguards System". The programme formally began with the IAEA 
Board of Governors' endorsement of the proposed effort in December 1993 and is 
sought to be completed within two years. According to Hooper, the initial goal of 
the IAEA Secretariat was to present the Board with the technical, legal and financial 
implications of a fully integrated and tested set of measures for strengthened, more 
efficient safeguards prior to the April 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. 
The measures, aimed at giving the IAEA increased access to relevant information
31'^According to David Kay it is not certain yet whether this is more than a symbolic victory, 
since no such inspections have been carried out. Kay furthermore argues that, given the politics of 
the IAEA and the Board of Governors, it is difficult, for example, to imagine that the Director- 
General would have authorized seven successive special inspections to Iran in three months if the 
first three had found nothing. Kay also notes that, in the case of Iraq, inspections have been 
frequent and with no certain end in sight. Unsuccessful inspections have quickly been followed by 
others, and then successfully uncovered the entire nuclear program of that country. See, David 
Kay, ibid., pp:324 - 323.
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and sites -without dramatic cost increases- have undergone testing in a number of 
Member States directly involved in the process.
The Iraqi experience, and in some ways more importantly the inspections in 
South Africa (following the declaration that the South African government 
abandoned its nuclear weapons programme and that it decided to accede to the 
NPT) have played a central role in efforts to strengthen safeguards. Iraq, as Hooper 
notes, provided an important lesson because it helped demonstrate the breadth of 
information and access needed to credibly address the completeness issue (i.e., 
assumption that declarations about the nuclear materials was complete). South 
Africa, on the other hand, helped to demonstrate what is possible when both sides 
honestly address nuclear transparency and openness. The conceptual development 
of Programme 93+2 is based on the notion that the level of assurance a safeguards 
system provides depends ultimately upon two key attributes: coverage and 
continuity. Coverage involves the extent to which safeguards relevant materials and 
events are effectively subject to verification. Continuity addresses the extent to 
which the status of the whole continuum of relevant materials and events can be 
inferred from verification of single parts.^^^
Programme 93+2 builds on the current system of material accountancy and 
control by integrating the present system's best elements with increased access to 
information and its effective use by the Agency plus increased physical access for 
inspections. New proposals, and the measures already adopted, relate to three main 
areas of reform:
2  ^^Richard Hooper, "The Objectives of Programme 93+2", IAEA Seminar on Verifying Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Pledges: Future Directions fo r  the IAEA Safeguards, Vienna, 
Austria, December 1995.
^Hooper, ibid., p.3.
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1.. .Those that strengthen the IAEA's access to information include:
...) an enhanced declaration of nuclear facilities by all nations which have 
signed a comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. While current 
safeguards focus on safeguarding nuclear material, this enhanced declaration will 
compel parties to provide descriptions of all nuclear related facilities including those 
used for research and development, production, and training.^^^
...) greater use of publicly available data on nuclear activities through 
increased use of data acquisition, processing and evaluation. An enhanced effort in 
collecting and analysing data from IAEA, public and government sources is 
proposed as a relatively low cost and useful method of assessing nuclear activities;
...) early access to design information on declared facilities; and 
...) new reporting scheme on export and import of nuclear material and 
specified equipment.
2 . .  .Those related to increased physical access to s/fes include:
...) unrestricted access to nuclear and nuclear-related sites. This would entail 
inspection techniques such as "managed access" to protect commercially sensitive 
information;
...) access beyond nuclear and nuclear-related sites arranged case by case to 
follow up on information or to implement technical measures; and
...) using the existing right to access on short notice or no-notice during 
routine inspections.
3.. .Those related rationalisation Sz administrative streamlining include;
...) expanding the use of the IAEA's two regional safeguards offices in Tokyo 
and Toronto;
"Nuclear Proliferation", the Draft Information Document, issued by the Scientific and 
Technical Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly (NATO Parlamentarians), AM 310, STC 
(95) 10, October 1995, p. 9.
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...) partnership agreement with EURATOM Inspectorate;
...) a proposal for simplified designation procedures for inspectors;
There are also measures relating to the use of environmental monitoring. 
Experience in Iraq has confirmed that environmental samples from rivers, the 
atmosphere etc. can reveal a great deal about nuclear activities, and the IAEA has 
conducted a series of pilot studies elsewhere. These have indicated that sampling can 
uncover important features about nuclear activities being conducted and that 
samples can be taken under existing safeguards agreements.^^^
Other measures under consideration include:
...) reducing the frequency of inspections at light-water reactors;
...) greater use of unattended measurement and surveillance equipment with 
remote transmission data from monitors such as cameras and motion detectors 
which could alert the IAEA instantly to events at facilities under safeguards;
...) multiple entry visas for inspectors; expanded capability for inspectors to 
communicate with headquarters;
...) additional regional safeguards offices to safe travel costs and facilitate short 
notice and non-notice safeguards inspections;
...) expanded training of inspectors;
ai Q
...) revision of safeguard parameters;
...) joint use of equipment and laboratories by the IAEA and State Systems of
Ч9ПAccountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC);
2 ^^See the NATO document, ibid., pp: 9 - 10.
319rhe IAEA is looking at the definitions of "significant quantities" of fissile material and 
"conversion times" to see if these have kept pace with progress in the technologies of weapons 
manufacture. For details see Appendix B of this study.
the NATO document, ibid., p. 10; and Richard Hooper, op cit., p. 4.
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iii... Proceedings of the "Programme 93+2*'
At a four-day meeting in late March 1995, the IAEA Board of Governors 
considered the set of proposals by the Agency's Secretariat (Programme 93+2) for a 
strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system. After long debate, the Board 
reportedly endorsed the direction of the "Programme 93+2", reaching consensus on 
the General thrust of the proposed new system, which should provide for 
verification by the Agency of the "correctness and completeness" of declarations by 
states party to comprehensive safeguards agreements, so that there is credible 
assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared facilities and of the 
absence of undeclared activities. Reportedly recognising that a strengthened 
safeguards system would require states to grant the Agency greater access to 
information and locations than had previously been required, the Board asked the 
Secretariat to submit for consideration at its meeting in Jrme 1995 specific proposals 
on the implementation of the Programme, preparatory to presentation to the 
General Conference of the IAEA, in September 1995. Some Board members are said 
to have expressed reservations about the need for greater access to sites and to have
argued that the proposed extensions were going too far 321
The proposals duly submitted by the Secretariat for the June Board are 
understood to have been in two parts. With respect to activities for which the 
Agency's Secretariat believes existing instruments, notably the safeguards 
agreements based on document. INFCIRC/153, give it the necessary authority, and 
which it would be practical and useful to implement at an early date, specific 
implementation measures were proposed. For those measures for which the 
Secretariat thinks it does not now have express authority, it presented proposals for 
implementation through additional authority that would complement that given in
321programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newshrief, Second Quarter 1995. No: 
30, p. 9.
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the safeguards agreements. The former part is understood to include the collection 
of environmental samples at sites where the IAEA already has the right of access; the 
acquisition of information for which it has not previously asked, including parts of 
fuel cycle that precede the introduction of safeguards material into a reactor or 
enrichment facility, such as mining, processing and conversion plants; and 
information on past operations. It is said to be the Director General's intention that a 
start should be made right away with the implementation of those measures. Even 
so, some measures that come within part of the Programme may require 
negotiation. An example is increased cooperation with states' systems of accounting 
and control, on which the Agency seeks more information, which it feels it has the 
right to ask for, while some states may need persuasion to provide it.^^^
With regard to the second part of the Programme, where the Secretariat sees a 
need for extended access to locations and information, the Board has asked the 
Secretariat to present for discussion at its December 1995 meeting, model legal 
documents through which it would be given the necessary additional authority. It 
seems that the Board is divided on the nature of the legal mechanism that would be 
required. Some governors are said to favour the preparation of draft protocols to 
existing safeguards agreements, or a revised version of the model safeguards 
agreement, either of which would first have to be formulated in general terms and 
subsequently negotiated for formal adoption with each of the states concerned. 
Other governors apparently think that the matter might be settled in a state-by-state 
arrangements, which presumably would take less time to conclude. Activities for 
which the Secretariat apparently considers it necessary to obtain such additional 
authority include declarations of, and physically access to, locations where the state 
has declared that activities are carried out that are "functionally" related to fuel cycle 
operations; an example given is heavy-water production. Another issue is that of
322ibid.,
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obtaining full access to sites where a state has identified nuclear materials to be 
present; environmental sample collection would be done at the site, not just the 
facility. Yet another area that would reportedly come imder the second category of 
measures is an expanded declaration, giving a complete description of the nuclear 
fuel cycle.^^  ^ Reportedly, a number of states' representatives, including those from 
countries in the Middle East, which fear they may be targeted by the new 
procedures, as well as some of the more highly industrialised Western states, have 
objections to the increased intrusiveness of the Agency's safeguards system.
323ibid.,
324programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief, Th\xd Quarter 1995, No: 31,
p. 12.
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CHAPTER X. SUPPLEMENTARY MEASURES FOR
HINDERING STATES FROM ACQUIRING 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY
fl... Oueruiem
By adhering to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, states have in a way 
promised the international community that they would behave in conformity with 
the principles and the norms of the regime, and that they would abide the rules set 
forth within the regime framework. This, however, would not be sufficient for 
preventing a state from acquiring nuclear weapons capacity through various means 
in case a hidden political will existed in the leadership of that state. The previous 
chapter displayed how difficult it may be in some instances to verify that states party 
to the NPT do fully comply with their basic undertakings. The implication of this is 
that, the legal documents may be effective only up to a certain degree, and beyond 
that level some other measures may be required in order to effectively prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. A further deduction from this implication, 
therefore, would be to propose making it a difficult process, by othei‘ means, for the 
states (either party to the NPT or not) to acquire the capacity to manufacture 
nuclear explosive devices. Hence, this chapter will elaborate on what could be such 
measures that would ultimately contribute to the operationalization of the principles 
and the norms of the nuclear non-proliferation regime even though these measures 
may not be necessarily linked to the regime by any legal documents or so. The 
implicit aim of these measures should be to raise the hurdles, that a proliferator 
state would have to jump, at every stages of the process of manufacturing nuclear 
explosive devices.
As it is also described in the Appendices in sufficient detail, acquiring the fissile 
material is essential for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. Therefore,
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setting tight controls on the transfers of fissile as well as dual-use materials 
between the states ivould certainly make it difficult to acquire the materials 
needed, unless their destinations to peaceful uses can be definitely identified. 
Increasing the effectiveness of the export control measures, which are indeed in 
force (so to speak) for decades, as well as making them more up to date regarding 
the changing political environment is an issue that should be seriously considered. At 
that point, the importance of reliable intelligence also reveals itself. Because, in order 
to determine the actual destination of a nuclear material acquired, either from the 
IAEA or from the international nuclear market, the political will behind procuring 
such material should be determined by means of accurate and reliable intelligence. 
But, since intelligence gathering facilities (e.g., satellites etc.,) are rather scarce in 
number and they are mostly concentrated at the disposal of a small group of states, 
then the question of how to make the supply of dependable information to the 
IAEA authorities about the suspected activities of several states in the nuclear 
market is also an issue which should be seriously dealt with.
In addition, availability of especially the fissUe material, which is sine qua non for 
nuclear explosives, should be considerably limited. Abundance of fissile materials in 
the international market, which is the case today, would certainly make their safe 
storage highly difficult. Regarding the tremendous amounts of fissile material, 
particularly Plutonium available at the disposal of several states,325 ^ cut-off in the 
production of fissile material would also contribute to preventing states from 
manufacturing fission weapons.
Furthermore, since nuclear weapons are the products of a series of extremely 
sophisticated processes, they ultimately require, among other things, testing their
the plutonium that is still being produced in the operating reactors, or the plutonium 
obtained from the dismantlement of nuclear warheads.
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reliability. Accordingly, effective limitations on testing the nuclear devices would 
lower the credibility and thus deterrence capacity of such a device both for the 
manufacturer country and their would-be target countries. Hence, so would the 
political will of states be less in that regard. Thus, putting into force a comprehensive 
ban on nuclear tests would pi'obably contribute to the non-prolifei'ution cause.
Moreover, the motives behind the will of those states which have opted for 
seeking a nuclear weapons potential to be at their disposal are, to some extent, 
related to their security considerations vis-à-vis their geo-political environments. 
Comprehensive studies in these respects demonstrate, though not statistically, the 
existence of such a correlation.326 Therefore, making those states feel safer may 
necessitate strong assurances from the nuclear capable states that they will not be 
threatened by the existence of these weapons, and that these states will help them in 
case there emerges a nuclear threat to their state-survival from the third coimtries. 
Hence, providing reliable security assurances by the existing nuclear powers to the 
non-nuclear states would most probably demolish any will of these states for 
acquiring nuclear weapons capacity for the sake of securing their survival.
This chapter will therefore search for the feasibility of the suggested measures, 
enumerated above, with regard to their possible contributions to an enhanced 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. Brief investigations about the past and the present 
state of affairs of these issues may be necessary for drawing inferences about what is 
likely to be achieved in the future.
B... Nuclear Export Controls
The desired objective for export controls is to reduce the possibilities for 
transferred items being used in nuclear weapons, not to restrict international trade
3263ee fo  ^example the books by Leonard S. Spector et al., cited in the footnotes.
212
between the industrial and developing nations.327 With the 'Atoms for Peace' 
speech of Eisenhower, the peaceful development and the dissemination of nuclear 
energy required the controlled transfer of materials and dual-use items among the 
states. This issue has also been envisaged in the NPT, particularly in the terms of 
Article III, 2 as:" Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide ... (b) equipment 
or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or productio7t o f special 
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the 
source or special fissionable jnaterial shall be subject to the safeguards required by this 
Article."
It is, however, interesting to note that this Article specified that safeguards 
were required only on equipment lohich was especially constructed for nuclear purposes. 
Hence, the export of dual-use items (i.e., an item which might be used for both 
nuclear and non-nuclear purposes) would be exempted from international controls. 
This was a weakness of the Treaty. There was furthermore no consensus among the 
states on what would be the equipment that required Agency controls. A number of 
sensitive technologies relating to fuel reprocessing and enrichment were initially 
excluded from the control list. The difficult task of agreeing upon an export control 
list that would plague the leaks of Article 111(2) was originally undertaken by the 
Zangger Committee and the the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
i... The Zangger Committee
The Zangger Committee^^S one of the regime elements spawned by the 
NPT. It is established in 1971, a year after the NPT's entry into force, by a group of
327see the note of the editor. Harald Müller and Lewis A. Dunn, Nuclear E.xport Controls and 
Supply Side Restraints: Options fo r  Reforms, PPNN Study Four, Programme for Promoting 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Southampton, UK, October 1993, p. iii.
328since the representatives of the states party to the NPT that were significant exporters of 
nuclear plant or material had begun to meet informally in 1971 under the chairmanship of the 
Swiss Professor Claude Zangger, the Committee is theretofore associated with the name of the 
Prof. Zangger.
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NPT signatories who were also major nuclear suppliers. The purpose of the 
Committee was to flesh out the vague requirement of safeguards on export of 
nuclear equipment and material contained in Article IIL2. The Zangger Committee 
made two influential statements to this end. First, it determined that full-scope 
safeguards were not required by Article III.2. Exporters needed only to ensure that 
safeguards arranged for a particular export rather than for the importing nations' 
entire program. Second, the Committee developed a trigger list, also known as the 
Zangger list of items of nuclear equipment and material that require safeguards as a 
condition of export. At present, all twenty-nine Zangger Committee members329 
voluntarily commit themselves not to export trigger list items unless the importer 
has arranged for international safeguards on them. Hence, the Zangger list is widely 
regarded as a significant contribution to the non-proliferation regime.330
ii... The Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines (The London Club)
The 1974 Indian nuclear blast^Sl shocked the West and led the major nuclear 
suppliers to question the adequacy of the NPT for regulating the flow of nuclear 
materials and technology. This concern led to the creation of Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG)^32 to further restrict the supply of items that might be used to
329 original body of the Zangger Committe consisted of the USA, the Soviet Union, the 
United kingdom, France, F. R. Germany, Canada and Japan. Eventually, the Committee enlarged 
to include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark. Finland, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland (recently Russia took over the seat of the Soviet Union). 
330see, Garry T. Gardner, 1994, Nuclear Nonproliferation : A Primer, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder & London.
33 lin 1974 the Indian government officially announced that its scientists had tested a nuclear 
explosive device at Pokharan in Rajasthan. It is noteworthy that if the Pokharan test had taken 
place before 1 January 1967, India would have been one of the officially recognized nuclear- 
weapons state under the Article IX. 3 of the NPT. India was thus the first country to use a civilian 
nuclear plant to make the material for a "reportedly peaceful" nuclear explosive device.
^^^The Nuclear Supplier Group has reproduced a set of guidelines that most of the suppliers of 
nuclear plants and materials agreed to in London on 21 September 1977. That's why this group is 
equally known as the London Club. This set of guidelines is also attached to communication 
addressed on 11 January 1978 to the Director-General of the IAEA. These guidelines for nuclear 
transfer are also labelled as INFCIRC/254. The initial signatories of the guidelines are; Belgium, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and 
the USSR.
2 14
advance a non-peaceful nuclear program. The NSG required export conditions 
stricter than those specified in the NPT. The London Guidelines differ from those of 
the Zangger Committe in many respects. They included addional items, particularly 
heavy-water technology, and requested that suppliers should exercise restraint over 
exports of sensitive technologies and materials (defined as the production of heavy- 
water, enrichment, reprocessing, and weapons-grade fissionable material). 
Commitments were required to place replicas and re-exports of transferred 
technologies under safeguards constraints. Guarantees of peaceful use and adequate 
physical protection were also requested from importing states.333
iii... Weaknesses of the Recent Export Controls
Although there was broad agreement among the nuclear exporters over the 
guidelines, they were unable to agree on the principle of full-scope safeguards of the 
IAEA as a condition of supply. Prior to the early 1990’s, progress on reducing the 
weaknesses within the export control system based on the NPT was limited. With 
regard to their export policy objectives, several exporting states such as France, 
Belgium, Switzerland, F. R. Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Soviet Union were still 
concerned with achieving a compromise between commercial and non-proliferation 
interests. The real proliferation risk posed by the recipient coimtry was of almost no 
importance. Whereas exports of nuclear technology by the Co-ordinating Committe 
for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) to the Warsaw Treaty Organization states 
were stricly limited, this did not apply to India or Pakistan, except as a result of the 
national export control policy of the US and Canada. The goods sector of export 
control stiU excluded dual-use goods (the exception was again CoCom). The system 
also contained no guidelines for the enforcement of their penalties for breaches of 
export control laws.
333pjarald Muller, "Reform of the System of Nuclear Export Controls", in Müller & Dunn, ibid., 
p .3
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These and the other significant weaknesses of the export control system was 
particularly because the nature of the proliferation problem had changed as a result 
of threshold states pursuing a different procurement strategy. They were no longer 
seeking the supply of complete turnkey plants through overt legal contracts. On the 
contrary, they now sought to integrate dual-use items and dual-use production 
equipment into their rudimentary nuclear infrastructures. Hence, the purchasing 
strategy of the threshold states was concentrated on the weaknesses of the 
prevailing export control system. It was not until the end of the 1980's that these 
weaknesses were acknowledged. And, it was the shock of the acute danger of an 
Iraqi bomb that created pressure to motivate reform of the system.^^^ The 
discovery of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons programme, which was based on 
imports for ostensibly non-nuclear purposes, prompted the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, meeting in Warsaw in April 1992, to adopt the Guidelines for Transfers of 
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Teclmology.335
iv... The Warsaw Guidelines
In 1991, as a result of the US initative, the NSG members met in the Hague for 
the first time since 1977, and agreed that the existing system had to be supplemented 
by guidelines on the transfer of dual-use items. The member states decided to 
appoint a working group to draw up principles and guidelines for export licences, 
and compiling a list of those dual-use goods to which the guidelines would apply. 
They also agreed on the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply; 
and to meet in Warsaw in the Spring of 1992. In the mean time, in their January 1992 
meeting in Switzerland, the member states succeeded in solving the main
Harald Müller,, ibid., pp: 3 - 5 .
335papgr by Prof. Jozef Goldblat prepared for a Seminar on Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The 
author wishes to thank Prof. Goldblat for giving the paper to the author in a private interview at 
UNIDIR, Geneva in April 1995 at the time of presenting it to the Seminar.
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controversial matters which stood in the way to a new system.336 their next 
meeting in Warsaw in March/April 1992, these states adopted four documents 
namely, the dual-use guidelines; the list; a memorandum of understanding on 
procedural matters; and a statement on full-scope safeguards.
The dual-use guidelines defined non-proliferation objectives as the prevention of 
transfers of goods which could further 'nuclear explosive activities' or 'nuclear fuel 
cycle activities which are not subject to safeguards'. The basic principle of guidelines 
was therefore to prohibit all forms of transfer of listed goods to non-nuclear 
weapons states. The list, on the other hand, included some sixty five goods which 
could be clasified in eight different categories, such as, uranium separation 
equipment and components including instruments for laser enrichment and electro­
magnetic isotope separation (EMIS); heavy water production equipment extending 
beyond the goods already specified in the London Guidelines, nuclear weapon test 
equipment; explosion technology equipment including electronic precision circuits; 
and other equipment including tritium and tritium plants.337 With the memorandum 
o f understanding the signatories agreed to apply simplified licence procedures in 
transfers between them, and to conduct a mutual exchange of knowledge and 
information on the status of nuclear programmes and on the purchasing activities of 
threshold states. They also agreed to meet each other for consultations at least once 
a year, and accepted that the Japanese embassy in Vienna acts as the 'point of
33ÖT[he United Stated abandoned its additional demands concerning the scope of the list and the 
parameters for the machine tools which was in contrast to the position of Japan and France; Japan 
succeeded in its demands for exporters to refuse export licences for transfers not only to non­
nuclear-weapon states but also to nuclear-weapons states if there is an 'unacceptable risk' that the 
exported goods could be diverted for nuclear explosive activities or used in a way contrary to 
non-proliferation objectives; and agreement was reached among the states that full-scope 
safeguards should in future be a condition of supply. This agreement was reached following 
acceptance of this export condition by France and the United Kingdom 1991. For details see. 
Nucleonics Week, March 14, 1991. Also see, for his comments, Harald Müller, in Müller & Dunn, 
ibid., p. 7.
list is noteworthy because it includes for the first time nuclear weapon components and 
technology for the production of nuclear weapons. In the past, nuclear -weapon states have been 
reluctant to compile a list of this kind because of concerns about revealing military secrets and 
their commitments under Article I of the NPT. Müller, ibid., p. 8.
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contact', i.e., as the informal secretary to group of signatories. Hence, the export 
control system has been given a strong institutional structure than was the case with 
the London Guidelines. Finally, with the statement on full-scope safeguards, it was 
agreed that the goods in the old list of the London Guidelines should not be 
exported if the recipient country has not accepted the full-scope IAEA safeguards.
a... significance of the Warsaw guidelines
With the improvements in implementation procedtires which resulted from the 
gradual institutionalization of the system, as well as the binding effect of rejection 
notices, regular consultation and establishment of a point of contact, the Warsaw 
meeting marked a milestone in the development of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. The meeting extended and stabilized all aspects of the previous export 
system. It formulated clear criteria for export licence procedures. With the 
standardization of the fuU-scope safeguards as a condition for trade in nuclear goods, 
the guidelines in a way discriminated between the members complying with the 
non-proliferation regime and those that insist on remaining outside. The agreement 
on the long list of dual-use items to be subject to licensing procedures is a reaction to 
the new purchasing strategies of the threshold states which sought to circumvent the 
prefixed export control system. The inclusion of nuclear weapons technology into 
the list of controlled goods finally closed a huge gap in that respect which existed in 
the old system. Furthermore, the supplier states were encouraged to enforce the 
guidelines and impose penalties for breaching them.338 Notwitstanding such a 
remarkable progress in this field, there still exist several points that need to be 
further improved for a much more effective export control system.
338ibid„ p. 10.
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b... weaknesses of the Warsaw guidelines
A principal weakness of the Warsaw Guidelines is that there is no provision 
about the states which may act as transhipment points in nuclear trade. Those states 
are neither supplier nor possible proliferators. However, their intermediary role 
may have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the export control system. 
Therefore, the guidelines may have a provision to check whether the recipient 
country has been an intermediary for illegal nuclear transfer in the past. Another 
issue relate to the enforcement of penalties. Although penalties are envisaged in the 
guidelines, the procedural matters that are needed to implement them are not 
specified. This lowers the credibility sanctions. Furthermore, there are no 
appropriate verifications provisions in the guidelines for controlling the end-uses of 
the transfered material. Recipients' declarations are considered to suffice -as it is the 
case for the declaration of nuclear facilities and material as states adhere to the NPT. 
In addition, the current system of nuclear exports lacks a mechanism for monitoring 
the implementation of the guidelines by the signatories. Finally, as noted by Harald 
Müller, not all the supplier states view steps towards further institutionalization with 
great sympathy. In that respect, the Japanese proposal to convert the Suppliers 
Group into a more permanent organization with semi-annual meetings, a decision­
making structure and a more formal administration, was rejected.339 jt would be 
wise to establish some sort of institutional link to other activities taking place in the 
field of export control so as to increase overall effectiveness of the system.
V ... Suggestions for an Enhanced Export Control System
The success of the reform in the export control system will unquestionably 
depend on the attitudes of its drafters. Willingness of the signatories to seriously 
implement the guidelines and to cooperate with each other will certainly help
3^%apanese proposal was forwarded during the first meeting at the 'point of contact' in Vienna, in 
December 1992. See Harald Müller, ibid., p. 13.
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forging the reforms. As regards the success of the new export control system, the 
situation within the frontiers of the former Soviet republics should be seriously 
considered. To this end, the experience gained by the older members of the 'Club' 
should be transmitted to the 'newcomers' out of the former Soviet Union. The 
porous frontiers of these newly independent republics are very convenient for illegal 
trafficking of especially fissile material.340 vVith the partial exception of Russia, none 
of these republics have the necessary laws, regulations, procedures, mechanisms, 
and trained personnel to ensure effective control over exports from its territories. 
Hence, leaky export control procedures of these states need to be overhauled.^41 
There is also great concern about the threat of a "brain drain" (intellectual export) of 
skilled and experienced nuclear scientists andengineers who could assist rogue 
regimes with clandestine nuclear programmes. The US and Europe have provided 
funds for International Centers for Science and Technology in Moscow and Kiev in 
order to provide contracts for the civil employment of nuclear experts, but there is 
concern that these efforts are not subtantial enough to address the problem fully .342
C... Comprehensiue Nuclear Test Ban
Nuclear disarmament, as it is envisaged today, should not be confined to 
disarmament of the five de jure nuclear-weapons states, but should also encompass 
states that have already become de facto weapons states, and those that may choose 
nuclear path in the future. An effective way of realizing a comprehensive
340[)uring 1994, there was an unprecedented increase in cases of nuclear smuggling and this 
seems to be continuing unabated. Although the sources of the smuggled material do not seem to 
be weapons facilities, some cases have involved genuinly significant material. Vloreover, concern 
about nuclear smuggling has been fuelled by recent reports about the possibility of building 
nuclear weapons with smaller quantities of fissile material than was hitherto believed. Another 
alarming possibility is the use by terrorists of so-called radiological weapons which would employ 
material such as radioactive waste scattered by a conventional explosive. North Atlantic Assembly 
(NATO Parlamentarians), Draft Information Document, Nuclear Proliferation, Scientific and 
Technical Committee, AM 310 STC (95) 10, October 1995, p. 14.
341por a comprehensive set of proposals in this regard, and for more about universal concern 
with controlled nuclear exports, see Lewis A. Dunn, "Buttressing Nuclear Export Controls and 
Supply-Side Restraints: Initiatives and Actions", Harald Müller & Lewis Dunn, ibid., pp: 20 - 25. 
342see (pg NATO document, p. 14.
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disarmament would therefore be to put an end to testing nuclear explosives and 
their related components. Because, it will not be possible for at least the aspiring 
states to count on the credibility of their nuclear explosive devices, if they may 
develop at all, without testing (except the Hiroshima-type primitive nuclear 
explosives). Hence, the will of such states to hold a stockpile of powerful nuclear 
explosives would probably diminish.343 Seen from this perspective, the contribution 
of achieving an all-encompassing nuclear test ban to strengthening the non­
proliferation norm, will be straightforward.
i... The Historical Context
Achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the oldest items 
on the international nuclear disarmament and arms limitation agenda. In mid-1950s 
it was regarded as a measure which would both halt the race then taking place to 
develop more powerful atomic and thermonuclear weapons, and stop pollution of 
the atmosphere with radioactive fall-out resulting from atmospheric testing. The 
negotiations on a CTBT in the late 1950s and early 1960s took place in the context of 
a Soviet Union - United States - United Kingdom moratorium on nuclear testing, 
from 1958 to 1961, and a disarmament agenda which involved talks to stop the 
production of fissile material and nuclear warheads in the three existing nuclear- 
weapons states, and for them to engage in nuclear disarmament. None of these 
negotiations resulted in a satisfactory agreement, though in 1963 the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom and the United States signed a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 
Moscow. The PTBT limited nuclear testing to underground locations. By the mid- 
1960s, attempts to negotiate an East-West agrément on both conventional and 
nuclear disarmament had given way to the idea of negotiating arms control and 
disarmament measures in successive stages, starting with a nuclear non-
343pf|e author wishes to thank Mr. Asım Arar from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
supplying his article on the nuclear test ban issue, Nükleer Yayılmanın Önlenmesi, Nükleer 
Denemeler ve Kapsamlı Nükleer Deneme Yasağı, unpublished article, Ankara, February 1996.
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dissemination/proliferation agreement, namely the NPT. Specitfic references were 
made in the Preamble to the Treaty to the discontinuance of all test explosions, the 
cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the elimination of all 
stockpiles. Article VI of the NPT also contained an undertaking to pursue negotiations 
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
Negotiations on a CTBT betw^een the Soviet Uruon, the Unite Kingdom and the 
United States restarted in 1977, but were suspended at the end of 1980. The issue of 
CTBT had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, 
but no actual negotiations took place, owing to the opposition from the United 
Kingdom and the United States.345 January 1991, a conference was held at the 
United Nations in New York to attempt to amend the PTBT into a CTBT, but it broke 
up without achieving any obvious progress towards this goal. Following the entry 
into force of the NPT in 1970, in the Treaty Review Conferences that followed every 
five years, the lack of visible progress towards a CTBT was seen as a key indicator 
that the nuclear weapons states were not fulfilling their obligations under Article VI. 
The inability to reach agreement over wording relating to this issue resulted in the 
failure to agree a final document at the NPT Review Conferences of 1980 and 
1990.346
344i)arryl Hewlett & John Simpson, The NPT and the CTBT: an fne.xtricahle Relationship 
Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Southampton, UK, Issue Review, No:l, 
March 1992, p. 1
345(;;'j’3 j  has been viewed detrimental to the security interests of the United Kingdom and United 
States because of their perceived absolute needs to maintain nuclear deterrence and the technical 
credibility of their nuclear stockpiles. Hence, any non-proliferation benefits a CTBT might
?roduce were viewed as having a lesser priority.46lbid., pp; 1 -2.
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11.. . Earlier Thoughts on Nuclear Test Ban
Soon after the first nuclear explosion in 16 July 1945 at Alamogordo Desert, Los 
Alamos, New Mexico, the diverse effects of nuclear weapons had brought about the 
necessity, at least at the intellectual level, to put a limit, or rather a complete ban to 
nuclear tests. At the beginnig, such a ban was pursued, as Howlett and Simpson put 
it, for at least four specific purposes:
...to prevent developments in nuclear weapons technology moving out of 
control towards a potential catastrophe;
...to stop the harmful environmental consequences of atmospheric testing;
...to deny to existing nuclear-weapons states the ability to develop and deploy 
thermonuclear weapons; and
...to put pressure on aspiring nuclear weapons states to refrain from testing any 
types of nuclear weapons.
In the intervening years, some of the original objectives of the CTBT have 
taken on a different significance:
...the PTBT resolved the environmental problems by prohibiting atmospheric 
testing;
...all of the declared nuclear-weapons states have tested their thermo-nuclear 
devices; and,
...with the current level of nuclear technology, states have become able to 
design and construct as well as to stockpile Hiroshima-type fission weapons ^vithout 
nuclear explosive testing; and most significantly,
...the drastic changes have taken place in the intenational system.
111.. . Debate Over the Consequences of a Comprehensive Test Ban
To assess the impact of a comprehensive ban on further well-being of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime, it may be useful to elaborate on the points of
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contact between the tw'o issues. For doing this, it would be wise to go through the 
debate among the scholars, scientists, and policy makers as to what would be the 
consequences of an all-out ban on nuclear testing on both the nuclear-weapons 
states and the non-nuclear-weapons states. The positions of the parties to the debate 
(those in favour of cessation, and those in favour of continuation of nuclear tests) 
may then provide hints in these respects.
Many of those who believe that nuclear deterrence has kept peace during the 
Cold War years are mostly in favour of continuation of nuclear explosive testing by 
putting forward that the safety and the credibility of their nuclear force posture 
necessitate such tests. Those who favor cessation, however, argue that a CTBT could 
provide a major contribution to the enhancement of international security at a 
minimal cost to the deterrent postures of the existing nuclear weapons states. As 
Hewlett and Simpson note, this is because important considerations in support of 
continued testing, such as safety, reliability, weapon modernization and maintaining 
relevant personnel, can be accomplished in other ways.
Those who argue that nuclear tests are utmost important, if not definitely 
imperative, hold that the test are mainly required for: tailoring nuclear warheads to 
specific delivery systems; evaluating the effects of nuclear explosions on the 
functioning of both nuclear and conventional weapons; ensuring safety and security 
of the stockpile; garding against technological surprises; guaranteeing the technical 
reliability of existing warheads; and maintaining a cadre of personnel with relevant 
technological knowledge who would have the confidence to make judgements 
about the effects of changing the components in existing nuclear weapons.^47
347por an excellent assessment of the cited issues see, Hewlett & Simpson, ibid., pp: 2 - 4 .
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Moreover, of those scholars who favour the continuance of nuclear tests 
holding that such tests are crucial for the continuance of the nuclear deterrence 
capability of the de jure nuclear-weapons states, Katheeen Bailey points out to the 
fact that such states as North Korea, Iran, Syria, and Libya show evidence of being 
interested in acquiring nuclear weapons. And that, India, Israel and even Pakistan 
have already developed nuclear weapons. Hence, in such a circumstance, the United 
States and Russia are likely to need to deter nuclear forces other than each other's. 
Since, as the nuclear arsenals of both will diminish and the number of warhead 
designs deployed will be reduced, there wiU be increased need to be sure that the 
systems work, and without testing a large proportion of the current stockpile in 
either country will be rendered ineffective if just one device design were to be faulty. 
Accordingly, Bailey concludes that it would be both ironic and foolhardy for either the 
United States or Russia to give up nuclear testing at a time when the number o f states they 
may have to target and deter is groiving.^^^ Bailey further suggests that neither the 
United States nor Russia should stop all nuclear testing until all potential proliférants and 
existing nuclear-weapons states agree to adhere to a ban. The underlying reason in this 
line of thought is that, according to its proponents, there is no relationship between 
banning nuclear tests and enhancing nuclear non-proliferation, because:
...Testing by declared nuclear weapons states is not a driving force behind 
proliferation;
...Proliférant nations do not need to test in order to acquire a first-generation 
nuclear weapon capability, as Pakistan and others have proven;
...The NPT does not call for a CTBT but only mentions in the preamble. It states 
that the preamble of yet another treaty (the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty) calls for 
discontinuance of all nuclear explosives testing;
'^^^Kathleen C. Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Westview Press. Boulder, 1993, 
p. 64.
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...A ban does not constitute disarmament. It does not get rid of any weapons, 
nor does it place any limits on further weapons production.349
Hence, based on what is quoted above, one might argue that, if a 
comprehensive ban on tests will not contribute to the cause of nuclear non­
proliferation, what would be the feasibility of risking the deterrence potentials of 
existing nuclear powers whose mere existence are believed to have kept the long 
peace between the East-West blocks for decades. Notwithstanding such a line of 
reasoning, one should bear in mind that achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban 
will have at least a psychological effect on the non-NPT non-nuclear weapons states. 
And, this effect may ultimately direct the hold-out states towards joining the non­
proliferation regime by any means.^bO Hence, if safety, reliability and survivability 
of the existing nuclear deterrent can be achieved by alternative methods rather than 
explosive testing, achieving an all out test ban would therefore prove feasible.
iv... Alternative Methods for Ensuring Safety & Reliability of Weapons
The argument that new delivery systems or revised force postures have been 
driving force behind requirements for new warhead designs should no more be 
imperative due to the recent developments in the delivery systems which are build 
around the existing warheads. And, alternatively modifications can be made to the 
dimensions, weight, and yield of warheads in the existing inventory without 
explosive testing while retaining confidence in their predicted yield.
Nuclear tests were also conducted for evaluating the effects o f nuclear explosions 
on the functioning o f both nuclear and conventional components. The degree of 
survivability of various delivery vehicles, warheads and military system when
349gaiiey p. 61.
35^hese 'any means' are either the NPT itself, or the NWFZs or bilateral/multilateral nuclear 
restraint agreements, which are elaborated in sufficient detail in Part II and Part III.
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subjected to nuclear explosions of different types and yields needed to be tested. 
Whether the knowledge about the nuclear weapons effects accumulated thus far 
would suffice for evaluating the functioning of military systems without exposing 
them to nuclear tests remains to be investigated fully. However, many individual 
types of weapons effects can be generated in test-rigs using sources other than 
nuclear explosion.351
Nuclear tests have been used to evaluate the likelihood of innovations in nuclear 
explosive technology, in order to reduce possibilities that such innovations, if made by 
a potential adversary, would have a negative effect on the state's own security 
position. But, since nuclear explosive technology has been developed for five 
decades, the likelihood of innovations to stimulate a major change in the force 
postures of states is considerably low. Thus, the need to conduct nuclear explosive 
tests to fulfill this need should also be lower.
To ensure the safety and security o f the nuclear stockpile has also been a mjaor 
concern of weapons designers. Ensuring that no nuclear yield occurs in case a 
nuclear warhead is exposed to an abnormal condition such as fire, required a variety 
of safety standards, and thus nuclear explosive testing. Today, weapons designs 
vv'hich minimize the risk of accidental detonation of the chemical explosives in the 
warheads (which trigger the nuclear explosion) are available. Moreover, the risks of 
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons can be reduced by improvements to existing 
designs and processes rather than by the production of new designs requiring 
revalidation by explosive testing.^^2
^Similarly, satellite components can be exposed to the radiation produced by nuclear 
explosions in space by using materials testing reactors or particle accelerators. Chemical 
e;qjlosions can simulate most blast effects. Howlett & Simpson, ibid., pp: 2 - 3 .
^^^Improvements may involve enhancing the existing software controlling launch and detonation 
processes, and introducing more sophisticated and secure coded destruction systems in the event 
of unauthorized use. See, Howlett & Simpson, ibid., p. 4.
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Ensuring that stockpiled nuclear warheads remain reliable over periods of ten to 
thirty years requires a systematic programme of periodic warhead disassembly and 
checking of individual components, to ensure that process of ageing have not 
changed them. If processes of ageing are identified, and they create uncertainties 
over whether the weapon will operate as designed, this may require 
remanufacturing of either some of its components or the entire weapon. Computer 
simulations of the impact of changes generated by remanufacturing upon the 
functioning of weapon, using data acquired from past nuclear explosive testing, have 
been developed and can resolve many uncertainties.353
Maintaning a cadre of personnel with relevant technical kno'wledge has also been 
considered as an imperative for the continuance of nuclear explosive testing so as to 
guarantee the safety and reliability of warheads, as well as the effectiveness of any 
design improvements to them. These personnel are believed to have ongoing 
practical experience of design problems and knowledge of how to move from the 
design stage to a workable weapon. It is further argued that, if safer, more secure 
and reliable nuclear weapons are to be produced and stockpiled, it is necessary that a 
technical culture of nuclear weapons experts is maintained. However, this argument 
is being challenged by the fact that, explosive testing is only a limited part of an 
overall nuclear weapon research progranune, and the assertion that removal of the 
testing element will unduly affect expertise or morale is highly disputable, especially
353j( continues to be argued that nuclear explosive testing may still be required in some cases, 
both to ascertain the effects of ageing and the ability of remanufactured weapons to operate in 
conformity with the original design specifications. As noted by Howlett & Simpson, the Kidder 
Report of 1987, in USA, indicated that warheads which have been thoroughly tested prior to 
deployment can be expected to remain reliable. But, where warheads have been inadequately 
tested prior to introduction, confidence in their future reliability may be reduced and corrective 
action, including nuclear testing, may prove necessary. But fortunately, few, if any, current 
warheads fall into this latter category. See, R. E. Kidder, Stockpile Reliability and Nuclear Test 
Bans. Response to J. W. Rosengren's Defense o f  His 1983 Report, Livermore, California, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, February 1987, cited in Howlett & Simpson, p. 5.
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if new simulation methods were to be developed as surrogates for nuclear explosive
testing.354
V ... The Impact of a Test Ban on the Non-Proliferation Objective
Part of the discussion so far revealed that no consensus has been reached 
among the scholarly and scientific circles yet on whether to put a halt to nuclear 
explosive tests or not. The lack of consensus emanates mainly from a disagreement 
on the primar}' objective of the NPT. If NPT is said to primarily aim at preventing 
the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, a CTBT would not contribute to this aim 
so far as the states may be happy with primitive low-yield Hiroshima-type fission 
weapons which do not necessitate actual explosive testing. Because, laboratory 
exprementation or the published documentation about the fission bombs offer a 
potential proliferator the necessary information to construct a gun-assembled or 
implosion device.355
However, if the NPT is also said to aim at, if not primarily, facilitating nuclear 
disarmament and preventing further modernization and sophistication of existing 
nuclear arsenals, then achieving a CTBT would certainly contribute to the non­
proliferation cause. Since, advanced nuclear weapons will surely necessitate 
explosive testing, then a ban to nuclear test would be a major impediment in that 
respect. Bearing this technical side in mind, it should further be noted that, the 
conclusion of a CTBT is still seen by many NPT parties as part of the political bargain 
inherent in the Treaty i.e., by accepting a non-nuclear-weapon state status these 
states have expected parallel limitations to be accepted by the nuclear-weapons 
states. This bargaining chip has had an impact on the NPT Review Conferences in 
1980 and 1990 by not giving way to producing final declarations. Since, non-nuclear-
354p[o\vlett & Simpson, ibid., pp: 4 - 5 .
355For a detailed explanation about nuclear explosives, see the Appendices.
229
weapons states feel that they are threatened by all nuclear weapons, not just those of 
de facto or would-be nuclear-weapons states. That fear may significantly be 
responsible for additional non-nuclear-weapons states to choose nuclear path in their 
security considerations. When seen from this perspective, which is in perfect 
conformity with the main theme of this thesis, those arguments stating that a 
comprehensive ban on nuclear test would have nothing to do with cause of nuclear 
non-proliferation, become unwarranted.
vi... The Current Situation in the CTBT Issue
The former Soviet Union was the first to halt nuclear testing when, in October 
1991 then-President Mikhail Gorbachev announced a one-year moratorium. In 1992, 
George Bush signed a bill halting American tests for nine months which, in turn, 
prompted Boris Yeltsin to extend the moratorium until July 1993. Subsequently, the 
American moratorium was extended again for a minimum of fifteen months, 
provided the other nations did not conclude tests during that period. In January 
1995, President Bill Clinton announced an indefinite extension of the American ban 
on nuclear testing. The American ban also prevented British nuclear weapons tests 
since the United Kingdom uses American test sites in Nevada. In any event, the 
United Kingdom declared a formal end to nuclear testing in April 1995. In April 1992, 
French President François Mitterand proclaimed a moratorium until the end of that 
year, and in early 1993 he stated that France would forgo additional testing as long 
as the United States and Russia refrained. However, this moratorium was opposed 
by elements of the French military who argued that further testing was needed to 
maintain and enhance France's nuclear deterrent and to develop the simulation 
technology needed to enable France to forgo testing in the future.356
356see the Draft Information Document, North Atlantic Assembly (NATO Parlamentarians), 
Nuclear Proliferation, Scientific and Technical Committee, AM 310 STC (95) 10, October 1995,
p. 11.
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Negotiations on a CTBT have been in progress in the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva since August 1992, and following the NPT extension 
decision in May 1995, there was considerable optimism about the succesful 
conclusion of these negotiations in 1996. However, in just hours after the NPT 
extension decision, P. R. China conducted a nuclear test. Moreover, the French 
President Jacques Chirac announced that France too would conduct a series of up to 
eight nuclear tests by May 1996. The reason cited for French nuclear tests is the need 
to develop the simulation technologies required to modernize nuclear arsenals 
without conducting further tests. The French leadership declared that the current 
tests (resumed in the sixth) will mark the definitive end of its test programme. It has 
been declared that France will support a complete test ban. On the other hand, 
China conducted another test in August 1995. Though China is believed to conduct 
further tests in 1996, Chinese authorities declared that China would comply with a 
complete test ban in 1996. Despite French and Chinese nuclear testing, progress 
toward a complete test ban is being made. The announcements by France and the 
United States that they would support a complete test ban -so that even nuclear 
explosives with exceptionally low yields would be prohibited- have helped move 
negotiations forward.357
D... Cut-Off Production Fissile Materials
Stringent limits to the availability of fissile materials -plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium HEU as the most essential element of the process of 
manufacturing nuclear explosive devices- would certainly make it much harder, if 
not totally impossible, acquiring brand-new nuclear weapons capability clandestinely 
by the aspiring states. In this regard, a universal convention which would require
^^7^Ithough some issues have been resolved, disagreement persists over entry into force 
provisions; the nature of implementation agency for the test ban; and aspects of verification such 
as the number of monitoring stations, on-site inspection procedures, and the role of national 
technical means of verification. Ibid., pp: 12 - 13.
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halting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons is an issue which is 
being seriously considered in international circles. But achieving such a convention 
does not appear to be a straightforward one due to its likely repercussions for both 
the nuclear-weapons states and the non-nuclear-^veapons states party to the NPT, as 
well as the so-called threshold states which are believed to have already 
manufactured nuclear explosives.
i... Political Aspects of a Cut-Off Convention
The idea of putting an end to the production of fissile material was first and 
then repeatedly voiced by the United States in the early 1950s at a time when the 
concern was to try to halt the Soviet production. But the Soviets rejected the US 
suggestions for they were still trying to catch up with the US level of nuclear 
armament. In the 1980s, this time it was the United States which would reject the 
Soviet suggestions to put a halt to the fissile material production. But, at present, 
since START-II imposes deep cuts it the number of warheads to be held in the 
nuclear arsenals of both the USA and Russia, then the idea of a cut-off seems more 
plausible. Hence, on 26 Semptember 1993, the Clinton administration put forward a 
major non-proliferation initiative by announcing that the new US administration 
would give priority to the cut-off issue with a renewed momentum.358 And, the 
1993 session of the United Nations General Assembly witnessed a consensus on that 
subject which indeed had been in the multilateral disarmament agenda (i.e.. 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva) for decades. Accordingly, on 16 December 
1993, the UN General Assembly adopted without a vote the Resolution on 
Prohibiton of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other 
Nuclear Explosive Devices.359 General Assembly Resolution set out the
358The US President Clinton called for a Multilateral Convention Prohibiting the Production of 
Highly Enriched Uranium or Plutonium for Nuclear Explosive Purposes or Outside of 
International Safeguards.
^^^United Nations General Assembly, 48th Session, Resolution 48/75L.
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parameters of an agreement on cut-off. Accordingly, the Resolution called, first of 
all, for multilateral negotiations on the modalities of a universal convention. 
Secondly, it defined the scope by calling for the banning of production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Thirdly, the 
Resolution permitted the production for legitimate civilian uses and non-explosive 
military purposes such as naval propulsion. And, finally, it recommended a non- 
discriminatory verification regime to provide requisite confidence in a cut-off treaty. 
In is interesting to note at this stage that the current stockpiles of fissile materials, 
either at the disposal of de jure nuclear-weapons states or in the hold-out (threshold) 
states suh as India, Pakistan and Israel that are not subject to the full-scope IAEA 
safeguards, will not be subject to verification. Whereas, these stockpiles will be 
capped as of the entry into force of a cut-off treaty.
The concept of a cut-off has traditionally been seen as part of a larger package 
of disarmament measures which also included a comprehensive test ban that can 
prevent the development of new weapons as well as a ban on further production of 
such weapons. Whether or not a cut-off is seen as a disarmament initiative on its 
own merits or as part of a package, it is nonetheless part of an incremental process, 
reinforicing the trend of moving towards a nuclear-weapons-free culture .3^0 if a 
universal cut-off agreement can be achieved, the IAEA controls on installations of 
the states like India, Pakistan, and Israel producing highly enriched uranium and 
plutonium can be presented as an appreciable advance. Since, nothing concrete had 
come of all the attempts made to induce such states to accede to the non­
proliferation regime. It is accordingly asserted that, the United States presented its
360see Rakesh Sood, "Halting Fissile Material Production for Weapons: A Step Towards Nuclear 
Disarmament", in Thérèse Delpech, Lewis A. Dunn, David Fischer and Rakesh Sood, Halting the 
Production o f  Fissile Materials fo r  Nuclear Weapons, UNIDIR Research Paper, No: 31, New York 
& Geneva, pp: 47 - 58.
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proposed convention as a non-proliferation measure chiefly in regard to those three 
countries.3^1
« ...  stance of the nuclear-weapons states
The United States and Russia, which possess considerable stocks of fissile 
materials are all the more inclined to support the proposed convention in that it does 
not entail any special constraints and enables them, on the contrary, to announce as 
a measure in the direction of nuclear disarmament a decision that would have to be 
taken in any case. However. France and the United Kingdom are in a different 
position. They have a more modest arsenal and much smaller quantitites of fissile 
material. They must therefore see the preservation of their basic interests in the 
convention. In addition, both countries have a powerful nuclear industry, 
particularly in the nuclear fuel cycle field, and nuclear powered submarines. 
Therefore, they are lukewarm about an extension of international controls within 
their territories. Despite all these factors, the two nuclear-weapon states have 
adopted a favourable position of principle regarding their participation in the 
negotiations, provided at least that the benefit in terms of non-proliferation is clear. 
As to the position of China, it is one of more conservative and reluctant when 
compared to the other nuclear powers. China considers that there is no possible 
comparison between its stocks and those of the United States and Russia, and that it 
is not in its interest to take an active part in negotiations that would place it at a very
considerable disadvantage.362
36lThérèse Delpech, "A Convention on the Prohibition of Fissile Material: Uncertain Benefits for 
Non-Proliferation", in Thérèse Delpech et al, UNIDIR Research Paper, No: 31, p. 3.
362geg Thérèse Delpech, ibid., pp: 5 - 6 .  For estimated amounts of plutonium and highly 
enriched uraniumin military stocks of the five nuclear-weapons states see, David Albright, Franz 
Berkhout and William Walker, World Inventory o f  Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1993, pp: 198 - 200. Accordingly, by the end of 
1990, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had 125 tonnes of plutonium (PU-239) and 
720 tonnes of HEU; the United States had 112 tonnes Pu and 550 tonnes HEU; the United 
Kingdom had 11 tonnes Pu and 10 tonnes HEU; France had 6 tonnes Pu and 15 tonnes HEU; 
Finally, China had 2.5 tonnes Pu and 15 tonnes HEU. Assuming that, on the average, 
approximately 4 kg of plutonium or 15 kg of HEU are needed per nuclear warhead, then for 
instance the French stocks of fissile material would suffice 1000 to 1500 warheads, and China's
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b... stance of the threshold states
Of the three threshold states, Israel’s nuclear capability is likely to be least 
affected by a cut-off. By all accounts Israel has the largest and the most sophisticated 
nuclear arsenal, and the most effective means of d e l i v e r y I s r a e l ' s  inventory of 
weapon-grade plutonium is similar to that of India, in terms of nuclear explosive 
potential, much larger than that of Pakistan. Hence, Israel, unlike the other two 
threshold states, has at present no real or potential nuclear armed a d v e r s a r y O n  
the other hand, a cut-off would leave India with rather ample stocks of fissile 
material, but if the cut-off were combined with CTBT, India would be left with few 
nuclear warheads. For the forseeable future India would be condemned to remain 
greatly inferior to China.^^^ Finally, Pakistan has little hope of catching up with 
India in nuclear industry and sophistication.366 Therefore, it refuses any approach 
that could lead it to sign the NPT unless India undertakes to do likewise. Pakistan, 
however, could also have come to the conclusion that it would be advantageous for 
it today to halt production in both countries as soon as possible, given the fact that 
the disproportion between the fissile material stocks of India and Pakistan may be 
much more increasing in the future.367 Having said these about the stances of the
stocks would manufacture 600 warheads, whereas the British stock would suffice for some 700 
warheads.
363see, The Military Balance 1993-1994, London, Brasseys for International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS), p. 118.
364|f Iran's recent engagements with Russia and China to build two 1300 MW light-water reactors 
in Bushehr and their likely implications to the security considerations of Israel are to be neglecled 
for the time being.
365with regard to halting both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, India 
presented a resolution, in 1982, to the UN General Assembly, concerning A Freeze on Nuclear 
Weapons (UNGA, 37th Session, Resohition 37/lOOA) accompanied by a cut-off in production of 
fissionable material for weapons purposes. And, the Indian resolution which was tabled annually 
was merged in 1988 with a Mexican resolution on the same subject which also included a 
comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and on their delivery vehicles. Canada too had a 
resolution on the same subject. However, the then stance of the nuclear-weapons states made 
forward movement on the subject impossible. These developments imply that the official stance of 
India, which is indeed seen as one of the most problematic countries in these issues, will be 
affirmative as regards to the putting into force a cut-off treaty.
366£)avid Fischer, "Some Aspects of a Cut-Off Convention", in David Fischer et al, ibid., UNIDIR 
Research Report, No: 31, pp: 2 8 - 31 .
367Estimates of the total quantities of plutonium at the disposal of Israel amount to 275 - 475 kg 
by the end of 1995. With this amount of separated plutonium Israel is able to produce 55 - 95 
nuclear warheads. The corresponding figures for India are 290 - 425 kg plutonium enough for
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threshold states vis-à-vis a would-be cut-off convention, it seems that, so far as the 
reactions of the fissile material producer states are concerned, achieving a universal 
convention is not a remote possibility.
c... non-nuclear states' concerns with legitimation of the thresholds
The fact that capping production of fissile material will be effective as of the 
date of the entry into force of a universal cut-off convention (or a treaty), the fissile 
material produced by a state party to the convention will not be subject to any 
constraint. In other words, the fissile material hitherto produced by the non-NPT 
threshold states will be freely used for either civilian or military purposes (until 
these stase do accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapons states and fully respect the 
non-proliferation norm). The concern of the non-nuclear-weapons states party to the 
NPT is therefore the oblique legitimation of the nuclear-weapon state status of the 
threshold states by a treaty. Those states which are capable of producing fissile 
material but have previously joined the NPT will therefore be in a disadvantageous 
position when compared to the current hold-out states having stockpiles of 
considerable amounts of weapons-grade nuclear materials.
When a convention will be signed it will certainly require verification of the 
basic undertakings of states party to it. But, the possibilities of measures to be taken 
against a state will be limited if the verifying body finds out initially undeclared 
material in the inspected facilities of the states. Because, inspected states may then 
assert that the fissile materials in mention was produced before the cut-off, and that 
it was under no obligation to declare it. Therefore, if the convention implicitly 
recognizes the right of the threshold states to be regarded as nuclear-weapons states 
(legitimize), then nuclear exports to such countries should be subject to the same
85 warheads. Neither Israel nor India are known to have significant amounts of HEU at stock. As 
for Pakistan, that state is estimated to have had enough HEU in stock (a figure like 130 - 220 kg) 
which would enable Pakistan to produce some 10 warheads. See, Albright et al., pp; 155 - 166.
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regime as that applying to exports of the five de jure nuclear-weapons states under 
Article III.2 of the NPT.368
ii... Technical Aspects of a Cut-Off Convention
Effectiveness and thus relevance of a cut-off treaty with regard to the efforts 
spent to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime will heavily depend on the 
verification provisions that will be stated in the treaty articles. There are concerns 
amongst the scholars, scientist, and policy makers as to which body would be 
responsible for carrying out such a burdensome process. And, the IAEA appears to 
be the best candidate for the time being, provided that its budget is at least doubled, 
or even tripled. This being said, the major problems in this respect are, first of all, 
whether a cut-off can be effectively verified by the organization that will be given 
this task; and, secondly, what overall verification approach should guide the 
verification provisions: a comprehensive IAEA-like approach, or one with a more 
streamlined nuclear facility targeted approach ? Such and other questions will find 
their answers during the multilateral discussions on the modalities of a cut-off 
convention.369 However, the concern of this study with the cited problems is to 
investigate whether the verification provisions of a cut-off will have a positive 
impact on the verification culture of the non-proliferation regime; and \vhether the 
current threshold states will be subject to comprehensive verifications of the IAEA in 
a foreseeable future.
368jsjprj’ ( j o e s  not require any safeguards on nuclear exports of the five nuclear-weapons states. 
369^ Group of Technical Experts, comparable to the Group of Scientific Experts established 
within the Conference on Disarmament to take on the CTBT issue, can be established to elaborate 
on the Cut-Off issue as well. The works of such a Group may also facilitate the inclusion of the 
threshold states into to the cut-off convention by paying special attention to their peculiar security 
considerations.
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iii... Cut-Off and Nuclear Non-Proliferation
A brief analysis of the fissile material cut-off issue revealed that a universal 
convention to cap further production, when considered within itself, should not 
imply high expectations in the name of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. Because, the already existing fissile materials at the disposals of non-NPT 
states, so far as they are not joined the NPT, will still suffice to endanger the 
international peace and security. However, a successfully drafted cut-off convention 
may attract the threshold states at first to join the convention and accept relatively 
more comprehensive IAEA verification when compared to the current IAEA job in 
these countries. And, then, at a second stage, these countries may be better 
persuaded to join either regional nuclear restraint agreements or adhere to the 
universal Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, a cut-off is high on the list of the arms 
control measures sought by the non-nuclear-weapons states. The conclusion of such 
a treaty would help substantitate the nuclear-weapons states' contention that they 
are carrying out their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. And, since a cut-off 
treaty would apply to both the nuclear haves and the have-nots alike, and should 
bring the entire civilian nuclear programmes of the nuclear-weapons states under 
IAEA safeguards, it would, in this sense, diminish the discriminatory aspects of the 
non-proliferation regime. On both counts, it would improve the prospects for a 
strengthened non-proliferation regime.370
E... Significance of Intelligence
Availability of accurate and reliable information about the activities of states in 
the field of nuclear energy is of utmost importance for the proper functioning of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime with all its aspects. Information constitutes the 
basis of all kinds of evaluations about the performance of the states and the regime 
itself. Short of reliable and sufficient information, no convincing verification can be
370see David Fischer, ibid., p. 27.
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fully implemented especially in the suspected states. No matter how stringent 
measures be adopted, unless the IAEA is supplied and makes use of accurate and 
timely information about the states, the outcome of inspections may not fully assure 
the international community about the healthy functioning of the non-proliferation 
regime. Because of its significance, this issue has been, from time to time, brought 
into the discussion tables at different levels in international gatherings. But, no 
substantial results have been obtained.
i... Problems with Supplying and Using Information
There are various causes for not making use of supplementary information 
about the activities of states. Part of these relate to the scarcity of national tehnical 
means all over the world. Such sophisticated technical means as satellites, remote 
sensors and the like are available only to small group of states. Another reason was 
the reluctance of the IAEA Board of Governors in counting on the information 
supplied to it -either directly communicated to the Agency, or the information that 
appeared in the media. Strong trust of the Board members to the accounting system 
that the Agency inspectors implemented during their routine inspections, 
undermined the significance of information made available to the Agency from 
elsewhere. The issue of using extraneous information has also been thought, by 
some of the influencial Board member states' representatitves (e.g., India) to be 
humiliating for the IAEA. Those holding a similar line of reasoning within the 
Agency circles further asserted that intelligence gathered through the technical 
means of such states as the United States might have been biased, and therefore 
untrustworthy. This has been the picture of the 1980s. But with the beginning of the 
1990s, the attitude of the IAEA authorities are changing though the pace is slow and 
difficulties remain.
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In the immediate aftermath of the discoveries of the clandestine nuclear 
weapons programme of Iraq, there was an upsurge of enthusiasm for making 
national intelligence data available to the IAEA so that it could improve its 
inspections. In February 1992, along with the Board's approval reaffirming the right 
of the IAEA to undertake special inspections, the Board "further reaffirmed the 
Agency's right to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations 
in accordance with the Agency's Statute and all comprehensive safeguards 
agreements."371 While this language has been taken from INFCIRC/153 and 
therefore could not be labeled as a new power or authority for the Agency, the 
interpretation of this wording was new. Accordingly, the Director General of the 
IAEA stated his intention to invite all member states to provide him with relevant 
information and he is further believed to be in favour of setting up an intelligence 
unit of the Agency in order to receive and evaluate the data.372 Some countries 
were upset with the idea that the Director General would solicit information from 
third parties. The Belgian representative to the Board of Governors noted there was 
a danger that the Agency might act upon doubtful, arbitrary, or biased information, 
and that the state against which information was directed might not have any 
opportunity to refute it or to justify itself. Others feared that the dominant source 
information would be the United States, turning the IAEA into a tool of Washington.
Although it has created too much anxiety in some circles, for a variety of 
reasons. Director General's proposal to establish an intelligence rmit not likely to lead 
to a substantial long-term increase in the flow of high-grade national intelligence 
information to the IAEA unless an appropriate restructuring can be achieved.
37 I1AEA Board of Governors, "Record of Seven Hundred and Seventy-Sixth Meeting", 
GOV/OR.776, April 9, 1992, p. 16.
372 jh is was a departure from the generally accepted past understanding that information 
regarding a country's nuclear activities would come only from the country in question, from 
IAEA activities in that country, or from data provided by a supplying country. See Kathleen 
Bailey, ibid., p. 71.
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Because, national intelligence communities may remain reluctant to provide, on a 
continuing basis, information to an international bureaucracy that does not even 
perform background checks on its own staff before or after hiring. It also seems 
difficult to expect national intelligence agencies to count much on the IAEA as an 
organization which has no real communications security, nor document storage that 
measures up to national secure storage standards. Furthermore, the IAEA is claimed 
to lack any counter-intelligence culture and capability.373
ii... Technical Means Available for Intelligence Gathering
Various means exist to gather intelligence on nuclear weapons programmes 
such as, NUCINT for nuclear intelligence, IMINT for imagery intelligence, COMINT 
for communications intelligence, and HUMINT for human intelligence. The most 
direct technical means of collecting intelligence on other nations' nuclear weapons 
programmes is through variety of sensors that fall in the NUCINT category. Such 
sensors which detect radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources, 
can be deployed on spacecraft, aircraft, ships, helicopters etc.. Fuel reprocessing 
plants can be monitored by the releases of krypton-85 gases, which are sufficiently 
large to be detectable at long distances. Similarly, plutonium production reactors can 
be detected by satellite infrared sensors. However, NUCINT sensors become much 
less valuable when the questions involve a nation's nuclear intensions, its efforts to 
acquire nuclear material and technology, research and development, or production 
work. None of such efforts give off signals detectable by technical sensors. In spite of 
the massive intelligence-gathering means at the disposition of several nations, 
including overhead reconnaissance and electronic intercepts, there may be serious 
deficiencies in the general assessment of a nation's nuclear programme, due to an 
inadequate devotion to human intelligence collection and an overreliance on
373see the criticisms and suggestions of David Kay in these matters. David Kay, "The IAEA: How 
Can It be Strengthened ?", in Mitchell Reiss & Robert S. Litwak (eds.), Nuclear Proliferation after 
the Cold War, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, 1994, p. 326.
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technical collection. Therefore, HUMINT can be potentially applied to suspected 
states' nuclear programmes in order to provide a level of understanding that would 
probably be unavailable from technical collection. Similarly, IMINT and COMINT 
can provide significant hard information (and a valuable check on HUMINT) on 
many aspects of suspected nuclear programmes. Gaseouos diffusion plants are 
reasonably conspicuous because of their large size and tremendous amounts of 
electricity that they use. Satellite imagery can show the presence of completed 
reactors, cooling towers, as well as facilities under construction. Moreover, 
communications between the different elements of a nuclear programme and 
between different elements and higher authority are subject to interception by space 
and other COMINT systems.3'74
iii... Suegestions for Making Use of Intelligence Facilities
If an effective coordination can be sustained between the IAEA and the 
advanced national technical means of states that possess them, there can be no doubt 
that the non-proliferation regime will function much more effectively. For this to 
happen, the necessary institutions should be established that would make it possible 
for the Agency and its member states to rely on the accuracy of the intelligence 
supplied. This can be in the form of a special unit to be established within the 
Agency, and consisting of qualified personnel experienced in intelligence gathering 
and evaluating issues. Their existence may make the national intelligence agencies of 
the IAEA member states share their findings with that special unit. There was 
endeed such a proposal in 1992 to set up a small staff dedicated to intelligence 
assessments. However, this did not materialize primarily because of political
a detailed coverage in these respects see, Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Can the Intelligence 
Community Keep Pace with the Threat ?", in Mitchell Reiss & Robert S. Litwak (eds.). Nuclear 
Proliferation after the Cold War, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
Washington, 1994, pp: 291-308
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opposition from nations fearful that the assesments would facilitate domination of 
less developed South by the highly industrialized North.375
In this regard the suggestion of David Kay as an experienced IAEA staff 
member also worths noting here. According to Kay, the UN Charter does provide 
an institutional mechanism that holds considerable promise for harnessing national 
intelligence efforts to international objectives. This is the Military Staff Committee 
envisaged by Article 47 of the Charter. This body, which was rendered moribund by 
the Cold War, is composed of representatives of all five permanant members of the 
UN Security Council and can be supplemented by other countries if needed.3^6 
can also create subsidiary bodies. It would be appropriate to consider creating a Joint 
Intelligence Staff (JIS) under the Military Staff Committee, which would be the focal 
point for screening, analyzing, and reporting to the appropriate UN bodies those 
developments that might lead to threats to international peace and stability. The JIS 
would be the body responsible for protecting the sources and methods involved in 
collecting the information and for providing the Security Council and the IAEA with 
the necessary interpretative skills for understanding the data. In the case of 
information relating to nuclear proliferation, such a Joint Intelligence Staff could 
relay the information to the IAEA after having screened the information for its 
relevance and quality.377
F... Secuhtii Assurances
Measures envisaged so far, in order to prevent states from acquiring nuclear 
weapons (or the necessary nuclear infrastructure that may, one day in the future, be 
exploited to assemble nuclear weapons), mostly included prohibitive actions. This,
her comments see, Bailey, ibid., p. 73.
376a  selection criterion may be applied similar to the one adopted for selecting the IAEA Board 
of Governors members 
377p)avid Kay, ibid., p. 327.
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indeed, is a natural result of taking into consideration the incentives for states to 
pursue nuclear ambitions which emanate from various security considerations. 
Taking also into consideration that not all of the states, but a few, would be 
determined to seek for nuclear weapons capability regardless of the reactions of the 
rest of the world, several measures which may make the majority of states feel 
much safer would probably be effective in preventing an increase in the number of 
the determined states in the future. These measures may not have to be prohibitive, 
but rather persuasive by providing them with strong assurances against the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons. Two such measures exist, namely positive and 
negative security assurances, of which the former means a commitment by a 
nuclear-^veapons state to come to help a states in case an actual use or a threat of use 
of nuclear weapons occurs against that state. Whereas, the latter denotes a 
commitment of a nuclear-weapons states that they will not use nuclear weapons 
against a non-nuclear weapons states provided that these states fulfil certain 
conditions (e.g., being a state party to the NPT or regional/multilateral nuclear 
restraint agreements such as the Tlatelolco Treaty etc..).
So far, all of the five de jure nuclear-weapons states have formally declared 
unilateral security assurances either by their representatives in the United Nations or 
by their foreign ministeries. The common point in these declarations was that they 
would not use nuclear weapons states against those states which renounced the 
production and acquisition of such weapons.^78 Moreover, as a consequence of the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, the five nuclear-weapons states being also the five 
permanent members of UN Security Council have issued, on 5 December 1994 in 
Budapest, memoranda on security assurances in connection with the accessions of
378The Soviet Union, in the statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 26 May 1978, 
further emphasized the non-deployment as important a condition as non-possession of nuclear 
weapons on the territories of states for making assurances effective. Official Records o f  the 
General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 5th meeting, paragraphs 84 - 85.
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the nuclear-weapons capable fornaer Soviet Republics (i.e., Kazakhstan, Ukraine and 
Belarus) to the Non-Proliferation Treaty having the status of non-nuclear-weapons 
states. In these memoranda the five nuclear-weapons states reaffirmed their 
commitment not to use nuclear weapons against them as they become party to the 
NPT as non-nuclear-weapons states. The five nuclear powers also reaffirmed their 
commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide 
assitance to these republics if they should become victims of an act of aggression or 
an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
There already exists a UN Security Council Resolution379 same respect
which recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such 
aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would create a situation in which the 
Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapons state permanent members, 
would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the UN 
Char ter .3^0 Morover, in 1992, to deter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
the President of the UN Security Council stated, on behalf of its members, that such 
proliferation would constitute a "threat to international peace and security", and that 
appropriate action would be taken to prevent it. However, this statement of the 
President of the UNSC has no binding legal effect. It should be converted into a 
formal decision of the Council to have such effect. The Council would then be 
entitled to take coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Security assurances represent an important issue on the diplomatic agenda of 
the post-Cold War international system. Achievements of security assurances in the 
name of persuading states to refrain from nuclear option in their military structuring
2^9Resolution 255 (1968). Adopted by the Security Council on 19 June 1968.
380\yith tj,jg Resolution the Security Council reaffirmed the inherent right of individual and 
collective self-defense, as recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, if an armed attack ocurs 
against a member of the UN until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.
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will strengthen efforts to address security concerns particularly in the Middle East 
and South Asia. The Arab states of the Middle East, for instance, attribute a vital 
importance to a renewed and effective positive security assurance that would be 
pledged by the five nuclear-weapons states as one of the prinicipal conditions for the 
establishment of a Middle East Nuclear-Weeapon-Free Zone.381 However, 
providing negative security assurance for supporting the establishment and effective 
functioning of NWFZs is more in the interest of nuclear-weapons states because of 
various political considerations.382 accordance with other developments in the 
nuclear non-proliferation field i.e., achieving a CTBT and a Cut-Off as well as an 
effective export control system, those steps which do not appear to be thinkable 
today may become feasible and more enhanced with the updated pledges of positive 
and negative security assurances of the nuclear-weapons states. Such an occurrance 
would surely contribute more to the maintenance of international peace and 
stability.
381See, Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Verification Provisions of a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in the 
Middle East with Special Reference to EURATOM and ABACC, The Turkish Yearbook o f  
International Relations, Ankara University Press, (forthcoming); See also, Mustafa Kibaroglu, 
"EURATOM and ABACC: Safeguard Models for the Middle East" in Jan Prawitz and James F. 
Leonard (eds.), A Zone Free o f  Weapons o f  Mass Destruction in the Middle East, UNIDIR 
Research Report, New York & Geneva, pp: 93 - 123.
382j^ggarding the de facto  nuclear-weapon status of Israel, it does not seem plausible to suggest 
the United States to provide positive security assurance to its Arab allies against Israel at the 
expense of detoriating its relations with this strategic ally. Neither India would like to depend on a 
Chinese security assurance as an apriori for a NWFZ in South Asia.
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CONCLUSION
This study tried to find out what would be the measures which would be 
effective in the struggle against the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons 
throughout the world. The existence of general principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures in this regard has formed the background of this study. Hence, 
the study of theory of international regimes provided valuable insights as to how 
the international efforts that culminated in the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
could be rendered more effective. In this respect, the writings of the leading scholars 
in the field of regimes theory suggested that, effectiveness of international regimes 
are closely linked, inter alia, to the effectiveness of the elements constituting the 
regime. Moreover, the importance of perception of actors that belong to the regime 
is also emphasized in the same context. In the light of the theory of international 
regimes, the need for overhauling the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime 
became obvious. Accordingly, the phases that the elements of the regime have 
passed through are investigated. The comprehensive research divulged the 
following results:
Essential elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (e.g., the NPT, and 
the IAEA Statute and its safeguards documents) have come about as the products of 
the lengthy deliberations in various international gatherings. These inter-state 
negotiations have mostly suffered divergence of views about the proposals for 
effective verification provisions. Thus, consensus on what would be an effective 
mandate for the IAEA was hardly attained in such meetings; sensitivity of states to 
their sovereignty, ideological confrontations, and the discriminatory norm of the 
non-proliferation regime between the nuclear haves and the have-nots, prevailed as 
major impediments to concluding more intrusive and more effective measures for 
verifying compliance of states with their basic undertakings; irreconcilable security
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considerations of various states emanating mostly from regional threat perceptions 
and manifold motivations of some radical regimes to acquire nuclear weapons 
complicated the task of settling up effective mechanisms for controlling the 
development of nuclear energy. Consequently, the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
suffered from loopholes and shortcomings.
Contrary to the inability of the regime to encompass the militarily significant 
states, regional non-proliferation initiatives appeared as feasible alternatives for 
associating them with the non-proliferation principle. Nuclear-weapon-free zones 
and the zones of peace, as well as bilateral nuclear restraint agreements cherished 
the ideal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. For instance, the African continent is in the 
process of becoming a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Adherence of South Africa to the 
NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state abolished the obstacles on the way to the 
Pelindaba Treaty. The South Pacific is also becoming a nuclear-free zone in the real 
sense of the word. Because, in the past, regardless the declaration of the states in the 
South Pacific, the nuclear-free status of the region was not respected by the nuclear- 
weapons-states and particularly France conducted scores of nuclear tests.383 phe 
Argentine-Brazilian bilateral nuclear non-proliferation initiative which culminated in 
the Quadripartite Agreement revealed the significance of democratization and 
rational leadership for giving up nuclear ambitions. Moreover, the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America has 
become more effective with the ratification of these two significant states .
The study on the zonal agreements also revealed that the effectiveness and 
usefulness of such arrangements depend, to a great extent, on the attitudes of the 
nuclear-weapon-capable states {de jure or de facto) towards the zones. For instance.
383jhe pace of developments towards completing a comprehensive nuclear test ban affected the 
attitude of these states.
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relentless arms race between the "superpowers" and their strategic relations within 
the military alliances made it difficult for them to refrain from deploying their 
nuclear forces almost anywhere on the globe.384 Similarly, the existence of the so 
called de facto nuclear-weapons states in South Asia (India and Pakistan) and the 
Middle East (Israel) still make the establishment of such zones in these regions 
extremely difficult. The chain reaction of political, cultural, and religious factors 
obstructed any prospects in these respects. Hence, these examples demonstrated 
that political decisions prevailed in the debate for taking technically feasible 
measures against nuclear proliferation. Nonetheless, EURATOM instructed those 
who sought really effective and intrusive verification provisions in order to secure 
nuclear non-proliferation despite the political pressures from both inside and 
outside. EURATOM thus stood as an example of self-denial of a group of states that 
were politically and technologically capable to manufacture nuclear weapons.
Throughout the research it became equally obvious that, in the aftermath of 
the Cold War, it is uncertain whether the world will become a more secure place to 
live or not. The end of world-wide ideological confrontation between East and West 
is said to bring the so called North-South confrontation into the fore in world 
politics. In such a circumstance, advanced non-nuclear-weapon states of the North 
may feel threatened by the clandestine exploitation of nuclear energy by the states 
of the South. Hence, states from the North may decide to go nuclear should they 
anticipate that nothing could stop states from the South from acquiring nuclear 
weapons potential. As a matter of fact, with the advanced levels of technology at all 
respects, it would not take more than several months for states of the North to 
manufacture and stockpile a score of nuclear weapons together with their delivery 
vehicles. The likelihood of this briefly mentioned scenario is the 'nightmare' of many
^^4one exception was Antarctica where heavy military deployment would have serious 
repercussions.
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policy makers as well as scholars \vhile, however, it impels them to search for 
feasible solutions to the nuclear predicament. Consequently, the research on what 
else should or could be done to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
principally revealed that the existing mandate of the IAEA had to be reconsidered so 
as to vitalize the power of the Agency which is sometimes obliquely stated in the 
terms of the NPT and the related safeguards document INFCIRC/153. Hopefully, 
there are signs in this respect. The project undertaken within the IAEA by a group of 
experts, namely the "Programme 93+2" is a valuable work. It is hoped that the 
proceedings of the project will clarify more precisely what really is conferred to the 
IAEA in the internationally agreed documents, especially with regard to its power to 
conduct special inspections in the suspected installations of states party to the NPT 
regardless whether they are declared to the Agency or not. To complement such 
internal restorations within the regime elements, external steps should also be taken 
such as concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban as well as a universal ban on 
the production of fissile material. Otherwise, it will certainly be very difficult to 
hinder the nuclear-weapons-capable states of the South to develop advanced 
generations of nuclear weapons (thermo-nuclear weapons which definitely require 
testing). These states may then be more willing and ready to transfer their first 
generation nuclear weapon manufacturing technologies to new aspiring states of the 
South. In that case, no matter how many sophisticated weapons are held in the 
arsenals of advanced states, they may not be capable of deterring the leaderships of 
the less developed states which may then possess first generation nuclear explosives. 
With the present level of nuclear technology such 'crude' nuclear explosives need not 
being tested. Given that fissile material and know-how are relatively more accessible 
today, first generation nuclear explosives may thus become the "poor man's atomic 
bomb" instead of chemical weapons, as they are usedto be.385
^^•^Chemical weapons, which require much less investment and sophistication in manufacturing 
technologies, and which necessitate much more easily obtainable ingredients from the
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Thus, if states fail to "plug the leaks" in the export control provisions and 
further institutionalize these "gentlemen's agreements", then the free flow of 
weapons-grade nuclear material, if coupled with the scientific and technical 
assistance, may eventually result in an increase in the number of de facto nuclear- 
weapons states around the globe. In addition to these measures, the extremely 
sophisticated technological products in the field of communications and intelligence 
gathering should be made available to states so that they should serve the non­
proliferation ideal. The good-old ideological oppositions to reliance on the 
information supplied by such states as the United States or France should be put 
aside. Such oppositions should not become an instrument to cover the clandestine 
operations of several states. Instead, ways for making effective and accurate use of 
dependable intelligence data should be explored. All in all, concerted action of states 
at all respects should be achieved. Otherwise, future generations may have to live in a 
world o f nuclear crowd.
international markets, are long treated as powerful deterrents as nuclear weapons for those states 
which could not afford a clandestine nuclear weapons programme.
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APPENDIX A. CHARACTERISTICS OF ATOMIC BOMBS
Atoms consist of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Protons and neutrons bond 
together strongly to form a nucleus, and electrons orbit around them. The number 
of protons gives an atom its unique identity and a family name. All uranium atoms, 
for instance, have 92 protons, hence any atom with 92 protons must be a uranium 
atom. If a proton is added to an atom or taken from it, the atom's identity changes 
completely. Neutrons, on the other hand, can vary in quantity in the same kind of 
atom. For instance, some uranium atoms have 143 neutrons, while some have 146 
neutrons. Atoms of the same family are called isotopes. The uranium isotope U-235, 
which is very rare in nature, is made up of 92 protons and 143 neutrons, whereas the 
more common isotope U-238 has 92 protons and 146 neutrons. A nuclear weapon is 
a device in which most or all of the explosive energy is derived from either fission, 
or fusion, or a combination of the two nuclear processes. Nuclear fission is the 
splitting of the nucleus of an atom into two or more parts. In nuclear fusion, 
however, light isotopes of hydrogen, usually deuterium and tritium, do join at high 
temperatures and similarly liberate energy and neutrons.
n... Fission lUeapons
The basic nuclear weapon is the fission weapon (originally called the A-bomb) 
which relies entirely on a fission chain reaction to produce a very large amount of 
energy in a very short time -roughly a millionth of a second - and therefore a very 
powerful explosion.3^^ Nuclear fission occurs when a neutron enters the nucleus of 
an atom. Many heavy atomic nuclei are capable of being fissioned, but only a 
fraction of these are. fissile, which means fissionable by neutrons with a wide range 
of velocities. It is this property of the fissile material principally highly enriched
386Frank Barnaby, How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s. 
Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p. 27.
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uranium U-235 and plutonium Pu-239, that allows a chain reaction to be achieved in 
weapons employing the fission process.387 Highly enriched uranium or plutonium 
atoms, when bombarded by neutrons, do split, release energy and emit additional 
neutrons. In a controlled chain reaction, the previously emitted neutrons hit the 
previously splitted atoms by further splitting them into lighter atoms and releasing 
tremendous energy.388 With each successive fission generation additional energy is 
released, and, if the fission of one nucleus induces an average of more than one 
fission in the following generation, the energy yield of each generation is 
multiplied.389
The U-235 isotope of uranium is highly unstable, and this property makes it 
easier to split than the other uranium U-238 isotope. In a reactor, a neutron which is 
fired at a U-235, attaches itself to the atom, increasing its instability, which in turn 
causes the atom to split and release energy. The same neutron directed at a more 
stable U-238 atom would likely be absorbed without fissioning (i.e., without causing 
split). In a reactor, many neutrons are intercepted by U-238 atoms, and others are 
absorbed by the atoms of other materials in the reactor. Still others escape from the 
reactor completely. In sum, the fission process might be imagined as involving the 
following components:
1.. . the targets, i.e., the U-235 atoms, whose capture and fissioning releases 
atomic energy;
2.. . the arrozus, i.e., the neutrons, which attack the U-235 targets or seek to 
escape;
387jn theory. Thorium (Th), as another fissile material, can also be used. When the nucleus of the 
isotope Th-232 captures a neutron becomes Th-233 which undergoes radioactive decay to U-233 
which is fissile like U-235 or Pu-239. However, Thorium has not been used in nuclear weapons. 
388pissioning of one kilogram of uranium releases as much energy as the burning of 2,000 tons 
of coal. See, Anthony Nero, A Guidebook to Nuclear Reactors, Berkeley, University o f  California 
Press, 1979, p. 4.
389y\ fission explosion in the range of 1 to 100 Kt for example, would occur over a few 
microseconds and involve over fifty generations with 99.9 percent of the energy released coming 
in the last seven.
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3.. . the interceptors, i.e., the U-238 atoms, which defend the U-235 targets by 
absorbing neutron arrows.
The fissioning of a U-235 atom in turn releases two or three of its own 
neutrons. If at least one of these is successful in splitting another U-235 atom, a self- 
sustaining chain reaction will be established which wiU produce a steady output of 
energy in a nuclear reactor. The two parts into which a fissioned uranium nucleus 
splits are called fission products, and are normally radioactive isotopes.
1.. . Moderators
If a chain reaction involves enough atoms in a fraction of a second, as in a 
nuclear bomb, a tremendous explosion results. Without human intervention, the 
situation is not favourable for sustained fissioning of U-235 atom. Since, as noted 
earlier, the U-235 isotope is rare in nature, whereas the U-238 isotope is 140 times 
more common in natural uranium than the U-235 isotope. The rare U-235 isotopes 
are well defended by the abundant U-238 isotopes. Hence, neutrons which are 
normally too fast, can hardly attach themselves to U-235 isotopes to split them. To 
overcome such obstacles, several methods are available for slowing down the 
neutrons. In a nuclear reactor this is done by means of moderators which are 
materials as either light-water, or heavy-water, or graphite, that surrounds the nuclear 
fuel in the reactor core.
When neutrons collide with the heavy water or graphite atoms, they decelerate 
to a speed that greatly improves their chances of attaching to a U-235 atom and 
causing it to break apart. In reactors moderated by these materials, no other 
adjustments are necessary to make fission possible. When light (ordinary) water is 
used as a moderator, however, some neutrons are slowed, but others are absorbed 
by the light-water itself. Because ordinary water is plentiful and cheap when
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compared to heavy-water which is costly and very difficult to make, light-water is 
the preferred moderating material. To make use of light water, the proportion of U- 
235 in the reactor should be higher in order to increase the likelihood of a successful 
chain reaction. Therefore, in light-water reactors, uranium used must be enriched in 
U-235. In case the percentage of U-235 atoms in the reactor fuel is increased to 90 
percent or higher, neutrons become able to fission U-235 without being slowed by a 
moderator. Hence, the use of fast neutrons and highly enriched uranium is the 
characteristic of nuclear bombs and of the so-called fast reactors.390
ii... Uranium. Plutonium & Thorium
Another important event in the reactor core that increases the chances of 
successful fission is the transforming action of attacking neutrons. It was already 
noted that neutrons that are unsuccessful in splitting U-235 atoms are absorbed by 
U-238 atoms or other materials, or they escape the reactor entirely. Indeed, the 
neutrons captured by U-238 are not entirely wasted. Having failed to find and split a 
U-235 nucleus, these neutrons serve to convert the nonfissile U-238 into fissile 
plutonium Pu-239. This conversion process, too, like enrichment process requires 
successful achievement of several steps and sophistication. Once this transmutation 
is achieved, another fissile target has been created for other flying neutrons to 
attack. In fact, approximately 30 percent of the power generated by a nuclear reactor 
comes from the fissioning of plutonium created through this transmutation process. 
The same process takes place when thorium, which is occasionally used in nuclear 
fuel, absorbs a neutron and eventually creates U-233 as another fissile material. 
Nature supplies only one fissile isotope U-235, but scientists have created two others.
contrast to heavy-water and graphite moderated reactors, which use natural uranium as fuel, 
a light-water moderated reactor would necessitate use of low-enriched uranium, implying that an 
enrichment capability may be available. If so, highly enriched uranium could, in theory, be 
produced, obviating the need for plutonium as a weapons material. It is also possible that a state 
might import fuel for a light-water reactor under IAEA inspection, and after using the material to 
produce electricity, reprocess it to extract plutonium. Although IAEA rules would require the 
country involved to place any such plutonium under IAEA monitoring, the state might one day 
abrogate its IAEA obligations and seize that material for use in nuclear arms.
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namely Pu-239 and U-233. All three are useful in varying degrees for generating 
nuclear power, and all three can contribute to a nuclear explosive capability.
iii... Critical Mass
Atomic bombs are designed to keep the fission process going until their 
materials are so hot that they vaporize, reach a very high pressure, and then 
explode. The uncontrolled fissioning process in a nuclear bomb is possible only 
when a certain amount of fissile material, called critical mass, is present. At sub- 
critical amounts of fissile material, many neutrons escape and leave too few 
neutrons available to fission other atomic nuclei. A critical mass of nuclear material, 
however, is large enough to maintain a nuclear reaction even after neutrons are lost 
to the outside environment. The critical mass depends on a number of factors: first, 
the nuclear properties of the material used for fission, whether it is U-235 or Pu-239; 
second, the shape^^l of the material; third, the density^92 of the material: fourth, 
the purity of the material; and fifth, the physical surrounding of the material used 
for fission.
Since, the critical mass of material necessary to sustain a chain reaction may be 
lowered by increasing the material's density through comipression, or by surrounding 
it with reflectors to minimize the escape of neutrons, it is therefore difficult to pin 
down the precise amount of uranium or plutonium required for a bomb.393 p^vo
391a  sphere is the optimum shape because, for a given mass the surface is minimized , which in 
turn minimizes the number of neutrons escaping through the surface per unit time.
392phe higher the density the shorter the average distance travelled by a neutron causing another 
fission and therefore the smaller the critical mass.
393phe critical mass of, for example, a sphere of pure Pu-239 metal having a density of 19.8 
grams pier cubic centimeter (the densest for of the metal) is about 10 kilograms. The radius of the 
sphere is about 5 centimeters. If the plutonium sphere is surrounded by a natural uranium 
neutron reflector, about 10 centimeters thick, the critical mass is reduced to about 4.4 kilograms, 
having the shape of a sphere of radius of about 3.6 centimeters. A 32-centimeter thick beryllium 
reflector reduces the critical mass of densest Pu-239 to about 2.5 kilograms, with a sphere of 
radius of 3.1 centimeters. For detail see, Frank Bamaby, ibid., p. 28.
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basic nuclear fission weapons design approaches that are used to achieve a 
supercritical mass, are:
a. .. the implosion technique
A peripheral charge of chemical high explosive is uniformly detonated to 
compress a subcritical mass of plutonium or highly enriched uranium into a 
supercritical configuration. When the conventional explosives surrounding the sub- 
critical mass of nuclear material are detonated simultaneously, the pressure on the 
central core of nuclear material is so great that it compresses the material to 
criticality. Under appropriate conditions, the rate at which fissions occur then 
increases greatly and energy is released so rapidly that a nuclear explosion results;
b. .. the gun assembly technique
Two or more subcritical masses of highly enriched uranium (plutonium cannot 
be used) are propelled together by a conventional explosion, resulting in a 
supercritical mass. The conventional high explosives used to compress the spherical 
fissile core of a nuclear weapon are one of the most crucial components. If the 
compression is not symmetrical or rapid enough the nuclear explosion will not reach 
its predicted explosive yield.394 Normally, the more explosive charges there are the 
more perfect is the spherical symmetry of the shock wave.
In both cases, the conventional explosive used to compress the fissile material 
at sub-critical level, is placed outside a tamper (converter). The tamper has two 
functions: first, since the tamper is made of heavy metal, its inertia helps hold 
together the plutonium or highly enriched uranium to prevent the premature 
disintegration of the fissioning material and thereby obtain a greater efficiency. 
Second, the tamper converts the divergent detonation wave into a convergent shock
394 bomb dropped on Hiroshima was of this type.
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wave to compress the plutonium or highly enriched uranium sphere. The tamper 
may also serve to reflect back into the fissile material some of the neutrons which 
escaped through the surface of the fissile material core to minimize the mass of that 
material needed.395
B... Fusion lUeapons
If explosions in the range of a few thousands of kilotons are required, that 
extra high energy can be obtained from fusion. The fusion process is the opposite of 
fission. Fusion of light atomic nuclei requires a high density of fusion material and an 
extraordinary amount of heat (hundred million degrees or so), both of which are 
provided by a fission explosion in a thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb. Lithium-6  
deuteride is the most widely used thermonuclear material, serving as a source of 
both deuterium and tritium, the atoms whose nuclei merge, in a fusion weapon. 
There is no critical mass for the fusion process, therefore, in theory, there is no limit 
to the explosive yield of fusion weapons.
In a boosted weapon, fusion material is introduced directly into or next to the 
core of fissile material, improving the efficiency of a fusion weapon and thus 
increasing the yield of a given quantity of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. 
Although energy is released in the fusion reaction of a boosted weapon, the primary 
contribution of the fusion material to the explosion is that it provides additional 
neutrons for the fission process and therefore allows a more rapidly multiplying 
chain reaction to occur. Other thermonuclear weapons are designed to capitalize on 
the energy released in a secondary fusion reaction triggered by a primary fission 
explosion. In such devices, fusion material is kept physically separate from a fissile or
395in some designs the reflector is of a different material from the tamper, in which case the 
plutonium sphere is surrounded by another spherical shell, situated between the plutonium and 
the tamper. Beryllium is a good neutron reflecting material. See, Frank Bamaby, ibid., pp: 30 -
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boosted fissile core that compresses and ignites it. Additional stages of fusion or 
fission material may be included to augment the weapon's yield, with each layer 
being triggered by ones closer to the core. The hydrogen bomb includes a third 
stage or blanket of natural uranium, that is a widely available fissionable but not 
fissile material, which is fissioned by fast neutrons from the primary fission and 
secondary fusion reactions. Hence, the energy released in the explosion of such a 
device stems from three sources: a fission chain reaction; burning of the 
thermonuclear fuel; and fission of the U-238 blanket. Very roughly, fission and 
fusion reactions generate the both halves of the total energy.
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APPENDIX B. MANUFACTURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS &
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
A nation seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons must complete a number of 
essential, often extremely demanding steps.
1 .. . it must develop a design for its nuclear device or obtain such a design from 
another state;
2 .. . it must produce the fissile material for the core of the device or obtain it from 
external source and must then machine the fissile material to fabricate the nuclear 
parts of the weapon;
3 .. . it must fabricate, or obtain from outside, the non-nuclear parts of the device, 
including the high-explosive elements and triggering components that will detonate 
the nuclear core;
4 .. . it must verify (test) the reliability of these various elements individually and 
as a system; and
5 .. . it must assemble all of these elements into a deliverable nuclear armament.
fl... Design of an Atomic Bomb
It is generally accepted today that designing an atomic bomb, that is drawing 
its blueprints, is within the capabilities of quite a number of nations. Several states 
are believed to have received nuclear weapons design informations or assistance 
from other states. France and Israel, for example, are believed to have collaborated 
on the design of French nuclear weapons, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, after 
which France is thought to have provided Israel with information from a number of 
its nuclear tests. China, similarly, is believed to have provided Pakistan with the 
design of the nuclear device that it detonated in its fourth nuclear test, which 
involved firing of a nuclear-armed missile. India, however, apparently designed the 
plutonium-based implosion device that it detonated in 1974 \vithout outside
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assistance, and South Africa also apparently designed its uranium-based gun-type 
nuclear weapons without foreign aid.396
B. .. Bcquirinq Fissile Material
The major technical barrier to making a nuclear device is obtaining the fissile 
material, i.e., the weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, for the weapons core. How 
much would be needed for a nuclear weapons depends on the technical capabilities 
of the country involved and the size of the weapon it sought to produce. 
International Atomic Energy Agency regulations assume that 25 kg of weapons- 
grade (i.e., highly enriched) uranium or 8 kg of plutonium are the minimum 
amounts needed to manufacture a nuclear device with a yield of 20 Kilotons, 
roughly the size of the Nagazaki bomb. However, by utilizing more sophisticated 
designs that rely on high compression of the core material, a state could build such a 
weapon with considerably less material. According to one recent estimate, a country 
possessing a low technical capability could build a 20  kilotons device with only 6 kg 
of plutonium or 16 kg of highly enriched uranium. A state with high technical 
capability, on the other hand, could potentially build such a device with as little as 5 
kg of highly enriched uranium or 3 kg of plutonium. Moreover, a 1 Kt device, which 
would require considerable sophistication to manufacture, might need only about 
half these amounts397
C. .. Nuclear Fuel Ciicle
The diversion of natural uranium into weapons-usable uranium requires 
several steps, which is usually called nuclear fuel cycle. In the basic cycle, uranium is
396see^ Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear 
Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts. 1995, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington D.C., 1995.
Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount o f  Plutonium and Highly- 
Enriched Uranium Needed fo r  Pure Nuclear Weapons, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Washington D.C., 1994.
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mined, refined, processed into an appropriate chemical form, converted into fuel 
rods, fissioned (burned) in a reactor, and stored as waste. However, variations of 
this cycle are necessary to accommodate different reactor types. The uranium 
enrichment stage, for example, is needed to prepare fuel for use in light-water 
reactors, whereas heavy-water production is the prerequisite of supplying the 
moderator for heavy-water reactors, unless heavy-water is acquired from external 
sources.398 jn addition, both reactor types may operate on a once-thwugh fuel cycle 
(spent fuel is not recycled), or on a plutonium fuel cycle, which provides for extraction 
and re-use of plutonium spent fuel rods. This extraction process is an additional 
sensitive stage in the fuel cycle known as reprocessing.399
For illustrative purposes, the basic nuclear resources and facilities that would be 
needed to produce weapons-grade uranium indigenously include:
1 .. . uranium deposits;
2 .. . a uranium mine;
3 .. . a uranium mill for processing ore usually less than one percent uranium 
into uranium oxide concentrate, or as usually called yellow cake;
4.. . a conversion plant for purifying yellow cake and converting it into uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6)/ or uranium tetrachloride (UCI4) the material processed in the 
enrichment plant;
^98^|though technically not part of a fuel cycle, heavy-water production is important as an 
important auxiliary component of the heavy-water reactor fuel. Because reactors moderated by 
heavy water can fission natural uranium, the expensive and difficult step of enriching uranium is 
unnecessary. Heavy-water production is itself a difficult process, but is not beyond the capability 
of most industrialized nations. The United States, Canada, Russia, and Norway are the producers 
of heavy-water, and India is the world leader in the production of this material. Several hundreds 
of cubic meters of heavy waters are used to moderate a medium-sized heavy-water reactor.
399yj,e plutonium fuel cycle inflicted a debate among the scientists. The proponents argue that it 
requires far less fresh uranium fuel and produces lower quantities of nuclear waste than a once- 
through fuel cycle. Opponents claim that waste levels under the two are similar. More 
significantly, opponents worry that the huge amounts of recycled plutonium made available at 
power plants all over the world would significantly increase the chances of illicit purposes. They 
point out that all fissile material in the once-through fuel cycle remains in a form not directly 
usable for weapons. See, Anthony Nero, ibid., also see, Gary T. Gardner, Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: A Primer, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1994,
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5 .. . an enrichment plant for enriching the uranium hexafluoride gas or uranium 
tetrachloride in the isotope U-235;
6 .. . a capability for converting the enriched uranium hexafluoride gas or 
uranium tetrachloride into solid uranium oxide or metal.^ OO
1.. . Mining & Milling
Uranium ore is found in places close to the earth’s surface, and must be mined 
like any other mineral. Excavated uranium ore is milled to separate uranium from 
foreign matter. The uranium is then processed into a chemical form U3 O8 called 
yellow cake, named for its amber color. The world leaders in uranium mining and 
milling are Canada, the United States, Australia, France, Niger, Namibia, and South 
Africa. According to the London based Uranium Institute, excluding the former 
Soviet Union and the P. R. of China, a total of 28,360 tons of uranium were produced 
commercially in 1990, considerably less than the 43,800 tons produced in 1980 (the 
average annual production in the 1980s was 38,200 tons).4^1 About 5,000 kilograms 
of natural uranium are needed to produce the 25 kg of weapons-grade uranium for 
one atomic bomb.
ÍÍ... Conversion
At the conversion stage, the processed natural uranimn is converted to a form 
usable in a nuclear reactor. If the material is intended for use in a heavy-water 
reactor which burns natural (nonenriched) uranium, it is converted to uranium 
metal or uranium dioxide (UO2 ). Uranium destined for light-water reactors is 
converted to uranium hexafluoride, a gas suitable for the enrichment process.
40Orhe conversion of uranium hexafluoride into uranium oxide or metal is often associated with 
a yellowcake-to-hexafluoride conversion plant.
^Canada accounted for 30 percent of the total uranium produced in 1990 (in seven uranium 
mines); the United States for 14 percent (in eleven mines) Australia for 12 percent (in two mines); 
Namibia for 11 percent (in one mine); France and Niger for 10 percent each (in thirty-five 
mines); South Africa for 9 percent (in seven mines); and Gabon for 2.4 percent (in one mine). 
For details, see Frank Barnaby, How Nuclear Weapons Spread ..., p. 4.
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iii... Enrichment
To make weapon from uranium, the unstable U-235 isotope of uranium is 
used. Since natural uranium consists of less than one percent of U-235 
(approximately 0.7 percent), while in nuclear weapons 90 percent or more of U-235 
must be used, the percentage of natural uranium must be upgraded or enriched at 
an enrichment plant to achieve this concentration. Indeed, technically a weapon 
could be made of uranium enriched to more than 20 percent.402 Because U-235 and 
U-238 are chemically identical, it is necessary to use a physical method to separate 
and enrich them. Uranium enrichment is a highly complex process and requires 
considerable investment. For this reason, the uranium enrichment route was 
generally considered a less likely path to proliferation than the plutonium option.403 
Enriched uranium can also be used as a fuel in nuclear power reactors, research 
reactors, or naval propulsion reactors. The power reactors used in the United States 
and most other countries that are called light-water reactors use low-enriched 
uranium fuel (i.e., uranium that has been enriched from 3 to 5 percent U-235.404 
Thus, a country can have entirely legitimate, non-weapons related reasons for 
developing uranium enrichment technology even though the same technology can 
be used to upgrade uranium to the high enrichment level useful for nuclear 
weapons. On the other hand, developing a sizeable independent uranium 
enrichment capability is economically justifiable only for nations with large domestic 
nuclear power programs or significant potential export markets.405 Several
402^ 3 n practical matter, material enriched to more than 90 percent is preferred. For instance, the 
bombed dropped on Hiroshima used uranium enriched to 80 percent. Similarly, South Africa's 
first nuclear device used material enriched to 80 percent for the first device and 90 percent for the 
remaining 5 nuclear weapons.
403y\^rgentina, Brazil, Iraq. South Africa, and Pakistan with extensive aid obtained mostly by 
clandestine means, all selected uranium enrichment capabilities. India and Israel, although they 
have relied on the production of plutonium for their nuclear weapons capabilities, have also 
conducted research on uranium enrichment. India is known to have two experimental plants. The 
status of Israel's enrichment program is not publicly known. For details and the current status of 
these efforts, some of which have been terminated, see Leonard S. Spector et al, ibid., 
404jgchj^jcaiiy, low enriched uranium is defined as uranium enriched to less than 20  percent in 
the isotope U -235. Such material cannot be used in the core of a nuclear device.
405gggause highly enriched uranium is sometimes used to fuel research reactors, a nation can 
have legitimate reasons for obtaining quantities of this material, despite its usefulness in nuclear
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methods have been developed for enriching uranium, all of which ultimately rely on 
differentiating among the isotopes of uranium and isolating material with increased 
concentrations of U-235.
a. .. gaseous diffusion method
The most widely used eruichment method, gaseous diffusion dates back to the 
Manhattan Project. Uranium in a gaseous form, i.e., uranium hexafluoride, is forced 
through a series of membranes of a huge container. Each membrane allows the 
lighter U-235 atoms to pass through more easily than the heavier U-238 atoms. After 
penetrating each membrane, the gas is richer in U-235 than it was originally, but 
only slightly. Normally, 1,250 passes are needed to enrich the gas to 3 percent U-235, 
which is the enrichment level used in most light-water nuclear power plants. 
However, 4,000 passes are required to enrich the material to the weapons-grade of 
90 percent U-235. Gaseous diffusion is a technically complex process that requires 
massive amounts of electricity. For illustrative purposes, a typical enrichment facility 
in operation use about 5,000 MW of electricity. This amount is as much as the 
electricity consumed by a city of several million people. Therefore, the need for such 
a tremendous amount of electricity makes clandestine acquisition of a gaseous 
diffusion plant difficult.406
b. .. gas centrifuge method
The ultra-centrifuge or gas centrifuge method uses centrifugal force to draw U- 
238 atoms away from the desired U-235 atoms. When uranium hexafluoride is spun 
in a centrifuge, the heavier U-238 atoms gravitate toward the outer walls, whereas 
the lighter U-235 atoms remain in the center. The centrifuge method requires only
explosives. In recent years, the United States and France have developed lower enriched uranium 
fuels that can be used in lieu of highly enriched material in most of these reactors, considerably 
reducing the proliferation risks posed by fuel from these research facilities.
406see, Gary T. Gardner, ibid., pp: 11 - 23.
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35 repetitions to achieve weapons-grade uranium. A plant with 1,000 centrifuges can 
supply the uranium stock for several nuclear weapons per year. The relatively low 
power requirements of the gas centrifuge method of enrichment, coupled with its 
relative efficiency, make it an enrichment process of high proliferation concern.407
c. .. aet'odynamic method
Along with the above mentioned principal methods used for uranium 
enrichment, there are few other methods, too. Some of these methods are outdated, 
such as the Electro-Magnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) method that uses uranium 
tetrachloride, which is an inefficient, but less complex method, that was abandoned 
in the 1950s.408 Another enrichment method is the aerodynamic method. Like the gas 
centrifuge enrichment method, the aerodynamic method uses centrifugal force to 
separate U-238 from the bulk of the uranium stock. Uranium gas is blown over a 
curved surface, which has the effect of separating the heavier U-238 from the lighter 
U-235. Six hundred repetitions of this process are needed for 90 percent enrichment. 
This process as well requires tremendous amounts of energy.
d. .. laser method
Considerable research and development has been conducted on additional 
enrichment techniques, such as the laser isotope separation, but they are not used in 
the commercial production of enriched uranium for weapons manufacturing 
purposes. Laser method is still in the development stages. The method of 
enrichment uses different light waves to excite particular atoms while leaving others 
unaffected. The excited atoms can then be separated from the others. This method is 
so precise that only one pass is necessary to complete the enrichment process, and it
William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, Cambridge, Massachusetts, quoted in Gary T. Gardner, 
ibid., p. 22.
408iraq, however, unexpectedly revived this option in the 1980s as part of its nuclear weapons 
program.
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can be used on wastes remaining from other plants. Laser method appears to be out 
of the reach of most nations of current proliferation concern.409
iv... Fuel Fabrication & Fuel Burn-up
Before enriched uranium (or plutonium) can be used in a nuclear reactor, it 
must be fabricated into fuel rods. The enriched uranium, plutonium, or natural 
uranium used in heavy-water reactors is shaped into cylindrical pellets, which are 
then stacked in tubes called fuel rods. The rods are then bxmdled together into fuel 
ossemblies.^^^ Fuel rods fabricated for use in heavy-water reactors contain natural 
uranium, whereas those destined for use in light water reactors contain low- 
enriched uranium. In the reactor core the rods are irradiated as a controlled fission 
reaction is begun. Approximately 180 fuel assemblies containing about 110 tons of 
uranium are needed to fuel a typical 1,000 MW light-water reactor for three 
years.411- The quantity of fissile uranium is reduced as the fuel is burned up, but 
plutonium is produced in its place.
V ... Nuclear-Power Reactors
A nuclear-power reactor is basically a furnace where the heat produced by a 
controlled chain reaction is used to generate electricity. Typically, the heat used to 
turn water into steam issued to drive a turbine which generates electricity. A typical 
modern power reactor generates about 1,000 million watts (1,000 MW) of electricity, 
enough to supply the domestic and industrial electricity for, for example, a modern 
city of about 1 million people. In a typical nuclear-power reactor, the fuel is in the 
form of a number of cylindrical fuel elements. Heat is removed from the fuel 
elements by a coolant, such as water, which flows over them. The coolant then flows
^^ 99 Gardner, ibid., p. 23.
^^^Light-water reactor fuel assemblies each weigh from 200 to 500 kg. Each pair of assemblies 
are shipped enclosed in steel containers to prevent damage.
^See Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards, Ballinger 
Publishing Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974, cited in Gary T. Gardner, ibid., p. 17.
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through a heat exchanger where it turns water in a secondary circuit into steam to 
drive the turbine. The fuel, moderator and coolant form the core of the reactor, 
which is usually surrounded by a layer of material, such as graphite or natural 
uranium, which reflects back into the the core many neutrons which would 
otherwise escape, contributing to the efficiency of the reactor. 412
vi... Plutonium
Like the production of enriched uranium, the production of plutonium entails 
many steps, and many installations and capabilities besides the reactor and 
reprocessing plant are needed. For illustrative purposes, the following facilities and 
resources would be required for an independent plutonium production capability 
assuming that a research or power reactor, moderated by either heavy-water or 
graphite, and employing natural uranium fuel, were used:
1.. . uraniiim deposits;
2.. . a uranium mine;
3.. . a uranium mill for processing uranium ore containing less than 1 percent 
uranium into uranium oxide concentrate, or yellow cake;
4.. . a uranium purification plant to further improve the yellow cake into 
reactor-grade uranium dioxide;
5.. . a fuel fabrication plant to manufacture the fuel elements placed in the 
reactor, including a capability to fabricate zircaloy or aluminum tubing;
6.. . a research or power reactor moderated by heavy-water or graphite;
7.. . a heavy-water production plant or a reactor grade graphite production 
plant;
8.. . a reprocessing plant.
4l2yanous types of nuclear-power reactors are possible, based on different combinations of fuel, 
moderator material, and coolant. But only three types have significant commercial importance. In 
them, the material used as the moderator is graphite, ordinary (light) water or heavy-water (in 
which hydrogen is replaced by deuterium); and the coolant is gas (such as carbon dioxide), light 
water or heavy water. See, Frank Bamaby, ibid., pp: 8-9.
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« ... repi'ocessmg
A reactor can be designed specifically to maximize plutonium production, that 
is a production reactor, a large research reactor, or a power reactor for producing 
electricity. Uranium fuel, usually in the form of uranium-filled tubes (fuel rods) made 
of zirconium alloy (zircalloy) or aluminum, is placed in the reactor. For most 
production and power reactors and many large research reactors, the fuel itself is 
either natural or low-enriched uranium, which is not usable for weapons at that 
point. As the reactor operates, the uranium fuel is partly transformed into 
plutonium. This is amalgamated in the fuel rods with unused uranium and highly 
radioactive waste products, and it must then be extracted. To do the extraction 
operation, the spent fuel rods are taken to a reprocessing plant where they are 
dissolved in nitric acid and the plutonium is separated from the solution in a series of 
chemical reprocessing steps.
b... extraction
After burn-up, the fuel rods must be replaced with fresh fuel. The rods, that are 
depleted of U-235 but rich in plutonium, are removed from the reactor and cooled 
for several months in pools of fresh water. Spent-fuel rods are removed from 
storage pools and sent to a reprocessing plant for plutonium extraction. The rods are 
cut into pieces and dissolved in acid. Using the Plutonium Uranium Recovery by 
Extraction (PUREX) method, more than 90 percent of the uranimn and plutonium in 
the spent-fuel solution can be recovered. Uranium emerging from this process 
typically contains only 1 percent U-235. However, the plutonium obtained from the 
reprocessing operation can be converted to a form usable for nuclear weapons. 
Reprocessing of the highly radioactive spent fuel is done by remote control from 
behind thick walls.413 separated plutonium and uranium are virtually
the spent fuel rods are highly radioactive, heavy lead casks must be used to transport 
them. In addition, the rooms at the reprocessing plant where the chemical extraction of the 
plutonium occurs must have tick wails, lead shielding, and special ventilation to prevent radiation
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inaccessible during this operation, hence, unsafeguarded material in a reprocessing 
plant could easily be diverted to a nuclear weapon. High plutonium extracted from 
low bum-up fuel (e.g., from a production reactor or heavy-water natural uranium 
research reactor) is directly usable in a nuclear weapon. However, plutonium 
derived from the high bum-up fuel of the standard light-water reactor is not the 
preferred material for nuclear weapons, but could be used as a nuclear explosive by 
those who are not concerned with obtaining the highest possible yield.
D... Debate Ouer Plutonium Production
Like uranium enrichment facilities, however, spent-fuel reprocessing plants can 
also be used for legitimate civilian purposes, because plutonium can be used as fuel 
in nuclear power reactors. Indeed, through the 1970s it was generally assumed that 
as the use of nuclear power grew and world-wide uranium resources were depleted, 
and therefore plutonium extracted from spent fuel would have to be recycled as a 
substitute fuel in conventional power reactors. In addition, research and 
development is under way in a number of nations on a new generation of reactors 
known as breeder reactor, most notably in France, Japan, and Russia. Breeder 
reactors use mixed plutonium-uranium fuel surrounded with a blanket of natural 
uranium. Hence, as the reactor operates, slightly more plutonium is created in the 
core and the blanket together than is consumed in the core, thereby breeding new 
fuel.
Like plutorüum recycling, the economic advantages of breeders depends on
natural uranium's becoming scarce and expensive. However, over the past two
decades new uranium reserves have been discovered. Nuclear power has reached
hazards. Although detailed information about reprocessing was classified by the United States and 
France in the 1950s and is generally available, it is still a complex procedure from an engineering 
point of view. Indeed, many nations such as India, Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan, that have tried to 
develop nuclear weapons via the plutonium route, have sought outside help from the advanced 
nuclear supplier countries. Notwithstanding, North Korea has apparently succeeded in 
constructing a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon without such foreign assistance.
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only a fraction of its expected growth levels. Moreover, reprocessing spent fuel to 
extract plutonium has proven far more expensive and complex than anticipated. 
Furthermore, concern over the proliferation risks of wide-scale use of plutonium as 
a fuel has grown. These factors led the United States in the late 1970s to abandon its 
plans to recycle plutonium in light-water reactors and, in the early 1980s, to abandon 
its breeder reactor development program. Currently the United States is phasing 
out its recycling of plutonium. Great Britain, too, has frozen its development of 
breeder reactors, although it is continuing to reprocess spent fuel on a commercial 
basis for itself and several advanced nations.
The principal proponents of the use of plutonium for civilian purposes are 
France, Japan, and Russia, which are all continuing to develop the breeder reactor 
option and are moving forward with sizeable plutonium recycling programs. 
Belgium and Switzerland, although they do not have breeder reactor programs, are 
using increasing amounts of recycled plutonium in light-^vater reactors. Broadly 
speaking, the proponents of nuclear energy in these countries have maintained 
support for the civil use of plutonium by arguing that, although it may not be 
economical, it represents an advanced technology that will pay off in the future and 
will reduce dependence on foreign sources of energy. A new factor that will affect 
the economics of civil plutonixjm use is that many hundreds of tons of low-enriched 
uranium produced by blending down weapons-grade uranium from dismantled 
Russian nuclear warheads will soon be added to the international power-reactor fuel 
market. This will keep prices of this material low and should reduce the 
attractiveness of high-cost plutonium fuel cycles. Whatever the thrust of their 
domestic nuclear programs, the advanced nuclear supplier countries are strongly 
discouraging plutonium's use by nations of proliferation concern. The long-standing 
view that plutonium is a legitimate and anticipated part of civilian nuclear programs, 
however, has allowed India and North Korea to justify their reprocessing programs.
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even though such efforts provided these nations with a nuclear weapons 
manufacturing capability.414
E— Requisition of Fissile Material & Technoloqu from Abroad
Nations wishing to obtain highly enriched uranium and/or plutonium, without 
international restrictions prohibiting their use for nuclear explosives, would have to 
develop uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies independently, or 
obtain them illegally. Virtually all nuclear exporter states are unwilling to sell nuclear 
equipment and materials unless recipients pledge not to use them for nuclear 
explosives and agree to place them under the inspection system of the IAEA. 
Although, historically, every state that has developed nuclear weapons has also built 
an indigenous capability to produce fissile material for this purpose, the weakening 
of controls over such material in the former Soviet Union has increased the 
possibility of its becoming available on an international black market. In Russia, 
during 1994, the smuggling of plutonium and weapons-usable enriched uranium, 
apparently of Russian origin, was observed for the first time.415 xhe widespread 
availability of clandestine supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials could greatly 
accelerate the pace at which emerging nuclear powers could develop nuclear arms 
and simultaneously undermine the inspection and auditing system of the IAEA.
F... Testing
It is generally assumed that by rigorously testing the non-nuclear elements of a 
nuclear device and performing computer simulations, a state could build a reliable 
first-generation fission weapon without having to conduct a full-scale nuclear test. 
The greatest confidence could be achieved with a uranium-based, gim-type weapon. 
The United States, for example, was so confident that the gun-type Hiroshima bomb
414for further discussions in these respects see, Leonard S. Spector et al., ibid., p. 173.
415^ detailed and up-to-date discussion exists in Leonard S. Spector et al., ibid., pp: 59 - 82.
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would work as designed that it did not need to conduct a test of the device before it 
was used against Japan. The Trinity test, on the other hand, was of the more 
complex implosion-type bomb, that was later used against Nagasaki. South Africa 
employed a gun-type design and is not known to have conducted a nuclear test.416
Although a full-scale nuclear detonation may not be essential to develop a 
reliable nuclear weapon, of the three current de facto nuclear powers, India 
conducted such a test, while Israel and Pakistan received assistance from more 
advanced countries, which may be deemed the equivalent of such experimental 
proof of design. Since Israel thought to have boosted fission weapons but is not 
known to have conducted a nuclear test, building reliable versions of such weapons 
without testing appears possible. However, to build multi-stage hydrogen bombs, 
which are far more complex, nuclear testing would be required.
G... Non-Nuclear Components, flssemblu & Deliuerq
Finally, the manufacture of nuclear weapons requires the design and the 
fabrication of: specially designed high-explosive components to compress the fissile 
material core of the device; high-speed electronic firing circuits, or triggering packages 
to set off the high-explosives uniformly at precisely the correct instant; and an 
initiator (an intense source of neutrons to initiate the nuclear chain reaction in the 
core). Developing all these components necessitates considerable technical skill and, 
though less demanding than producing fissile material, can nonetheless be quite 
challenging.417 Assembly of the completed components of nuclear weapons and 
delivery by aircraft are relatively less demanding. To produce nuclear warheads for
hag speculation that an ambiguous signal detected on September 22. 1979, by a 
U.S. satellite overflying the South Atlantic may have been the flash from a nuclear test, and if the 
event was indeed a test that it was conducted by Israel or South Africa. Uncertainties about the 
event have never been resolved.
417[raq's effort to develop these elements of nuclear weapons is known to have suffered 
considerable setbacks and had not succeeded prior to the 1991 Gulf War, despite several years of 
effort.
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ballistic missiles, however, additional steps are necessary, such as the development 
of re-entry vehicles, the miniaturization and/or reconfiguration of nuclear weapons 
to fit into missile nose cones, and certifying the weapons to withstand the rigors of 
blast-off, extremely high altitudes, and re-entry.
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